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Abstract 
 
The oil-rich northern districts of Iraq were long considered a reflection of the country 
with a diversity of ethnic and religious groups; Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Assyrians, 
and Yezidi, living together and portraying Iraq’s demographic makeup. However, the 
Ba’ath party’s brutal policy of Arabisation in the twentieth century created a false 
demographic and instigated the escalation of identity politics. Consequently, the 
region is currently highly contested with the disputed territories consisting of 15 
districts stretching across four northern governorates and curving from the Syrian to 
Iranian borders.  The official contest over the regions administration has resulted in a 
tug-of-war between Baghdad and Erbil that has frequently stalled the Iraqi political 
system. Subsequently, across the region, minority groups have been pulled into a 
clash over demographic composition as each disputed districts faces ethnically 
defined claims.  
 
The ethnic basis to territorial claims has amplified the discourse over linguistic 
presence, cultural representation and minority rights; and the insecure environment, 
in which sectarian based attacks are frequent, has elevated debates over territorial 
representation to the height of ethnic survival issues. The existing literature and 
research on the region focuses heavily on the governance outcomes and little has 
been written about the impact of heightened identity politics on the everyday lives of 
citizens.  It is in this respect that the thesis examines the evolution of the education 
system post 2003. Drawing on over 50 interviews with regional education officials 
and community representatives, the thesis presents the impact of amplified ethno-
politics on the reconstruction of education in Iraq. The research provides the first 
academic exploration into education in the region, exploring the significance of 
cultural reproduction and the link between demands for ethnically specific education, 
societal security and the wider political contestation over the territory. 
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Dominant language is used to refer to language which is spoken within the 
administrative structures and government offices of a district.  
 
Mother-Tongue refers to a child’s first language, the language learned in the home 
from older family members. (UNESCO, 2003, p. 15) In some places, the term has 
taken on more of a culturally symbolic definition, so that an individual might say, ‘I 
Terminology 
 
Education and Language 
 
Mother-tongue instruction or mother-tongue medium instruction refers to the 
use of the learner’s mother tongue as a medium of instruction (UNESCO, 2003, p. 
14). 
 
Bilingual education refers primarily to the use of two languages in a formal 
education system (UNESCO, 2003, p. 17). Bilingual education need not include a 
local language; however the most common type of bilingual education (also called 
mother-tongue-based bilingual education) attempts to 
use the students’ mother tongue somehow in the curriculum. The more extensive the 
use of the mother tongue for instruction, the ‘stronger’ the bilingual education 
programme is considered to be. 
 
Transitional bilingual education or multilingual education refers to the objective 
of a given education programme (Stroud, 2002, p. 26). If the programme involves a 
planned transition from one language of instruction to another, at any grade, it is 
called transitional. 
 
Immersion education refers to a model in which the student is entirely ‘immersed’ 
in a language that is not the mother tongue for most or all curriculum content 
(Thomas and Collier, 1997, p. 58). Where the student is from a majority language 
community, immersion education can be quite effective, but when the student is a 
minority language speaker, immersion can significantly impede academic 
achievement. 
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don’t actually speak my mother tongue’. A related term, home language, refers to the 
language or languages spoken in the student’s home. 
 
Traditional Language refers to a language which is/was traditionally spoken by 
members of an ethnic groups, but may have been lost or become less used over 
time.  
 
Minority language refers to the language spoken by a numerically smaller 
population and/or to the language spoken by a politically marginalized population 
whatever its size (UNESCO, 2003, p. 13). In the second case, the term minoritized 
language is sometimes used (Lewis and Trudell, 2008,p. 266). 
 
Education and Management  
 
Education Structure, in the context of the thesis, refers to the structuring of the 
education system in terms of diversity management; whether schools are 
integrationist, separatist, or assimilationist. 
 
Education Management, in the context of the thesis, refers to the structures and 
influences who fund and make school management decisions. 
 
Capacity Gap, refers to any gap in management which leads to a deficiency in 
education delivery.  
 
Regional terminology 
 
Ethnic group / Community / Societal group, all refer to a distinct group of people 
bound by identity markers and differentiating themselves from the wider national 
group. 
 
The Disputed territories refer to the land disputed between the Kurdish Regional 
Government and the Central Government in Baghdad. When thesis uses this term it 
refers primarily to the two most ethnically diverse governorates; Kirkuk and Ninewa. 
(But reference is sometimes made to the third governorate of Diyala.) 
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Frequently used Acronyms 
 
KRG;   Kurdish Regional Government 
GoI;   Government of Iraq 
MoE;   Ministry of Education 
UNAMI;  United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq 
UNICEF;  United Nations Children’s Fund (formerly United Nations International 
Children's Emergency Fund) 
UNESCO;  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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THE RIGHT WORD   
by Imtiaz Dharker 
Outside the door, 
lurking in the shadows, 
is a terrorist. 
   
Is that the wrong description? 
Outside that door, 
taking shelter in the shadows, 
is a freedom fighter. 
 
I haven't got this right . 
Outside, waiting in the shadows, 
is a hostile militant. 
 
Are words no more 
than waving, wavering flags? 
Outside your door, 
watchful in the shadows, 
is a guerrilla warrior. 
 
God help me. 
Outside, defying every shadow, 
stands a martyr. 
I saw his face. 
 
No words can help me now. 
Just outside the door, 
lost in shadows, 
is a child who looks like mine. 
 
One word for you. 
Outside my door, 
his hand too steady, 
his eyes too hard 
is a boy who looks like your son, too. 
 
I open the door. 
Come in, I say. 
Come in and eat with us. 
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The child steps in 
and carefully, at my door, 
takes off his shoes 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
The oil-rich northern districts of Iraq were long considered a reflection of the country 
with a diversity of ethnic and religious groups: Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Assyrians, 
Yezidi, Shabak and Chaldeans, living together and portraying Iraq’s demographic 
makeup. However, the Ba’ath party’s brutal policy of Arabisation in the twentieth 
century created a false demographic and instigated the escalation of identity politics. 
Consequently, the region is currently highly contested with the disputed territories, or 
disputed internal boundaries (DIB’s), consisting of 15 districts stretching across four 
northern governorates and curving from the Syrian to Iranian borders.  The city of 
Kirkuk lies at the centre of the dispute due to its symbolic importance to both Kurds 
and Turkmen, and strategic significance to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG).  The official contest over the city’s administration has resulted in 
a tug-of-war between Baghdad and Erbil that has frequently stalled the Iraqi political 
system.  
 
Subsequently, across the region, minority groups have been pulled into a clash over 
demographic composition as each disputed district faces ethnically defined claims 
and an administrative solution for the disputed territories remains evasive. As the 
political impasse continues, ministries from both the KRG and Baghdad maintain 
varying degrees of administrative influence across the territories. These overlapping 
jurisdictions have created a complex system of service-delivery based on ethnic 
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identity.  While the two linguistically distinct centres of governance vie for control, 
inter-ethnic communal tensions are rising and questions of identity increasingly 
overshadow day to day life. The existing literature and research on the region 
focuses heavily on the governance outcomes and possible administrative solutions. 
Little has been written about the impact of heightened identity politics on the 
everyday lives of citizens. Regardless of the final administrative outcome, the multi-
ethnic population of the region requires services and systems of co-existence. It is 
within this context that the thesis examines the development of education systems 
across the region post 2003.  
 
In the fragile ethno-political environment of the DIB’s, the way in which the education 
system manages ethnic diversity is crucial. Access to linguistically appropriate 
education, equality of resource allocation and communal integration or segregation; 
all hold the potential to influence the wider identity-based conflict. The seminal paper 
by Bush and Santeralli (2000) The two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict brought 
together a considerable body of literature illustrating the negative outcomes of 
mismanaged education systems in conflict and post conflict environments. The 
UNICEF study argues that education in many conflict areas can have extremely 
negative implications for inter-communal relations. Education can become a weapon 
against ethnic groups in the hands of the power holders, serving to suppress cultural 
expression through practice of traditions, art forms, religious customs and cultural 
values (Bush and Sallteralli 2000).  
 
Yet, there is a complete absence of scholarly analysis in terms of, not only the 
emergent formal education system post 2003 in the Iraqi disputed territories, but also 
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the purpose bestowed on education by education officials and its possible role within 
the wider identity-based contest.  Therefore it is the purpose of this thesis to provide 
the first mapping exercise of education in the disputed territories and explore its 
relationship with identity and ethno-politics. The thesis will seek to examine the 
purpose of education, exploring the significance of cultural reproduction and 
investigate the links between demands for ethnically-specific education and the 
wider political, and often violent, contestation over the territory. It is the intention of 
this thesis to determine what factors have influenced the development of education 
structures in the disputed territories post 2003 in order to approach the central 
research question of ‘How has ethnic identity influenced the education narrative in 
the disputed territories’.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
In respect to the research question, two fields of influence have become increasingly 
significant: firstly, the ethnic basis of territorial claims which has heightened the role 
of ethno-politics within the region and amplified the discourse over linguistic 
presence, cultural representation and minority rights; secondly, the contested and 
insecure environment in which sectarian-based attacks have served to elevate 
debates over territorial representation to the height of becoming ethnic survival 
issues. Within this highly sectarian environment the thesis will seek to examine the 
purpose of education in the region, exploring the significance of cultural 
reproduction, the role of identity in everyday life, and investigating the links between 
demands for ethnically specific education and the wider territorial conflict.  
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Such an examination of education requires a theoretical focus which will allow the 
investigation of various influences on the education system. The overall political and 
security environment necessitate consideration and, as such, the role of identity 
protection will be central to the investigation of education practice and management 
in the region. In this respect the application of a societal1 security lens to the analysis 
has been deemed a highly beneficial tool. The organising concept in the societal 
security sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities define a 
development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community. Such threats 
can come from outside the traditional security spectrum of violence and may include 
threats to the continued practices and traditions of a group.  Therefore the focus on 
societal security allows for the education system to be viewed through the lens of 
ethnic identity protection, viewing education policy, access and practice in terms of 
cultural preservation, minority rights and ethnic survival.  
 
In order to address the research question from the perspective of societal security it 
is necessary to explore the theory’s application in relation to education provision in 
weak states. Therefore it will be essential to merge the academic exploration of 
societal security and securitisation with the relevant theoretical literature on 
education in weak states. By drawing on the two discourses, a hybrid framework will 
develop which will allow the demand for ethnically specific education access in 
fragile environments to be examined within the societal security sector. It is not 
suggested that the development of the framework in this way will be conceptually 
neat. Yet it is hoped that it will enable the thesis to identify how ethnic identity 
                                                 
1 The term societal security can lead to two misunderstandings about its definition; firstly a confusion with the term social security, with its 
individual and economic focus. In contradiction to this, societal security is about the collective and their identity, and refers to what Buzan et al call 
the ‘we identity’. The second problem with the use of societal is that the related term society is often used to designate the wider state population 
as a whole. Buzan et al state that this group often does not carry a group identity. Instead they use the term societal to indicate ‘a community with 
which one identifies’.    
 
19 
 
protection has influenced education, to what extent the issue has become part of the 
wider security framework in the region, and finally identify any potential negative 
practices which may have resulted. 
 
Therefore, this section will seek to set forth the theoretical framework within which 
the exploration will take place. Firstly it will present the relevant concepts 
surrounding ethnic identity and minority rights before linking into the influential work 
of the Copenhagen School2 on societal security. The second section will examine 
the separate body of literature pertaining to the influence of education on identity, 
minority rights and cultural reproduction within fragile environments. Then the 
concluding section will examine the dialogue surrounding securitisation, specifically 
within the societal sector. This section will introduce the idea that ethnically specific 
education holds more than a symbolic significance to societal security, that access to 
ethnically specific education can play a vital role in ethnic survival and as such 
emergency action may be taken to protect education access. 
 
1:2:1 Ethnic Identity 
A general definition of an ethnic group is a community of people who engage in 
shared social practices that reinforce their sense of identity (Bush and Sallteralli, 
2000; 12). Identity indicators which mark this can vary from traditional practices and 
cultural communities to language or religion and commonly portray a shared belief in 
collective descent, birth or kinship. This collective descent can be based on assumed 
national origins, or on shared phenotypic characteristics such as skin colour, but 
most importantly it emphasises the ‘we’ identity of the group (Roe, 2004). It is 
                                                 
2
 The Copenhagen School, named after the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, proposed that social groups be considered as equally 
important and distinctive consumers of security. 
20 
 
important to note that such defining features of ethnic identity, which enforce a sense 
of belonging, preserve the collective identity, can vary significantly and are 
contextually specific. Paul Brass defines ethnicity as the “subjective, symbolic, or 
emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture in order to create 
internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups” (1991:19). This 
understanding of ethnicity recognizes that the internal and external functions of 
group identity are cohesion and differentiation.  
 
Commentators examining ethnicity have differed in their view of whether ethnicity is 
innate or malleable and as such whether an ethnic identity evolves gradually, or is 
imposed or some combination of the two. At a theoretical and conceptual level, 
therefore, ethnic boundaries can be considered socially constructed or timeless and 
primordial (Lindholm, 1993;10). Both ontological positions provide settings for 
questions of collective identity and both acknowledge the strength of collective 
identity and ethnicity. They vary, however, on the nature of ethnicity’s ascription. 
Paul Roe suggests that ‘the problem lies in whether identity - and thus society itself- 
can be seen as either an object or a process; that is, whether identity is something 
solid and constant or whether it is something fluid and changing’(Roe, 2004;193).  
Yet the assertion that ethnic identity is socially constructed is currently commonplace 
among social scientists. The constructivist stance assumes that ethnic identity is 
dynamic rather than unchanging. This view suggests that identity is constructed by 
social, political and historical forces, and that individual identities change over time 
as social contexts change. Furthermore, people exhibit different identities in different 
contexts (Gee, 2000). Identities disappear and return, sometimes re-invented 
(Peterson, 2003). In the face of forced assimilation, ethnic groups can choose to take 
21 
 
on the dominate group identity or intensify group solidarity and identity as an act of 
resistance (Rex, 1995; Waever et al 1997).  This can be demonstrated by the shifting 
definitions of Yezidi ethnic or religious identity in Iraq.3 
 
Regardless of its conceptual origins and construction, ethnic affiliation establishes a 
particular community as distinctive and bounded in some way or other. Walker 
Connor (1999) notes that, as such, distinct ethnic communities exist within all 
regions of the world creating minority or majority status to each of the communities’ 
concerned. He states that they are found in ‘Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri 
Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America 
(Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The list 
includes countries that are old (United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large 
(Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor (Pakistan), 
authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as 
well as militantly anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are 
Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India), and Judaic 
(Israel)’’(1999;164).  
 
Although geographically dispersed and politically distinct, the groups presented in 
Connor’s quote share the fact that they have minority and majority ethnic groups 
within them. Consequently the minority groups share a common goal; they each 
strive to resist the effects of their dominant culture’s homogenising tendencies. This 
opposition to assimilation is based on the premise that ‘‘there is only one correct, 
true or normal way to understand and structure the areas of life’’ (Parekh, 2002;1). 
                                                 
3
 Yezidi key identity markers have shifted from religion to language in order to survive under suppressive 
governments. This has resulted in a division amongst their members between identifying themselves as being 
ethnically Yezidi to being ethnically Kurdish with a Yezidi religion.  
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Each of these national minorities shares the opinion that they are different from their 
respective wider societies. As such they are battling with the state over issues of 
political representation, language rights, control over resources and internal 
migration and thus seeking legitimate recognition of their differences, especially 
those differences viewed as key identity makers.  
 
The emergence of ethnicity and minority rights on the political theory mainstream 
agenda has resulted in a focus on the demands made by minority groups. How the 
rights of minority ethnic groups are handled in social and political arenas can be 
seen to reflect the wider acceptance of diversity in a state. The demands of minority 
ethnic groups have been categorized into three comprehensive types (Kymlicka 
1995). The first type concerns rights which pertain to governmental representation, 
such as special representation rights, devolution and national self-determination. 
These rights can be seen to be at play in the governmental structures of both 
Lebanon and Iraq as examples. Lebanon’s concessional democracy allocates seats 
based on ethnic identity within its government structures and the regional status of 
Iraqi Kurdistan demonstrates the call for more power over areas deemed ethnically 
homogenous.   
 
The second category concerns the rights which seek to incorporate a variety of 
distinct cultural practices within larger states, including both exemption and 
affirmation rights that aim to give special assistance to minority groups. The 
European debate over religious symbolism in the public sphere can illustrate these 
demands clearly. The UK has introduced a number of exemption and affirmation 
rights for minority communities living in the country (Sikhs who wear the turban are 
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exempt from using a motorcycle helmet and Muslim school girls are allowed to wear 
the head scarf in school) yet secular France has taken no such steps to incorporate 
inclusive rights. The final category pertains to requirements which relate to the issue 
of collective esteem through representation. These requirements become “a matter 
for public policy when the symbolism of flags, currencies, names, public holidays, 
national anthems, public funds for cultural activities bear on a minority’s fragile 
presence in the public culture” (Seglow 2002:158). Within this type of demand is the 
right to representative education for minority groups; the content of school curricula, 
the language of instruction and the right to religious education. Each become a 
means to protect the ethnic ‘we’ identity and prevent assimilations into the wider 
majority group.  
 
Therefore, each of these demands is attempting to secure the continued existence of 
the ethnic group and as such protect what the Copenhagen School4 refer to as their 
‘societal security’. The relationship between ethnic identity and the security of ethnic 
groups is clarified in Waever and Buzan’s work on the concept of societal security 
(Buzan, 1991, 1993; Buzan & Waver, 1997; Kelstrup, 1995; Wever, 1993, 1994, 
1995, Waver et al., 1993a). The concept of societal security was initially developed 
by Barry Buzan in People States and Fear (1991) where it was one of the sectors in 
his five dimensional approach to national security, alongside military, political, 
economic, and environmental concerns. Society was just one sector of the state 
which could be threatened. This work represented a widening of international 
security spectrum (Buzan et al, 1983), but the overall view remained state centric 
until it was redeveloped by Ole, Waever et al. in Identity, Migration, and the New 
                                                 
4
 The works of Buzan, Wæver and others on societal security and the concept of securitization have become 
known collectively as the Copenhagen School
4
. 
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Security Agenda in Europe (1993). Waever reconceptualised societal security by 
retaining it as a sector of state security but also examining it as a referent object of 
security in its own right. Waever emphasised the key notion of ethnic survival. Yet, 
Waever et al have faced criticism for the seemingly primordial and innate nature they 
have ascribed identity (McSweeney, 1999).  
 
In their defence, Waever et al go on to suggest a more constructivist stance; If one 
studies only the process by which identities are formed, then identity never becomes 
a ‘thing’ at all; there is never a product as such…. Why can one not think of identities 
as being definitely being constructed by people and groups through numerous 
processes and practices, and when an identity is constructed…  it becomes a 
possible and referent object for security (Buzan & Waever 1997: 2).Thus the 
Copenhagen School define an ethnic group or society as a social unit that is a large, 
self-sustaining identity group. Because identity is so crucial to the concept of society, 
it is not surprising that the Copenhagen School treat societal security as 
synonymous with ethnic identity security (Buzan, 1998). Societal security is thus 
defined as; the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or acute threats. More specifically, it is about the 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of 
language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom 
(Waever 1993:23) 
 
The extent to which a threat can emerge depends upon an ethnic groups’ degree of 
vulnerability. When an ethnic group is a minority within the population (as with 
Connor’s previous examples) it may fear that the majority ethnic group seeks to 
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assimilate them into the dominant identity, as was the intention of the Arabisation  
and state-building projects in Iraq under the Ba’ath. Therefore, it is important to note 
that threats to societal security ‘span from the inhibition of its expression to the 
prevention of its continuation’ (Waever, 1993) and are not just found in the physical 
acts of war. Thus, threats to societal identity can be found outside of the realm of 
physical security and ethnic cleansing. By suppressing an identity and thereby 
preventing it from replicating or reproducing itself, the identity cannot be transmitted 
effectively from one generation to the next and a group’s societal security is 
threatened (Buzan 1993: 43). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde Buzan, 1998) divide 
threats in the societal sector into four main categories: migration, horizontal 
competition, vertical competition and depopulation. In cases of migration, the host 
society is changed by the influx of those from outside. Horizontal competition refers 
to groups having to change their ways because of the overriding linguistic/cultural 
influence from another group. Vertical competition refers to those instances where, 
either due to integration or disintegration, groups are pushed towards either wider or 
narrower identities. The final category concerns the depopulation of an ethnic group 
through conflict or economic migration.  
 
Although analytically distinct, in practice each of these threats can be placed on a 
spectrum running from intentional, programmatic and political at one end to 
unintended and structural at the other (Collins, 2005). In the case of Migration for 
example, people may make individual decisions to move for reasons varying from 
economic opportunity to environmental pressure or religious freedom. But they may 
also move as part of a political programme to homogenize the population of the 
state. Within the Iraqi disputed territories all these motivations have resulted in 
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shifting demographics over the last century; Employment in the oil fields, perceived 
greater religious freedoms for Christians in the North and the state sponsored 
Arabisation policy of moving Arab families to Kurdish populated areas. Horizontal 
competition equally may simply reflect the unintended effects of interplay between 
large, dynamic cultures on the one hand and small, traditional ones on the other. But 
it can also be intentional, from the remarking of territories, as with the Ba’ath party’s 
repression of non-Arab groups. For the purpose of this exploration, the focus will be 
firmly on the intentional end of the spectrum.  Buzan states that such deliberate 
threats to societal security may span from ‘…forbidding the use of language, names 
and dress, through closure of places of worship and education’ to ‘the deportation or 
killing of members of the community’ (1993; 23).  
 
The acts of aggression found within Buzan’s description can be clearly divided into 
the categories of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘cultural cleansing’. Cultural cleansing is 
committed not against populations, but manifestations of group culture: for example 
religious and educational establishments.  Cultural cleansing strikes against the very 
core of societal identity. Robert Gurr (1993;6) also distinguishes between the two 
forms of oppression; ‘In extreme circumstances, systematic discrimination threatens 
communal groups’ most fundamental right, the right to survival. Many groups also 
face cultural discrimination and the risk of de-culturation or so-called cultural 
genocide in the form of pressures or incentives to adopt a dominant culture, or denial 
of cultural self-expression’.  
 
The extreme form of this threat can be referred to as `Ethnocide’. This can be 
defined as “the process whereby a culturally distinct people loses its identity as a 
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result of policies designed to erode its land and resource base, the use of its 
language, its own social and political institutions, as well as its traditions, art forms, 
religious practices and cultural values” (Stavenhagen, 1990).  For societies which 
perceive a threat to their societal identity, whether the threat be real or imagined, a 
clear defensive strategy is to strengthen societal identity. ‘This can be done by using 
cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that 
society reproduces itself correctly.’ (Waever et al 1993b 191). Waever argues that 
culture can be defended 'with culture', and that: 'If one's identity seems threatened... 
the answer is a strengthening of existing identities' (Weaver 1995:68). The 
strengthening of identity can be achieved through the pursuit of what has become 
known as ‘cultural nationalism’. John Hutchinson (1994) describes the purpose of 
cultural nationalism as ‘the moral regeneration of historic community, or in other 
words, the re-creation of their distinctive national civilization. Furthermore, he 
emphasises the establishment of ‘cultural societies and journals’ which educate 
communities of their common heritage ‘of splendour and suffering.’ Cultural 
nationalism endeavours to stress similarities such as language, religion and history 
(Alter 1994). 
 
The appeal for recognition that drives cultural nationalism contends that in multi-
ethnic states, ‘‘each constituent nation (ethnic community) has an equally valid claim 
to the language rights and self-government powers necessary to maintain itself as a 
distinct societal culture’’ (Kymlicka 2004;147). In trying to evade assimilation, 
national minorities look to rights and legislation which allow them to maintain their 
own culture through the creation of their own economic, political and education 
institutions. Therefore, formal education can play a vital role in the pursuit of cultural 
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nationalism. Education systems provide an obvious vehicle through which to transmit 
cultural practices, historical accounts, religion and language to the next generation of 
a community.  
 
1:2:2 Education and Societal Security 
 
The current dilemma of education in many countries, especially newly established 
ones intent on forging a national identity, is how to create unity and national identity 
while celebrating the ethnic diversity of the population. The position of education in 
most societies allows it to take on an important role in the socialisation of ethnic 
identity. In this sense education offers an ideal means of non-military defence when 
faced with threats to societal security or equally a perfect mechanism for state 
assimilation projects. Schools can yield significant influence over ethnicity through 
curriculum content, providing the opportunity to reproduce dominate language and 
culture and ensuring their transmission to future generations. Curriculum can teach 
history, religion and even geographical interpretations of homelands through the 
channels of history and geography. As such, the curriculum and content are often 
used to deny shared history and oppress minority language rights (T Skutnabb-
Kangas, 2002). 
 
Early analysts of nationalism have noted the important purpose endowed on 
education by 19th century state building projects, noting the significant role of 
schools for state communications with the population, serving to disperse an image 
of the nation, and promote loyalty (Hobsbawn, 1996). The transmission of nationalist 
propaganda through, what Gallagher (2004;23) refers to as, ‘common rituals and 
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practices toward iconic images of state and nation’ has seen education commonly 
used to assimilate populations. Equally, Coulby’s (1997) work on education and 
diversity emphasises various ways in which education has influenced the 
achievement of cultural homogenization, for example the use of a national language 
as a means of instruction and catalogues of ‘national literature’ within the curriculum. 
Churchill (1996) suggests that education helps to not only construct, but also impose 
a common culture which is founded on a common language and a shared sense of 
history. In this respect, public education has provided states with the opportunity to 
ignore social division and emphasise the unity of society, resulting in educational 
institutions which operate in accordance with the values of dominant tradition and 
consequently neglect minority interests (Smith and Vaux, 2003).  
 
Yet as the previous section suggested, education can also serve as a vehicle to 
promote collective esteem through the representation of ethnic groups within the 
state education system. Education can serve as the perfect medium through which 
culture and identity can be strengthened in the face of assimilation. Each aspect of 
the curriculum provides an opportunity for education to be used as a non-military 
means of societal defence and strengthen culture with culture. The medium of 
instruction and curriculum content can just as easily be used to transmit minority 
cultural practices as it can to assimilate into the dominant cultural environment. 
Ethnically specific poets and artists can be honoured and historical achievements 
commemorated, all of which can be a vehicle in expressing a pride in identity and 
belonging to the group. Thus, education management can serve to defend against 
migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition based threats to societal 
security. The structural organisation of institutions can have a direct influence on the 
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pursuit or oppression of societal security and whether education is used for 
integration or cultural or ethnic nationalism. Hence, the management of education 
institutions can reflect the way in which diversity is managed in wider society and 
demonstrate how minority groups are treated by the state. For example in the United 
States the school system was created to provide a “melting-pot” which would ‘fuse a 
multitude of migrant communities into American citizens’(Bush and Sallteralli 2000). 
In contrast schooling in Canada used the metaphor of a multicultural “mosaic” in 
which differences were recognized and highlighted, rather than overlooked and 
blended. 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DfID) has documented the 
Characteristics of education institutions, suggesting that the issue of ‘trust’ between 
ethnic groups in conflict may also be related to the way in which diversity is managed 
within the education system. DfID (Smith and Vaux 2003) characterise education 
systems and their institutions as either: assimilationist, separatist or integrationist.  
Integrationist systems are defined by ‘common or shared institutions with diversity 
represented within the population of each institution’ (2003;49).  In its ideal form this 
model of school should pose no threat to societal security and cultural identity, 
allowing all communities to be represented equally, although it is worth noting that in 
a fragile multi-ethnic society the strategic implications for achieving this form of 
schooling are extremely difficult. Choices of dominate language and equal 
representation can create ideological battlegrounds.  
 
Conversely, assimilationist systems which provide ‘single institutions operating 
according to the values of the dominant tradition, where minority needs and interests 
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are often neglected’ (Smith and Vaux 2003;46) These systems present a direct 
threat to the societal security of minority groups. They deliberately seek to repress 
cultural identity through the denial of representation. The important ethnic indicator of 
language is often the first victim under assimilationist school systems, as minority 
languages are forsaken in favour of a dominant regional language. The 
repercussions of this for societal security can be vastly influential as it is “through its 
language, a given group expresses its own culture, its own societal identity; 
languages are related to thought processes and to the way the members of a certain 
linguistic group perceive nature, the universe and society” (Stavenhagen, 1996;68). 
The dynamic is evident in the conflict between the Turkish State and the Kurdish 
minority in eastern Turkey. Kurds were prevented from using their language in 
schools and were subjected to corporal punishment for doing so. Teachers 
themselves were dismissed for permitting Kurdish to be spoken in their classrooms 
(Hassanpour and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1996).  
 
Another extreme form is illustrated by education policy in Kosovo during the Albanian 
and Serb conflict. To counter Albanian efforts to assert their minority national 
identity, the Serbian government adopted a policy of aggressive assimilation. 
Education policies prohibited teaching in the Albanian language and introduced a 
unified curriculum. Education institutions using the Albanian language were no 
longer assigned government funding and the major Albanian publishing houses were 
closed down. Bush and Saltarelli (2000;8) state that there can be no doubt that 
assimilatory education in Kosovo was a major contributor to the rise in violence that 
reached its appalling pinnacle in 1999, they note that;  “in its report to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child in 1994, the Yugoslav government admitted that it was 
32 
 
encountering major problems in the education of Albanian children in the provinces 
of Kosovo and Metohijo. Parents refused to send their children to schools working 
according to the “legitimate programme of the Republic of Serbia” and suggesting 
that the curriculum and the approach of teachers in the official schools were highly 
politicized. Instead, Albanian children attended non-accredited parallel schools, 
treated by the Government as illegal”.  
 
Therefore communities which wish to avoid assimilation often turn to other structural 
systems of education in order to protect their societal identity. Thus, as 
demonstrated by the Albanian case, one such means of protecting societal identity 
against deliberate attempts of cultural repression would be through seeking 
separatist institutions. Separatist systems are characterised by ‘separate institutions 
each serving different constituencies with relatively homogeneous populations’ 
(Smith and Vaux, 2003;15). Separatist education structures can present themselves 
in a myriad of guises which can further complicate the debate over their 
implementation (Davies, 2008). Discussions over separatist institutions depend on 
the historical, geographical and political contexts within which they operate. The 
divided societies which necessitate separatist structures exist in a number of 
conditions: the peaceful educational pluralism of Canada and Belgium, the complicit 
character of separatist schooling in Bosnia, and the imposed nature of apartheid in 
South Africa (Davies, 2008)5.   
 
                                                 
5
 The minority rights group (MRG) argue that the right to separate schools for minorities is compatible with international 
standards on human rights, but that an important distinction would have to be drawn between those situations where separate 
schools are imposed which they classify as segregation.   
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The thesis would suggest that in order to examine this categorisation with reference 
to societal security, separatist education would benefit from further division into 
Sought Segregation and Forced Segregation. Forced segregation would include the 
uneven distribution of education to suppress an ethnic minority and therefore its 
societal identity from the mainstream society, for example the apartheid system 
which the education structure in South Africa sustained and perpetuated. The 
second division of Sought Segregation would be more relevant to our discussion of a 
societal security. Examples of Sought Segregation can be found where ethnic 
groups, whether based on religion or language, seek to reinforce their societal 
identity for reasons of cultural nationalism.  These systems can be illustrated by the 
examples of education in Northern Ireland which was totally segregated along 
religious lines until the 1980s and the mono-nationalist schools of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina which still persist (see studies by Gallagher, Tawil, & Sobhi). 
 
The outcome of separatist education in fragile and diverse environments shows that 
inter-ethnic group interaction is often adversely affected and thus education can 
become party to wider ethnic conflicts. Gallagher (2004) suggests three hypotheses 
to explain the negative impact of separatist school structures in Northern Ireland, 
each of which can equally be extrapolated to illustrate the problems faced by other 
contested societies.  Firstly, the cultural hypothesis suggests that separatist schools 
enhance community divisions by introducing potentially opposing cultural 
environments. Education content can be used to emphasise the inferiority of the 
‘other’ and glorifying ancient ethnic battle victories.  Different curricula, containing the 
potentially political subjects of history, geography and language, serve to emphasise 
the differences between communities and fail to acknowledge mutual dependency. 
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This can be illustrated by an examination of the textbooks used in the segregated 
schools of Sri Lanka in the 1970s and 1980s. Sinhalese textbooks were strewn with 
descriptions of the Tamils as the historical enemies of the Sinhalese and actively 
celebrated those who had vanquished Tamils in ancient wars (Nissan, 1996). Nissan 
affirms that historical fact was ignored and Tamils, Muslims and Christians were 
portrayed as non-indigenous and irrelevant to Sri Lankan history, a manipulation of 
the curriculum that contributed to the conflict. In this sense the role of education can 
take on a more ethnically nationalistic character. The same channels which are used 
by cultural nationalism to celebrate identity can be manipulated to politicise it. 
 
Secondly, the social hypothesis suggests that regardless of what is taught, separatist 
schools serve to emphasise and validate group differences and hostilities, 
encouraging mutual ignorance and suspicion. Davies (2008) concurs that if pupils 
rarely meet those from other groups, then stereotypes are easily reinforced, and 
once this is combined with grievance there is little possibility to counter it. The 
character of separatist schooling has been accused of preventing not only the 
integration of pupils but also of parents, who are denied the opportunity of interethnic 
mixing at the school gates. Davies (2008: 69) draws attention to Rabbi Jonathan 
Romain’s rejection of separatist schooling in the UK on this basis. He suggests that 
separatist schooling is a ‘recipe for social disaster’ and states that ‘schools must 
build bridges, not erect barriers’ (Davies, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, Gallagher puts the accent on wider inequality between groups and blames 
this gap for the Troubles, rather than any issue concerning education in schools. 
Gallagher suggests that in the case of Northern Ireland, all three perspectives were 
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at play and therefore no consensus on a specific explanation has been reached. 
However, the issue of equality between ethnic groups in wider society can be linked 
back to the education debate and warrants further attention. The separatist school 
structure presents an opportunity for inequality of education provision between ethnic 
groups. Equality concerns may arise in terms of education ‘inputs’ (Smith and Vaux 
2003:30) such as the transparency in the allocation of resources for different ethnic 
separatist school systems and the recruitment, training and deployment of teachers. 
Such issues have the potential to create immediate grievances between ethnic 
groups and pose threats to societal security through decreased resource allocation 
for cultural reproduction.  
Additionally, inequality of educational inputs between separatist systems can  lead to 
long range equality issues in terms of educational ‘outputs’ such as differentiated 
education attainment between ethnic groups(Smith and Vaux 2003:30). Education 
‘outputs’ have important consequences for equal opportunity of employment which 
can sustain horizontal inequalities (and create inadequate representation of some 
groups in the political arena. Both forms of educational inequality carry the potential 
to inflame conflict between different groups within society and threaten societal 
security through immediate inadequate cultural reproduction and long term political 
representation. As such, this thesis suggests that the importance of equal provision 
between separatist institutions warrants addition to Bush and Saltarelli’s (2000) 
‘watching brief’, alongside the overall restriction of access for ethnic groups.  
 
The influence of education on societal security is undeniable, both content and 
structure can aim to strengthen or weaken a group’s cultural position within a society 
and affect inter-group relations.  It is apparent that ethnic communities recognise the 
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important role of education in safeguarding societal security. Thus, both ethnic and 
cultural nationalisms can seek to control the provision of education in society for 
purposes outside that understood of conventional formal education. Any attempts to 
inhibit the reproduction of culture through education are taken by communities as 
grave assaults against a community’s ability to reproduce itself and hence threatens 
their societal security. If we are to take the Copenhagen school’s logic to conclusion 
it would therefore suggest that protecting access to ethnically specific education 
becomes a non- military means of defence in the societal security sector. In this 
sense the framework must now look at the consequences of framing education in 
such a way and therefore the next section will examine the process by which 
education may become securitised.  
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Figure 1: Educations Negative Interaction with Societal Security. 
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1.2.3 Securitisation 
 
In order to address our education research questions through a societal security lens 
we need the framework to be able to ascertain the extent to which education has 
become a societal security issue in the disputed territories. The concept that we shall 
incorporate to achieve this returns us to the Copenhagen School and their idea of 
securitization (Buzan et al 1998). The Copenhagen School posit a spectrum along 
which issues can be plotted with regard to their status within the security realm. The 
spectrum ranges from those issues that have been politicised but can be managed 
within the existing political system, to those issues which require action beyond the 
state’s normal political procedures and have therefore been securitized. Therefore, 
the issue is only placed at the securitised end of the spectrum when emergency 
measures have been adopted. Hence to declare that an issue has become 
securitized ‘is to not only claim that it has become a security issue but also that the 
elite have responded by adopting emergency measures’ (Collins 2003;573). 
 
To securitize something an actor has to present the issue as an existential threat to 
security, in this investigation a threat to societal security. A securitising actor can 
come from any sphere of life, but the overall recognition is that if a securitizing actor 
has been elected to represent a community within a certain domain, as long as the 
securitizing move is within their remit, then the actor has legitimacy (Collins, 
2003;571).  The threat perceived by the actor must be deemed significant enough to 
require ‘emergency measures’ and therefore it must necessitate priority over all other 
issues. It must be presented to the audience with the presumption that ‘if we do not 
tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant, because we will not be here or 
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be free to deal with it in our own way’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 24). By 
suggesting that an issue is an existential threat to societal security the actor is 
therefore asking permission to take action which takes ‘politics beyond the normal 
rules of the game’((Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 24). If the actor is successful, 
then an emergency measure to tackle the issue will take place outside of the usual 
arena and therefore the issue will become securitized.  However, not all issues 
presented in this way will necessarily be successful; some issues may just 
experience ‘securitizing moves’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 23), securitising 
speech and politicisation, without becoming securitised. 
 
In this sense securitisation can be viewed as a three stage process. First the issue 
must be presented to an audience by the actor, second for an issue to be regarded 
as a security issue the audience has to adopt the elite’s interpretation that the threat 
is sufficiently dangerous that emergency resources must be mobilized to overcome 
it. Once the first two stages are achieved the issue has become a security issue. The 
final stage is the mobilization of resources to overcome the threat, known as 
adopting extraordinary measures. Securitization therefore not only provides the 
definition for what a security issue is – an existential threat – it examines which 
actors initiate the securitizing move, the need for the audience to accept this 
interpretation of events for it to become a security issue and, finally, the type of 
response adopted. 
 
The type of response adopted is of particular importance within the process detailed 
above and to this investigation. What constitutes ‘extraordinary measures’ is defined 
by the adoption of action outside the political process and the normal realms of the 
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issue securitised. Therefore the extraordinary or emergency measure, must be an 
action beyond the usual remit of the actor.  To extrapolate this concept to our 
investigation of education as a societal security issue, it would be necessary to have 
a framework covering what would constitute an emergency action within the 
education arena. To provide a clear example it is possible to return to the case of the 
actions of the Albanian community in the province of Kosovo. When faced with the 
states assimilationist education structures communities choose to ‘defend their 
culture with culture’ and open their own ethnically affiliated schools.  
 
By refusing to send their children to the state-run schools and favouring the non-
accredited parallel schools, treated by the Government as illegal, the Albanian 
community took emergency action to tackle the perceived threat to their societal 
security. These schools were outside the state system and the normal arena for 
education policy and practice. All three stages of the process were met in this case 
and access to ethnically affiliated education became securitised for the Albanians in 
Kosovo. Community leaders presented the threat from state education to the group’s 
societal security, the audience accepted the presence of the threat and emergency 
action was taken in the form of non-accredited, non-state school provision. 
 
When an audience enables an actor to take these emergency measures they grant 
the actor extraordinary power over that issue. The labelling of a problem as a 
‘security issue’ may result in little or no assessment or regulation imposed on the 
implementation of the emergency measures taken (Grayson, 2003). Collins (2003) 
states that ‘there exists, therefore, the danger that having granted the actor the right 
to implement extraordinary measures, the audience forfeits its authority to determine 
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the legitimacy of future actions undertaken by the actor’. As such, by securitizing the 
issue the audience and actor have jointly contributed to placing it ‘beyond the realm 
of reasonable public scrutiny’ (Collins, 2003).  
 
Grayson (2003) provides a valuable analogy involving Frankenstein’s monster to 
caution how precarious securitisation can be. Collins (2003) states that it is a 
valuable metaphor for securitization because ‘it not only captures the loosening of 
constraints on the elite that allows them to act almost with impunity, but it also 
visualizes just how powerful the securitizing actor can become.’ In this sense 
Waever (1995) also recognised the negative implications of securitisation and was 
quick to emphasise the importance of de-securitisation. He observed that once a 
security issue is declared and accepted the elite ‘can easily use it for specific, self-
serving purposes [and this] is something that cannot easily be avoided’ (Weaver 
1995: 54, 55).  Within the education arena the abuse of power and authority can lead 
to a number of negative outcomes. As discussed in the previous section the purpose 
of education can be manipulated to serve the interests of political elites and 
nationalist extremists. If emergency measures are granted within the education 
arena and that power is abused, it can lead to wider repercussions for the rest of 
society and inter-ethnic relations. The concept of securitisation within the societal 
security realm is not unproblematic, and its incorporation within the theoretical 
framework is not proposed as conceptually neat, but it will provide an analytical tool 
with which to examine the extent ethnically specific education has become a matter 
of ethnic security in the region. 
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1.3 Rational 
 
By acknowledging the significant pool of literature on societal security protection and 
the concept of protecting culture with culture, the thesis will seek to investigate the 
purpose bestowed on education in the disputed territories and determine whether it 
has become a means of non military self-defence for ethnic groups who wish to 
protect culture with culture in the fragile environment of the disputed territories. 
Subsequently, if education has been framed in terms of identity protection, it will be 
necessary to explore whether non-military threats to societal security have been 
generated from within the state delivered system and if so what the reaction to such 
threats has been. Therefore this investigation will seek to approach the central 
research question of; ‘How has ethnic identity influenced the education narrative in 
the disputed territories post 2003’. The thesis will unpack this question as it moves 
through the chapters addressing four key sub-questions;  
 
1.3.1 Question 1 - What role did ethnic identity play in education provision prior to 
2003? 
 
At the outset of the investigation, this was the very first question that the author 
posed. When establishing the parameters of the thesis it was necessary to consider 
the foundations upon which reconstruction of education was taking place. The 
current role of identity in formal education structures cannot be investigated in 
isolation from the education system that preceded it. How education influenced 
identity in the past will undoubtedly have significant influence on how it is perceived 
in the present. To understand the role of identity in today’s Iraqi education system 
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the thesis must first unpack how education has previously been used to fortify, 
diminish or assimilate ethnic identity and culture in the region.   
 
1.3.2 Question 2 – What role has ethnic identity played in the formation of formal 
education structures  in the region post 2003? 
 
This question is central to the investigation. In order to explore this, a number of 
factors must be explored: Firstly, the influence the previous regimes’ educational 
system may have had on the evolution of the current system. Secondly, the 
constitutional rights of ethnic and religious groups under the new Iraqi constitution 
and how they have been interpreted in the education arena in the disputed 
territories. Finally, the role of the current conflict has had on heightening identity and 
representation within the education sector will be analysed.   
 
1.3.3 Question 3 –What role does ethnic identity play in the current education 
Narrative? 
 
The next enquiry will explore the current role of identity protection in education and 
examine the consequences of bestowing education with societal security protection. 
If education has the purpose of fortifying ethnic identity, does this affect how 
educationalists view restrictions to its support? Do education narratives present 
access in terms of academic merit and achievement or in terms of identity 
protection? 
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Question 4 
What is the relationship between education and the wider ethnic conflict and 
fragility? 
  
The concluding pursuit will be to explore the reaction to any such threats, asking how 
ethnic groups in the disputed territories countered or accepted such threats. The 
thesis will examine whether action taken has opened the door for the manipulation of 
education structures by nationalist and extremist groups for their own purposes?  
The main research question will remain at the centre of the thesis throughout. The 
four sub research questions will serve to direct the chapters and keep the theoretical 
link structured. The specific education arena focus will result in the exploration of 
societal security from a non-military perspective. It will seek to determine whether 
education has become a means of self-defence for ethnic groups which wish to 
protect culture with culture in Iraq’s fragile environment. While, additionally exploring 
any non-military threats to societal security that are perceived from within the state 
delivered education system and how they are countered or absorbed.  
 
1.4 Contributions to the Literature 
 
The thesis speaks to both practitioners and researchers working on or in the 
disputed territories of Iraq. The project to which this work is attributed to (see 
Appendix: 12 for project research report), Conflict in Cities which, sought to better 
understand the ways heavily contested cities may become viable for all inhabitants. 
A team of researchers from three UK universities, Cambridge, Exeter and Queen’s 
Belfast, investigated the common subject of conflict management from a variety of 
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different perspectives. The multi-disciplinary initiative included: architecture, urban 
studies, politics, geography, and sociology. These lenses are used to try and 
understand conflict management in a number of European and Middle Eastern cities: 
Jerusalem, Belfast, Brussels, Berlin, Mostar, Nicosia, Berlin, Beirut, Tripoli and 
Kirkuk.  
 
More specifically, the project sought to understand how urban structures and 
institutions may strengthen cities to withstand state struggles, and establish to what 
extent cities may be transformed into effective and equitable sites for human 
settlement. In other words, the project is concerned with mechanisms for the 
confrontation and absorption of conflict as opposed to conflict resolution or solution6. 
This dissertation contributes directly to these objectives. The research unpacks the 
ways in which ethnic communities in contested regions of Iraq have employed 
education institutions as a means of ethnic resilience and identifies how this use can 
influence inter-communal relations within a contested territory.  
 
Despite the academic recognition of education’s influence in post conflict settings 
and the significance of ethnic identity in post war Iraq, there is a complete absence 
of scholarly analysis in terms of, not only the emergent formal education system post 
2003 in the Iraqi disputed territories, but also the purpose bestowed on education by 
education officials and its possible role within the wider identity-based contest. 
Academic explorations of the disputed territories concentrate heavily on the possible 
governance outcomes and political power-sharing solutions within the region 
(Stansfield, 2011; Wolff, 2011; Anderson, 2013; Leezenburg; 2010). Equally, 
                                                 
6
 More detailed information about the project and the nature and scope of the various associated research 
projects can be found at www.conflictincities.org.  
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examinations of the state education are limited to country-wide reviews of higher 
education (Harb 2009; Kaghed 2009; Al-Dabbagh 2005), targeted investigations of 
mainstream education for disabled youth in Iraq (Alborz, Al-Obaidi and Brooker 
2011) or assessments of literacy rates (Holmes, 2010).  
 
It is in this respect that the thesis contributes to two fields of understanding. Firstly, 
the author conducted the first ever mapping of education structures in the post 2003 
Iraq disputed territories. The data collection for the research includes previously un-
collated statistical data on the number of ethnically defined schools in the two 
governorates and a regional assessment of educational capacity gaps for each 
ethnic community. Additionally the author has classified different kind of schools 
which have developed in the region, a typology which explains for the first time the 
complex linguistic provisions unique to schools in the disputed territories. Secondly, 
and more significantly, the thesis presents the first scholarly exploration of the 
purpose bestowed on education by education officials in the disputed territories post 
2003, demonstrating its role within the wider identity-based contest and the 
consequences of the political manipulation by officials.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
Thus far the author has presented the subject to be tackled in the thesis and framed 
the investigation with the theoretical underpinnings of both education in conflict 
literature and the concepts surrounding identity and societal security.  I have 
underlined the contribution the thesis will make to the understanding of education as 
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an actor for peace or conflict in the Iraqi disputed territories. The plan of the 
dissertation is as follows: 
 
Chapter two will introduce the methodological approach employed for the thesis, 
presenting the importance of the pilot study conducted, the methods employed to 
secure over 50 elite educationalist and community leader interviews and the 
constraints to data collection within the fragile conflict environment. Chapter three 
will then provide a contextual overview of the Iraqi context. This chapter will focus on 
the role of ethnic identity in Iraq, both past and present, to provide the reader with a 
contextual understanding of the wider security environment. Despite the focus on 
non-military defence and non-military threats to societal security through education, it 
is necessary to understand that the education system is not in a vacuum and the 
wider security environment will have a significant influence on the perceived level of 
threat that an ethnic group will feel. For this reason it is essential that chapter three 
sets out the contextual background to the region and provides a historical framework 
for understanding the Iraqi disputed territories, identity politics and ethnic conflict. 
 
Chapter four will move on to address research questions one and two. The first 
section will provide an analysis of the role of identity in Ba’ath party education 
provision in the two decades before the invasion. This will then be taken forward in 
section two to present the influence of identity in the reconstruction of education in 
the region. This section will explore the legacy of Arabisation , the current 
constitution provision for minorities, and the ongoing insecurity in the region and how 
these elements have shaped the current system.  The final section will present how 
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consequently identity protection is at the core of education management in the 
territories.  
 
Chapter five will take the investigation forward to explore how the framing of 
education in terms of societal security and identity protection has influenced the 
wider education narrative. It will present the capacity gaps in education and how the 
these gaps are increasingly presented by education actors as the deliberate denial of 
ethnic resources and thus threats to the continued access to the means of cultural 
reproduction for non-Arab ethnic groups. This chapter will demonstrate how the 
securitising narratives of education actors has lead to a variety of external influences 
entering the education sphere and explore the consequences of this new dimension.  
 
Chapter six will take the conclusions drawn from chapters four and five and move on 
to explore the consequence of these findings on the wider fragile environment. It will 
explore the existing interactions between the education system and conflict, and use 
the theoretical framework to explore education’s potential impact on the wider 
ethnically defined conflict in the region. The chapter will take the findings of the 
previous two chapters and explore the significance for wider inter-ethnic relations. 
While references to the conceptual framework are made throughout, chapter seven 
will draw together the empirical findings of the research. It revisits the aims of the 
research and, in doing so, this final chapter considers the implications for further 
research and identifies some recommendations for policy-makers.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
2.1 Overview 
 
The absence of scholarly analysis in terms not only of the emergent education 
system post 2003, but also its role within the wider identity-based contest, directly 
influences the research design for the thesis. The thesis drew on a variety of primary 
and secondary resources in its investigation: policy documents, media reports, UN 
and NGO education assessments and the completion of fifty eight interviews with 
education officials and community representatives across the territories. Data was 
collected over the course of four separate research trips to Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan and 
Jordan between 2010 and 2011.  
 
To achieve an accurate picture of post 2003 reconstruction, within the climate of 
conflict and growing tension, open qualitative interviews with elite level education 
practitioners and community representatives were chosen as the most appropriate 
primary means of data collection. In-depth interviews are a significant qualitative 
method that enabled the researcher to ascertain the given purpose to education 
without influencing the interviewee with leading questions. They are used to gather 
rich, detailed information and give the flexibility of being able to take place in a one-
to-one or group situation. The research design indicated that this was the most 
appropriate modality of data collection in order to gain an in-depth and thorough 
understanding about peoples’ experiences of education policy and practice. The use 
of such open interviews would aim to establish the necessary factual information as 
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well as the perceptions of interview participants over education’s purpose and real 
and imagined threats to societal security through the education system. Walker 
Connor (1997: 33) proposed that ‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts 
but from perceptions; perceptions are as important or more than reality when it 
comes to ethnic issues’. This influential work resonated with the objectives of the 
thesis and further confirmed the necessary modality for primary data collection. 
 
This interview modality hoped to provide detailed information and insights about 
people’s experiences of education policy formation and education structures which 
could not be accessed through rigidly structured questionnaires. The ethno-political 
context and contemporary neglect of education in the disputed territories require that 
the research obtained detailed, complex information which would be difficult to 
quantify or anticipate in advance and therefore in-depth interviews were judged to be 
a highly suitable method of data collection. Hence a structured list of pre-prepared 
questions in a questionnaire format was deemed inappropriate and questionnaires 
were equally deemed unsuitable because of their pre-formulated, standardised 
nature preventing the deep, complex detail from being captured.  
 
In-depth interviews are commonly used when researching personal or sensitive 
issues and people’s emotions and feelings. The particular ethnic history and current 
political standoff over territory have created a situation where discussions of 
education provision, ethnic minorities and language rights carry an emotive and 
confidential element. Such interview modality allowed for the interviewer to be 
responsive to any difficulties and able to sensitively manage the interview so that the 
interviewee felt comfortable enough to talk openly and honestly about the topic The 
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interviewer’s role was to encourage the interviewee to speak freely in his/her own 
words about education provision and feel comfortable enough to freely critique any 
areas they felt necessary. Open interviews allowed the interviewer to reorder, reword 
and develop new questions to suit the interview context and the direction in which 
the interviewee was taking the interview. Such unstructured interviews provided the 
necessary flexibility for the researcher to gain a much greater grasp of the details 
and nuances of the interviewee’s perspective. 
 
Yet the design of an in-depth interview needs to be based on a clear sense of the 
purpose, scope and use of the research, so that relevant questions can be 
formulated and the interview conducted to encourage full, detailed answers. In order 
to maximise the data quality and achieve the most efficient interviews it was 
necessary to formulate a topic guide for interviews (see appendix 8). The topic guide 
was used to provide a list of themes and questions relevant to the research question 
in order to direct questions and keep the interview on track. However, the previously 
unstudied nature of the topic and limited availability of information on the education 
structure made the formation of such a guide very difficult. Due to the complete 
absence of factual information on the current education system in the region, pre-
empting the ordering of topics was impossible. Therefore to counter this restriction it 
was deemed necessary to conduct a pilot study to ascertain the basic facts on the 
ground and disposition of the discussion which surrounded education provision at 
this time.  
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2.2 Pilot Study  
 
The pilot study aimed to aid the development and focus of the research and assess 
the suitability of questions to reveal any deficiencies in the design (see appendices 5 
to 8 for interview questionnaires). This allowed any such problems to be addressed 
before time and resources were expended on the larger study. Thus the intention 
was to counter any potential problems arising from the relatively unexplored nature 
of the topic by using the results of a pilot study to direct the formulation of a topic 
guide. Due to the restrictions of time and funding, the pilot study required an 
interview modality which would be cost efficient and quick to implement. In order to 
achieve this, the use of structured asynchronous email interviews was chosen7. The 
pilot study involved semi-structured online interviews8 to establish the issues, facts 
on the ground and general areas of discussion surrounding current education 
provision in the city. Additionally, it served to assess sensitivity to terminology and 
the wording of questions and the conflict sensitive nature of the material to be 
discussed. The pilot study also tried to identify potential practical problems in 
following the research procedure, such as poor response rates, so that precautionary 
procedures or safety nets could be devised. The pilot study also hoped to uncover 
local politics or problems that may affect the research process.  
 
The pilot study was intended to improve the internal validity of the interview 
techniques and address the following issues; 
 ask the subjects for feedback to identify ambiguities and difficult questions  
                                                 
7
 A further discussion of the use of email interviews is presented later in the chapter in discussing a suitable secondary 
interview method for the main study. 
8
 Interview questions found in appendixes  
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 discard all unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions  
 assess whether each question gives an adequate range of responses  
 establish that replies can be interpreted in terms of the information that is 
required  
 check that all questions are answered  
 re-word or re-scale any questions that are not answered as expected  
 shorten and revise (Source: Table 3.23 in Peat et al. 2002: 123)  
For the initial pilot study it was deemed appropriate to seek preliminary participants 
working outside the education system, but with a vested interest in it, for example 
NGO workers and human rights activists. It was felt that an external view of 
education was of most benefit at this point in the research due to the emotive nature 
of education and societal identity in the contested territories. This was to determine 
factual information with regards to the education system in the city as well as gauge 
perceptions of the purpose of education. These online questionnaires and email 
exchanges enabled the researcher to question participants “on a topic of interest to 
the interviewer and of relevance to the interviewee” (Watten and Kamer, 2007;116), 
but more importantly seek factual answers alongside an interpretation of meaning 
from responses (Kvale, 1996).   
 
Of equal importance was that participants for the pilot study presented a 
representative sample from each of Kirkuk’s ethnic communities and were 
unconnected with one another. Therefore, contact was established with a number of 
key humanitarian actors in the city and a series of initial introduction emails were 
exchanged. The initial sample included NGO workers, an Institute of War and Peace 
Reporting (IWPR) trained journalist, UNICEF personnel and a human rights activist, 
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each from different ethnic communities (See appendices 2 and 3, attached for letters 
of invitation and participant list). From this selection, further participants were found 
through a process of ‘snowballing’. Participants were found from within existing 
social networks, beginning with the initial contact.  The criteria for the recruitment of 
further participants were then extended to include elite education professionals, such 
as head teachers and members of education councils. Once a small focus group 
size sample was established, a series of open emails were exchanged with each 
participant.  
 
The content of each email exchange, although between only interviewer and 
participant, influenced the further interactions with all participants and facilitated the 
collection of rich and informative data regarding the education system in the city. 
Once this information was gathered it was possible to focus the area of study for the 
large scale research. In addition, a number of valuable insights were gained with 
regards to question formation and sensitivity to terminology. For example, the use of 
the phrase ‘separate education institutions’ although descriptively accurate, caused 
concern for many participants who associated the word ‘separate’ with that of 
political separatism and had reservations to associating with the phrase. 
 
2.3 Interview methodology  
 
Once the pilot study was conducted and the topic sheet formulated for further 
research, it was necessary to determine how the next stage of qualitative interviews 
would be conducted. In order to construct a research model for the thesis the 
suitability of different forms of qualitative interviews were considered. Face-to-face 
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interviews were held as the most significant of interview modalities due to the 
advantage of being able to view social cues such as voice intonation and the body 
language of the interviewee. These cues are regarded as important sources of 
information which serve to supply the researcher with additional data that can be 
added to the verbal answer of the interviewee. Face-to-face interviews also allowed 
the researcher to create both a productive interview ambience and ensure the 
interviewee was comfortable in the environment, serving to facilitate a more open 
course of dialogue. However, as valuable as this modality is, it does have its 
restrictions.  
 
The potential participants for this study were located throughout the disputed 
territories of Iraq (see appendix: 10 for interview schedule and participants). The 
geographical distribution of participants and unstable security situation made 
travelling throughout the region difficult and costly. This ultimately limited the number 
of participants the researcher would be able to reach. In addition to these 
restrictions, there is the often overlooked aspect of researcher safety. Sturges and 
Hanraham state that “researcher safety is too seldom discussed in the 
methodological literature” (Sturges, 2004). Traveling to a conflict zone obviously 
creates risks and ethical decisions for the researcher to overcome.  Furthermore, 
research accuracy can be questioned in these circumstances. Lee draws our 
attention to the threats posed by data collection in dangerous locations, claiming that 
such an environment can “shape research agendas by deterring researchers from 
investigating particular topics,” (R. M. Lee, 1995) and preventing the participation of 
wary interviewees.   
 
56 
 
The ethnically divided and often violent nature of the region has inevitably influenced 
the research design. Although face-to-face interviews were deemed the most 
valuable to the research, the exact location of interviews and logistical organization 
needed careful consideration. In conclusion, official buildings such as government 
offices, mayoral buildings or the UN compound in Erbil were chosen as interview 
locations. The interviewees were to be invited to the location to meet with the 
researcher. This type of location allowed the researcher to remain highly visible and 
negated the need to travel extensively throughout the territories.  
 
However, it was necessary to consider the influence of official offices on the 
ambience of the interview itself and the data collection.   It was possible that the type 
of building would be intimidating for some interviewees and prevent free and easy 
dialogue. In this respect the issue of participant selection became significant and 
held influence over the reaction to location. For example, participants who seldom 
deal with official channels may find the environment more intimidating. This problem 
is invalidated slightly by the type of participant sought for the research. In order to 
ascertain the information necessary, participants would be sought from elite level 
positions such as education officials and community representatives, the justification 
for this selection criterion will be addressed further in the following section.  
 
Therefore face-to-face interviews were championed and conducted wherever 
possible. Yet the reality of the working environment necessitated that the researcher 
was open to other modalities of interview when face-to-face were not possible or 
when interviewees felt uncomfortable with the location. Due to the possible dangers 
associated with travel for some participants it was necessary to devise a contingency 
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interview in order to include representatives from all communities. Therefore a 
number of interview methodologies were required in order to fully explore the 
research question. Unfortunately, a small number of participants were unable to 
attend face-to-face interviews due to security concerns. In these circumstances the 
issue of methodology subsequently became a matter of finding forms of interview 
which could be offered which closely replicated the process of face-to-face 
interviews.  
 
Telephone interviews were therefore considered as a possible ‘back up’ interview 
methodology. Telephone interviews were considered as a substitute which 
“preserves the research endeavour” (Lee, 1995) and accuracy of the data and 
allowed for the access of hard to reach participants (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). 
However, several key issues presented themselves with telephone interviews; as 
Arksey and Knight affirm, the medium of telephone interviews can generate short 
answer responses in interviews, and not in-depth descriptive and reflective accounts 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999). Additionally the linguistic variation of participants in this 
research presented restrictions in terms of their use.  Kirkuk has three functioning 
languages, none of which are the researchers’ mother tongue. The use of a second 
language in interviews by either the researcher or participant would no doubt have 
created situations where meaning is ‘lost in translation’. This was confirmed when a 
number of trial interviews were conducted via telephone with participants who spoke 
English, the issue was further complicated by the poor quality of telephone lines in 
Iraq. Hence, telephone interviews were dismissed for fear of low quality data 
collection and asynchronous email interviews, alongside emailed open 
questionnaires were considered. 
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Asynchronous email interviews and emailed open questionnaires provide a number 
of technical advantages which are often overlooked. Time efficiency and cost of 
email interviews allow a researcher to gather information rapidly and at relatively little 
expense. The advantages of rapid data collection in terms of travel are equally 
matched by those of automated data collection. The cost of recording equipment, 
flights and telephone bills can all be negated and issues of geographical dispersal 
and researcher safety are equally resolved. Moreover the internet enables 
communication among people who may be hesitant to meet face-to-face, for 
example, individuals with unpopular political views may be hesitant to express 
themselves openly. Therefore email interviews present additional perks which are of 
particular relevance to this study. The political tensions in the region may prevent the 
vocalizing of certain views which can be more freely expressed in text-based 
communications. Email interviews provide a degree of anonymity which allows 
participants to speak more unreservedly.  
 
Email interviews can be neglected by qualitative research, suffering from a bias 
which leaves the practice portrayed as a substandard alternative to face-to-face 
interviewing. The primary critique can be found in reference to the absence of non-
verbal and contextual data which is regarded as vital to the interview process 
(Creswell, 1998). The use of text-based communications is seen to deprive the 
researcher of the participant’s informal interaction Cresweall (1998) acknowledges 
this, but states that it is appropriate when the researcher does not otherwise have 
access to the respondent. This view is further complimented by Stephens’ work on 
interviewing elites in which he states that the articulate nature of his interviewees 
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made telephone interviews more viable. This thinking can be extended to assume 
that the professional make-up of the participants required for this study will enhance 
the quality of text provided (Stephens, 2004). 
 
Establishing trust in the identity of a person through email communication is often 
raised with regard to email based research. If the participant does not benefit from 
the reassurance of face-to-face meetings they have little to base their trust upon. 
Paccagnella recommends the existence of “…strategies of visibility…which make up 
for the lack of traditional social clues” (Paccagnella,2004).  Within the proposed 
research these concerns were negated in some instances as the participants and 
interviewer had already met. In addition, establishing the participants’ trust in the 
researcher was aided both by the initial contact’s recommendation and by the 
affiliation with a wider research project – Conflict in Cities. Providing a link to the 
website of an ESRC funded project which represents three UK universities and 
affiliation with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) aided the 
researchers’ credibility and proof of impartiality. 
 
In addition to accessing participants who were unable to travel, this modality was 
deemed useful for the purposes of conducting follow-up contact. Due to the politically 
sensitive nature of the topic, some interlocutors felt unable to speak completely 
freely in person. Therefore each participant was given the opportunity to follow-up on 
the interview via email or telephone. Those interlocutors who felt they had more to 
share after the interview provided follow up information via email. This generally 
consisted of a written report pertaining to the issues we had discussed during our 
interview. This was intended to ensure the most accurate data collection.  
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2:4 Participant Selection 
 
The criteria for interviewee selection centred around two focal points. The first was 
the general rule of achieving purposive sample which was representative of the 
groups in the region. In this respect it was necessary to achieve an equal 
representation of ethnic groups from each governorate. The geographical settlement 
patterns of ethnic groups meant that this required different representation for each 
governorate and was geographically varied. For instance there is no Yezidi 
community in the Diyala governorate and therefore Yezidi education access in this 
area is of no consequence and no interlocutor was sought. Equally participants who 
did not officially represent an ethnic group, but who could speak in general were 
sought, although these proved harder to find. Secondly the interviewee needed to be 
in a position of authority and able to discuss knowledgeably the research questions 
on education. Therefore elite level education and community representatives were 
selected. This criteria was expanded to include not just education officials from within 
the Ministries of Education but also academics and education specialists from within 
political, religious, civil and international organisations operating within the area. This 
reflects the myriad of actors currently influencing the provision of education in the 
disputed territories due to the failing capacity of the ministries of education in Erbil 
and Baghdad.  
 
Participants were located through a number of varied channels and all efforts were 
made to ensure a diverse range of participants. To map the evolution of education 
and the impact of identity over the two governorates it was vital to ensure all 
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perspectives were given a voice. Ministry of Education officials were the initial 
contacts sought in each region, yet not all ethnic groups have Ministry staff allocated 
for the provision of their education needs. Therefore, a form of snowballing was 
achieved from initial Ministry contacts which resulted in additional participants for 
interview. Additionally, two of the research trips were facilitated by the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq and as a consequence the research was granted 
access to the UN lists of interlocutors on UNICEF and UNESCO education lists.  
 
These lists of potential participants proved incredibly beneficial to the research, 
providing contact information for representatives of many harder to reach minority 
groups in Ninewa and again snowballed to further non-listed participants from each 
ethnic group. Yet it was still deemed essential to seek independent participants who 
were not already working with UN agencies or associated with those who were not 
implicated in any way with these groups. The third source of participant came from 
within the local civil society organisations and academics with a vested interest in the 
formal education system. In conclusion, interview data and secondary resource 
materials, such as school lists and pupil numbers were collected from nearly 50 
interviews with education officials and community representatives across the 
territories. This data was collected over the course of four separate research trips to 
Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan and Jordan between 2010 and 2011.  
 
2:5 Constraints to Data Collection 
 
The political realities of the contested territories impacted on the data collection and 
consultation process. Interviews often ended abruptly due to security alerts and the 
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subsequent necessity to travel at certain times for security reasons. In this respect it 
was essential to have an open research design which could be flexible in achieving 
the required data collection. The use of asynchronous email interviews for accessing 
participants who were unable to travel, those where interviews were cut short, or 
who were un-forthcoming in the interview setting, became a very useful tool. 
Providing each participant the opportunity to follow up on the interview via email 
actually enriched the data collection more than was anticipated. Many interlocutors 
who felt they had more to share after the interview provided follow up information via 
email. This generally consisted of a written report pertaining to the issues we had 
discussed during our interview and opened the channels for continued 
communication and clarification of issues raised in the reports provided. 
 
The environment of insecurity has also bred distrust and a number of interviewees 
requested that I listened without taking notes. It became apparent that as I wrote 
some interviewees became uncomfortable. In these cases interview notes were 
written up directly after interviews but without direct quotes, for fear of misquoting 
participants.  
 
The aim of establishing factual and statistical information of school numbers, 
enrolment etc was also met with obstacles. Quantitative data records on the number 
of grades offered, numbers of students by sex and age, numbers of repeaters, 
number of teachers by sex and qualification, statistics on gender, ethnicity and 
income would have added additional depth to qualitative research interviews.  
However, education in Iraq suffered considerably under the internationally imposed 
sanctions in the 1980-90’s and subsequently from the conflict in 2003. Education 
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authorities had neither the resources necessary, nor the systems of management, to 
routinely collect information on schools as part of their regular operations. Therefore 
answers were often vague and lacked any evidence of the use of Educational 
Management Information Systems (EMIS). 
 
Educational management information systems are designed to collect and analyse 
data on educational system to improve planning, resource allocation, monitoring, 
policy formation and decision making. However, in situations of conflict and post 
conflict this information ceases to be a priority and data is often not collected. 
Although some data was available though the Ministries of Education in the KRG 
and Baghdad, the statistics were often out-dated and always very limited. To 
illustrate this point I can recount numerous meetings with Ministry of Education 
officials who provided school numbers and sizes on scraps of paper which seldom 
corresponded with additional data offered by the same office they represented.  It 
was often representatives of ethnically affiliated civil society groups who provided 
more detailed statistics on school numbers and sizes. The option to collect this data 
independently was restricted by time, funding, security and the overall scale of such 
a project. Therefore although a considerable amount of statistical data was collected, 
it cannot be verified as accurate at this time. 
 
The wider political debate has no doubt influenced the discussion of education 
access and answers were often openly politically motivated. Therefore the possibility 
must be considered that there was a reluctance to submit data on linguistic 
education access because of its implications for the territorial representation of 
communities in the disputed territories.  
64 
 
 
2:6 Ethical Issues  
 
The project created and engaged with a number of ethical issues. However, the 
author is well versed in the proper actions to take in order to address the ethical 
issues; having studied such issues in detail during a Masters of Research, which 
was passed with distinction.  These principles were applied and the thesis adhered 
to the University’s ethical guidelines for the conduct of projects regarding protection, 
confidentiality and sensitivity where programme beneficiaries are participating as 
informants and objects of study.  
 
Information sheets and letters of invitation were provided to potential participants. 
The letter of invitation (see appendix 1- 5) clearly stated the voluntary nature of 
participation, the option for anonymity and the right to withdraw at any time. The 
information letter clearly outlined the purpose of the research. Interviews only took 
place after they were read and verbal consent was obtained from each participant. 
Written consent would prove too culturally and politically sensitive to obtain in Iraq. 
 
2.7 Data analysis 
 
The data analysis process involved coding all interview notes and transcripts to 
identify key themes emerging from the interviews. Once coding was complete it was 
possible to enter interview summaries into a comparable spread sheet so that issues 
surrounding each code could be compared within ethnic groups and between ethnic 
groups. This enabled the researcher to clearly view the relationships being 
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presented within the data. Once summaries were analysed in relation to one 
another, overviews of the perceived education provision and its purpose could be 
written for each ethnic community. 
 
2.8 Data verification  
 
The author placed a high level of importance on validating the findings and analytical 
conclusions; both from the communities involved in the research and also from 
academic peer review of the findings and theoretical framing applied. The first was 
achieved through a number of channels: the provision of report findings via email to 
a number of key community members; the provision of report findings to key 
members of the journalist community and NGO workers; and, finally face-to-face 
consultations during a final trip to Iraqi Kurdistan for the Second Annual Conference 
of the Iraqi Kurdistan NGO Network (IKNN). The second verification objective was 
met through the organisation of an academic workshop on the central themes of the 
thesis; Ethnicity, Education and Conflict. A number of key scholars in the field of 
education, identity and conflict (including Professor Tony Gallagher, specialist in 
education and identity in Northern Ireland;  Professor Lynne Davies, specialist on 
education, identity and conflict, and Dr Lori Heninger, Director of the Inter-Agency 
Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) ) were invited to the workshop in 
which a summary of the thesis was presented. In both rounds of validation, feedback 
was overwhelmingly positive, but issues which received constructive criticism were 
subsequently revisited, and feedback was iIncorporated into in the current version of 
the thesis. 
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In addition to this, I was very aware that my lack of fluency in the three main 
languages of the region may have resulted in the failure to obtain academic literature 
outside of the English medium. In order to ensure this was not the case, I contacted 
two Iraqi academic research centers in Amman. I spent a day at each and 
interviewed the academics working on Iraq in Arabic to ascertain if there were any 
publications which I had missed. In addition, I was aided by the Turkmen human 
rights NGO, the Turkmen Human Rights Foundation (SOIMT), to identify the Turkish 
literature on the subject. Finally, I was aided in my Kurdish literature search by 
colleagues. Although I did not find anything which tackled the main topics of the 
thesis, I was able to identify key texts which fed into the contextualization of the 
work. 
 
Throughout the duration of the research project the local news agencies and online 
ministry bulletin boards were monitored for issues pertaining to both education and 
identity. Any events or comments discovered and of interest were then verified by 
other actors and interview participants in the region to establish their authenticity. 
Those events that have been verified have been included in the following chapters.  
The author took a number of measures to verify the information gathered in this 
thesis and ensure that the perspectives presented are not that of a small number of 
people. The research strove to triangulate information and authenticate the findings. 
This was a vital process when working in such a political environment.  
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Chapter Three: The Iraqi Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to determine whether ethnicity and identity have 
influenced the development of education structures in the Iraqi disputed territories. In 
this respect two fields of influence are significant to our comprehension, both of 
which illustrate the significant relationship between identity and security in the region. 
Firstly, we can note how the history of ethnic conflict and co-existence within the 
region and how the brutal suppression of identity by the previous regime has left a 
legacy which influences identity issues in the region today. The second element to 
consider is the post-2003 national environment of insecurity, where groups are 
subject to seemingly sectarian-based attacks which are escalating throughout the 
country. The heighten role of identity throughout the country is subject to a mosaic of 
complex overlapping conflicts each with their own unique origins and goals. The aim 
of the thesis is neither to unpack individual conflicts nor to determine their exact 
influence over the security of each ethnic group. The focus of the study is to examine 
the influence of the general rise in ethno-politics and sectarian fragility on the 
evolution of the education system in the disputed territories. However, that is not to 
say that a wider understanding of the conflict actors is not necessary.  
 
The following chapter will therefore provide the reader with the contextual 
background required to proceed with the investigation. Specifically, in order to 
explore the role of identity in the reconstruction of education, the reader must first 
understand the Iraqi context. To achieve this, the chapter will briefly introduce both 
the national and regional environments. Therefore, this chapter will begin by 
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introducing the historical context of the disputed territories, covering the ethno-
political manipulation that has led to the territories’ contested position and defining 
the ethnic claims to the regions of Kirkuk and Ninewa. This will be followed by an 
evaluation of the impact of the 2003 invasion on identity issues and security in the 
country, before returning to look specifically at the current situation in the disputed 
territories.  
 
3.2 The Ba’ath Era 
 
 
The oil-rich northern districts of Iraq were long considered a reflection of the country 
with a diversity of ethnic and religious groups; Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Assyrians, 
Yezidi, Shabak and Chaldeans, living together and portraying Iraq’s demographic 
makeup. However, the region has historically constituted a buffer zone between the 
Arab South and Kurdish North which has witnessed Kurdish uprisings against the 
central government and the Ba’ath party’s policy of Arabisation in the twentieth 
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century. The systematic policies  which expelled hundreds of thousands of Kurds 
and other ethnic minorities, destroying hundreds of Kurdish villages and 
appropriating Kurdish and Turkmen-owned land (Inter-peace, 2011). Baghdad’s 
creation of a false demographic and the genocidal Afnal campaigns of 1987 and 
1988 have resulted in the region being highly contested between ethnic groups. 
What is now Iraqi Kurdistan eventually gained autonomy from Saddam’s Iraq in 
1991. By the end of the first Gulf War the majority of Kurdish areas of northern Iraq 
became effectively outside of Baghdad’s control, separated by a no-fly zone and the 
unofficial boundary known as the Green Line. This resulted in the Iraqi Kurdish 
region achieving relative autonomy from Saddam’s Iraq. However, the areas which 
lay beyond the green line continued to fall under central Baghdad’s control, most 
notably the oil rich governorate of Kirkuk. The disputed territories, or disputed 
internal boundaries (DIB’s), consisting of 15 districts stretching across four northern 
governorates and curving from the Syrian to Iranian borders, are currently subject to 
heightened identity politics and sectarian insecurity. In the aftermath of the 2003 
invasion the Kurdish Regional Government and Government of Iraq both laid claim 
to land spread over the districts. The tug-of-war between the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad (GoI) has seen the 
regions’ minority ethnic groups drawn into debates over ethnic composition. 
 
3.2.1 Kirkuk  
 
Kirkuk, the oil-rich city which lies within the Iraqi Governorate of the same name, has 
been central to the territorial dispute in the region.  Its place in the Iraqi state has 
been disputed by the Kurds since the creation of the country by the British in the 
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1920s. Claiming the majority ethnic status in the region, Iraqi Kurds passionately 
rejected their addition to the new Arab state and it has long been the cause for 
Kurdish revolt and intermittent conflict with Baghdad. Throughout the twentieth 
century identity politics plagued Kirkuk and demographic composition served as a 
catalyst for frequent conflict. The symbolic importance of Kirkuk to the Kurds and 
Turkmen lay in direct opposition to the strategic importance of the region to 
Baghdad.  
 
Consequently, Baghdad sought to counter the Kurdish claim to demographic 
dominance and set about a deliberate and cruel policy of Arabisation. Intent on 
increasing Kirkuk’s Arab population and achieving a majority status in the oil rich 
territory, the central government sought to assimilate or expel non-Arab ethnic 
groups from the region. Arabisation took hold of every aspect of society in Kirkuk, 
from the renaming of streets to reflect Arab nationalism through to education 
provision for minority groups. By 1975 Baghdad had stepped up its programme of 
Arabisation in the region, forcibly expelling Kurds, Turkmen and Christians. The 
central government aimed to achieve an Arab majority by persuading poor Shiite 
Arabs from the south to settle in the newly vacant homes in the north with enticing 
grants of  up to 10 000 Iraqi Dinars (Romano, 2007). During the 1980–1988 Iran–
Iraq War, Iraqi Kurdish involvement with Iranian forces led to the Arabisation policies 
deteriorating into all-out genocide. The subsequent Anfal campaigns claimed the 
lives of 100 000 to 200 000 Iraqi Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq (Romano, 2007).  
 
After the Kurdish region gained autonomy, the Kirkuk Governorate and areas to the 
south of the green line, continued to experience expulsions at approximately 1000 a 
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month until 2003 (Romano, 2007). From the beginning of the Ba’ath Party’s reign in 
1968 until the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, an estimated 200 000 to 300 000 
people, mostly Kurds, were expelled from the Kirkuk region, drastically changing the 
demographics of Kirkuk city (Baker, 2004). From 1997 onwards the Ba’ath Party 
government applied pressure to those non-Arabs living in areas under their control 
such as Kirkuk, Khaniqin, Sinjar, to “correct” their ethnicity. Nationality Correction 
Forms, were issued to the remaining non-Arab population (Kirkukui, 2007). These 
required registration as either Kurd, which resulted in expulsion over the green line 
into the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) or as Arab, which often necessitated participation 
in loyalist activities, including volunteering for paramilitary forces such as the popular 
army (Assyrian Council of Europe, 2010). Additionally, registration of newborn 
babies with non-Arabic ethnic or religious names was obstructed under the guise of 
being “alien to the heritage of Iraqi society.” (Assyrian Council of Europe, 2010). 
Every attempt was made to create an Arab dominance in the regions which bordered 
the green line and in doing so the cultural, linguistic and ethnic rights of the existing 
populations were denied. 
 
3.2.2 Kurdish Jerusalem 
 
The Kurds hold that accepting Kurdistan’s claim to Kirkuk is the only geographically, 
historically, demographically and morally sound action (O’Leary, 2007). The position 
of the Kurdish authorities is unwavering. They demand the preservation of a 
protected autonomy similar to pre-2003 and the opportunity, via referendum, of 
extending the Kurdish Autonomous Region to include Kirkuk. The history of 
persecution appears to drive the imperative to control their destiny in Kirkuk and 
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Kurdistan. The issue of Kirkuk is closely linked to Kurdish national identity and has 
become symbolic of the Kurdish struggle. Subsequently, Kirkuk has become a 
powerfully sacred concern and is described by the Kurdish leaders as their 
“Jerusalem”(Rafaat, 2008;252). Public opinion would not accept the forsaking of 
Kirkuk and therefore it is not likely that a Kurdish politician would make such a 
proposal. This has led to the Kurds consolidating their authority in Kirkuk post 2003. 
Kurdish authority is visible everywhere in the city. In addition to the provincial 
government and the police force, Kurdish military forces and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government intelligence service, the Asaish, are active in the city. 
 
 Figure 2:  Disputed Territories Claimed By The KRG 
 
 
(Taken from the International Crisis Group, 2008) 
 
3.2.3 Turkmen homeland 
 
74 
 
While Kirkuk is also often referred to as ‘The Heart’ of Kurdistan,9 it is equally 
important to the Turkmen people, who regard the diagonal strip of land stretching 
from the Syrian and Turkish border areas in the north of Iraq to the town of Mendeli 
on the Iranian border in Central Iraq to be Turkmeneli, Turkmen land. The Turkmens 
lay claim to Kirkuk city through an historical narrative in which their ancestors have 
been present in the region for centuries and have enjoyed key moments in the 
region’s leadership (Stansfield and Anderson. 2009). The question of who the 
Turkmen are and from where they originate is one of a complex series of narratives 
and debates. Stansfield states that few facts about the Turkmen population of Iraq 
are easy to establish and that it is not clear how many Turkmens inhabit Iraq or 
where they came from (Stansfield and Anderson. 2009).  
 
Figure 3: Land Claimed as Historically Turkmen 
 
 
(Taken from SOIM, 2005) 
 
                                                 
9
  Kurdish Leaders frequently use Kirkuk to appeal to national sentiment. For example since 1991 Talabani has referred to 
Kirkuk as the Jerusalem of Kurdistan and the heart of Kurdistan, an emotional metaphor rather than a direct comparison. 
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Academics and commentators alike tend to focus on the Kurdish demographic 
movements and suffering in the region and the vast majority of the literature from the 
mid 20th century onward focuses either on Iraqi elite level political history or, falls into 
a smaller body of literature, which can be deemed romantically pro- Kurdish 
(Stansfield and Anderson. 2009).  Consequently, the Turkmen community of Iraq has 
expressed concern that their suffering in the history of Kirkuk has been underplayed 
or ignored entirely (see Kerkuklu, 2007; Stansfield, 2009; Al-Hirmizi, 2007). The 
Turkmen narrative is framed by the injustices inflicted upon them throughout the 20th 
century at the hands of the state and also the ever encroaching Kurdish population. 
During this period the Iraqi political landscape was characterised by ethnically-
affiliated ideological choices and change was sought through violent action 
(Stansfield and Anderson. 2009). This led to Kirkuk’s Kurds and Turkmens taking up 
arms against each other and creating a legacy of massacres in the city. Such events 
have developed a ‘powerful symbolic dimension used to emphasise not only the 
plight of the Turkmens in the twentieth century but also the threats that may still 
exist’ (Stansfield and Anderson. 2009;62). One such event is the 1959 massacre, 
referred to by Al-Hirmizi as an ‘ever bleeding wound’ for the Turkmen community (Al-
Hirmizi, 2007;103) it remains as a stark reminder to the Turkmens of the dangers of 
living in a Kurdish dominated region of Iraq (Stansfield, 2009). 
 
The Turkmens consider themselves particularly wronged by external discussions of 
regional demography in terms of Arab, Kurd, and Turkmen proportions (Stansfield, 
2009;58). The 1957 census of the Kirkuk region is considered particularly significant 
in this discussion as it was conducted prior to the large scale population movements 
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of the Arabization policies. The results showed the Turkmens forming the majority 
group within Kirkuk city, while Kurds held the majority of the governorate in general. 
However, Turkmen academics suggest an overall inaccuracy of these numbers due 
to the mis-registration of many Turkmens as Arab or Kurd (Kerkuklu, 2007;74). 
Stansfield (2009;59) notes that Turkmens often refer to the writings of Batatu to 
illustrate support of their majority status.  Batatu declared Kirkuk to have been 
Turkish ‘through and through’ in its recent history and suggested that the economic 
rewards of oil industry had encouraged Kurdish immigration into the city in the 
twentieth century (Batatu, 1978: 913). Batatu also argued that by 1959 the Kurds 
had swollen to one third of the population and Turks had declined to just over half.   
 
The Turkmens believe that the under estimation of their population size illustrates 
miscalculations by western academics and journalists and a denial of their suffering 
at the hands of the Iraqi state. They maintain that the land taken under Arabization 
was in fact Turkmen land and not that of the Kurds. This belief serves as the 
foundation of their claim that they are the principle victims of Ba’ath party Arabization 
policies. Disputed as this may be, there is no denying that this linguistically and 
culturally distinct ethnic group has suffered from deliberate persecution. By 1973 
they were omitted from the provisional constitution of Iraq and during the 1970’s tens 
of thousands of Turkmen families were deported from Kirkuk against their will into 
the south of Iraq with hundreds of Turkmen villages being destroyed by the Iraqi 
regime under a variety of pretexts (Kerkuklu, 2007: 30). Turkmen communities are 
generally located in and around the citadel, which is the oldest location in the city, 
believing that their community settlement patterns reflect their primacy; Turkmen 
maintain Kirkuk to be their city. When this historical view of the city is coupled with 
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the suffering at the hands of Saddam’s regime, it becomes apparent that they are 
unlikely to yield their claim. Kirkuk’s Turkmen have stated that they will under no 
circumstances support the incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdish Region, preferring 
power sharing arrangements. They fear for their rights under the Kurdish authority 
and maintain their own historical claim to the city. 
 
3.2.4 Indigenous Arab and Christian populations  
 
Furthermore the governorate is home to a large Arab demographic who are both 
indigenous and as a result of forced migration, and to a smaller Assyrian population. 
The Kurdish authorities push for a forcible reversal of Arabization in Kirkuk has been 
met by fervent opposition from Kirkuk's Turkmen and Arabs. The sheer complexity of 
the issue is illustrated by the fact that the timescale of the Arabization policies has 
allowed for original Arab settlers to intermarry within the pre-existing population of 
Kirkuk and see their children and grandchildren born in the city. Expelling the Arab 
settlers, who were principally coerced by Saddam to settle in the north under the 
banner of ‘return’ is seen as perpetrating further injustice (Interview AB2, ABA, KD9). 
The very conceptualisation of ‘return’ is highly contested and frequently seen in 
terms of the forcible expulsion by the Arab community.  
 
3.2.5 Article 140 
 
The Coalition Provisional Authority, which governed Iraq in the year after the 
invasion, responded to the situation in Kirkuk by implementing a “stay-put” policy for 
Arab settlers. A legal process for determining property claims in the city was 
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employed: The Iraqi Property Claims Commission, but the body has been criticized 
for its extremely slow response (Interviews KD1, KD4,TM1). Displeased with the lack 
of action over Kirkuk, Kurdish parties insisted that the permanent Constitution 
replicate Article 58 of Iraq’s 2004 transitional Constitution. Negotiations over the 
permanent Iraqi Constitution almost failed over the Kirkuk question, but the Kurdish 
parties were ultimately successful. The resulting Article 140 of the new Iraqi 
constitution necessitated a three stage process: normalization, census, and 
referendum. Normalization would be achieved by the assisted return of internally 
displaced people and the recovery of their property. Arab settlers who choose to 
return to southern and central Iraq would be helped in doing so and the boundaries 
of the governorate of Kirkuk would be restored to that of pre 1974. Subsequently, a 
census and a referendum would be conducted to decide the future of the city and the 
governorate. The set deadline for the implementation of this article was December 
2007. However, this deadline has expired, been extended and expired again.  
 
Negotiations over the permanent Iraqi Constitution almost failed over the Kirkuk 
question and efforts to resolve the status of Kirkuk have currently stalled over non-
implementation of Article 140.  The issue is further complicated by the absence of 
reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the governorate. With no exact data 
available due to frequent accusations of vote rigging and disputes over voter 
eligibility, each group is free to claim the majority status and instigate IDP 
movements to reinforce their claim. This precarious situation has led to fluctuating 
demographics within the region; IDP’s of different ethnic origins have moved toward 
the region, while existing members of the population have fled, with sources noting 
at least 2,000 families having left Kirkuk alone in the latter half of 2007 (IRIN, 2007). 
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3.2.6 Ninewa  
 
Due to its significant oil reserves, ethnically mixed demographics and symbolic 
importance to the Kurds and Turkmen, Kirkuk has become the focus of the Arab-
Kurdish dispute. Much Iraqi and international attention has been devoted to defusing 
the ethnic tensions within the region. However, despite Kirkuk’s significance in 
negotiations, the territorial contestation extends far beyond its boundaries. The 
Kurdish Regional Government and Government of Iraq continue to contest land 
spread over three additional governorates, Diyala, Salah al-Din and Ninewa. The 
Governorate of Ninewa is of particular interest in terms of ethnic identity. Identity 
politics in Ninewa are especially intricate as the governorate is home to a diverse 
range of competing and often antagonistic ethnic identities. It has witnessed 
significant clashes between Kurdish and Arab nationalist movements in the capital of 
Mosul and further minority ethnic groups have demographic dominance in their 
regional locations.  
 
The governorate has a majority Arab population with a strong Kurdish minority (ICG, 
2009). Under the Ba’ath party, Kurdish national aspirations were suppressed in 
Ninewa through forced displacement and discriminatory resource distribution 
administered from the Arabist capital of Mosul. In 2003 the Kurds set out to redress 
their position in the region. Kurdish forces moved across the Green Line and laid 
claim to six of the governorate’s nine districts (Sinjar, Tal Afar, Tilkaef, Sheikhan, 
Hamdaniya, and Makhmour) as well as two additional subdistricts (Qahtaniya and 
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Bashiqa)10. With the exception of Arab dominated Mosul this constitutes the 
governorate’s remaining arable land and populated areas (ICG, 2009)11. In 2005 a 
Sunni Arab boycott of provincial elections allowed the Kurds to gain regional political 
control which was disproportionate to their population size. The conflict dynamic in 
Ninewa witnessed the Kurds gaining unbalanced control in an area in which they 
were actually a minority (ICG 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, between 2003 and 2008, Ninewa’s strong Arabist, military and Sunni 
religious traditions resulted in a growing number of Sunni insurgence groups 
operating in the governorate (Russel, 2010; Eisenstadt, 2005; Dagher; 2009). Driven 
by mounting anti-Kurdish and anti-Shiite resentment, former officers, Baathists and 
an increasingly destitute youth have been recruited by religiously motivated 
insurgency groups to enforce rule over predominantly Sunni Arab areas (ICG, 
2009)12. Traditional Arab-Kurd friction was overlaid with the essentially Sunni versus 
Shiite sectarian struggle previously centred in the capital. However, the political 
environment changed gradually as Iraqi forces strengthened the resolve to stabilise 
Ninewa and Prime Minister al-Maliki sought to push back Kurdish territorial 
advances. 
 
The 2009 provincial elections saw Sunni Arab leaders re-enter the political arena 
uniting around a ‘resolutely nationalist and anti-Kurdish platform’ (ICG, 2009;9) 
Unified around Ninewa’s strong Arab identity and the non-negotiable existence of the 
1991 Kurdish boundary, the al-Hadbaa National List achieved success in the 
                                                 
10
 Most maps of Ninewa also show the district of Akre as part of the province. However, this district is entirely above the Green 
Line and has been fully administered by the KRG since 1991. 
11
 Find qoute Ninewa’s southern districts of Al-Ba’aj and Al-Hadr are largely desert and sparsely populated. 
12
 A further exploration of this is addressed in the following section.  
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elections. Al-Hadbaa subsequently set about reasserting the provincial governments’ 
authority in the disputed territories previously under Kurdish control. Rising tensions 
have seen clashes occur where Arabs and Kurds vie for administrative control and 
where Iraq’s army and Kurdish peshmergas face off across an increasingly tense 
divide. 
 
3.2.7 Minorities 
Further complicating the issue of demographic majority in these areas is the heavy 
concentration of smaller ethnic and religious minorities. Ninewa has been home to 
indigenous Assyrian Christians13, Yazidis14, Shabaks15, Turkmen, and other 
minorities for centuries. They account for 10 per cent of the Iraqi population and are 
concentrated in disputed borderlands between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq. All districts 
in question demonstrate ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity beyond the two 
conflicting parties. Many of these minorities hold demographic dominance in their 
districts and they have been represented in Ninewa for millennia. These groups 
frequently complain of being caught up in the larger Arab-Kurdish struggle. Non-
Kurdish groups interviewed in Ninewa suggested that their continued existence was 
threatened by the introduction of restricted rights based on ethnic identity, denial of 
the means to reproduce cultural identity and politically motivated forced migration of 
Kurds into parts of the region. These actions are perceived as a deliberate policy of 
                                                 
13
 The Assyrian community or Assyrian-Chaldo community are an ethnic group characterised by their religious and linguistic 
markers. Assyrians are a Christian group who speak a Neo-Aramaic dialect.  1947 census 3.1% of Iraqi population 
concentrated primarily in the northern governorates. UN 2003 1.2% 
14
 The Yezidi community are a unique ethnic group with a religion, language, and culture distinct from the Arab and Kurdish 
cultures among which they live. However, in the pursuit of security the Yezidi community have alternately claimed to be Kurds, 
Turkmens, Arabs and Assyrians and this has caused great divisions within their representation. Therefore their political 
alliances are split and two distinct interpretations of education provision are provided from within the community. Ninewa has 
various heavily-populated Yezidi areas are in SInjar, Sheikan and Talkif and Ba;shique. 1947 census 0.67% of population./ 
2003 UN1% 
15
 The religious and ethnic minority community of the Shabek reside to the east of the Ninewa province in the region often 
referred to as the Ninewa plain. 
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Kurdification which threatens to assimilate minority non-Kurdish groups.  The Kurds 
are accused of moving systematically to increase their control of territories to 
guarantee annexation into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) while Non-
Kurdish groups in the region continue to resist what they see as Kurdish 
encroachment.  
3.3 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Security and Identity 
 
 
3.3.1 Overview  
 
It is impossible to consider the current ethno-political environment in the disputed 
territories without an understanding of how the US invasion of Iraq influenced 
security. As briefly eluded to in reference to the political contest over Ninewa, the 
ethnically defined contest in the disputed territories is not clearly divided along neat 
ethnic lines. Instead it is influenced, entwined and intrinsically linked to the wider 
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sectarian-based identity conflicts that have been exacerbated post 2003.  It is for this 
reason that the following section will examine the decisions made by the US 
administration in the aftermath of the invasion and how they have contributed to 
fortifying ethnic identity in the region and creating ethnically defined insecurity 
 
3.3.2 Operation Iraqi Freedom’s fortification of ethnic identity 
 
Despite strong opposition, Operation Iraqi Freedom was instigated by a coalition of 
troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland on March 
20th 2003. According to the then U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, the objective was "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi 
people”(White House, 2003). Tragically, over the course of the last ten years these 
aims have not been met. It is now widely accepted that the reason weapons of mass 
destruction were never found was because they never existed in the first place 
(Phythian; 206). The link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda is highly 
contested and the activity of terrorist cells in Iraq has undoubtedly increased post 
invasion (BBC, 2003).  And finally, although the Iraqi people were liberated from the 
rein of dictator Saddam Hussein, their freedom from terror has not been achieved 
(Freedom House, 2012). In 2012 Iraq was considered one of the most dangerous 
countries in the world, appearing fourth from the bottom of the Global Peace Index 
(2012), with only Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia proving less peaceful. 
Furthermore, in 2012 Iraq featured at the top of the Global Terrorism Index and was 
classified as ‘not free’ by the Freedom House democracy scale (FreedomHouse, 
2012).  
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Understandably, the war in Iraq has since been described by former sectary of state, 
Madeline Albright as possibly “one of the worst disasters in American foreign policy” 
(New York Times, 2006), with Bush stating that the intelligence failure in Iraq was the 
biggest regret of his presidency (The Guardian, 2008). Yet the initial flawed 
intelligence was only the first mistake in a long road of coalition miscalculations 
which have contributed to Iraq’s current security status and influenced ethnopolitics. 
In the months following the US invasion officials faced the daunting challenge of 
occupying and reconstructing an Iraq that had been devastated by decades of 
sanctions and war. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear to see that the decisions 
made in this initial period contributed to fortifying sectarian identity and shaping the 
political landscape in terms of ethno-political influence (Barak, 2007)). A series of ill-
advised coalition policies formed the future of conflict in Iraq and served to divide 
communities according to identity.  
 
The first of such steps was the decree that Iraq’s ruling Ba’ath Party would be 
disbanded without consultation or review. These party members were banned from 
future employment in government roles, which resulted in 15,000–30,000 of Iraq’s 
officials being excluded from participating in the new Iraqi government (Megally and 
Mufti, 2005).  This ruling was upheld and few attempts were made to incorporate any 
members of the Ba’ath party into the new government formations. A consequence of 
this action, highlighted by Barak (2007), has been the grave impact on governmental 
competency through removing all those with administrative experience. By removing 
the Ba’ath Party collectively and at great ‘cost of administrative efficiency’ (Bremer, 
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2005:45), the US officials failed to recognise the differentiated motivations of party 
members.  
 
The former regime had ultimate control over state affairs and as such party 
membership offered the only means of social mobility. The Baath party contained 
members with varying levels of ideological affiliation. “By failing to distinguish these 
self-motivated Ba’ath members from their ideological comrades, US officials in fact 
pushed the two groups closer to one another” in their resistance of the US 
occupation (CSIS 2006). The move also created a political vacuum which the 
existing parties and returning exiles failed to fill. The only influential actors who 
operated outside Iraq’s tightly controlled political system before 2003 and managed 
to remain in place after the invasion were religious leaders. As such it was these 
leaders who entered the previously secular political arena to address the void 
(Barak, 2007).  
 
In an equally unconsidered move, the same logic was applied to the Iraqi Army. US 
Chief Administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, issued a statement that the institution was 
officially disbanded on May 23, 200316. This caused hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers to lose their jobs, their salaries and pensions, and their honour and prestige 
(Hashim, 2003; Tripp, 2004). As such it is estimated that 350,000 soldiers, described 
as ‘well trained, well armed, and deeply angry at the Americans’, were ‘sent out into 
bitter shame and unemployment’ (Danner, 2003). US officials failed to appreciate 
                                                 
16
 This step has been explained in several ways. Some argued that the USA disbanded the Iraqi Army in order to prevent it 
from opposing the USA’s ‘nation-building’ project owing to the troops’ loyalty to Saddam Hussein and the army’s own, dubious 
character (Slevin, 2003). Others explained that the Iraqi Army in fact fragmented soon after the invasion (Slevin, 2003; 
Slocombe, 2003; Perito, 2005; Rathmall et al., 2005; Bremer, 2006). Finally, it was suggested that Shi’is and Kurds, who had 
been oppressed by the army and were, moreover, underrepresented in its ranks, demanded its total dissolution and, perhaps, 
made their support for the ‘nation-building’ project conditional on this (Slevin, 2003; Hickey, 2005; Bremer, 2006: 59). 
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both the central role of the military and the particular history of the Iraqi Army (Barak 
2007). Despite its negative associations for Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’is (Sahil 1996), the 
military was the state’s most patriotic institution. The Army fought on behalf of the 
Iraqi state almost continuously for nearly a quarter of a century, having been 
involved in three inter-state conflicts in the past three decades. The dissolution of the 
army consequently held symbolic significance and was ‘tantamount to erasing its 
entire institutional history’ (Barak 2003). Its un-ceremonial dismissal was perceived 
as a dishonour to all those who had given their lives for their country (Barak, 2007). 
This action consequently fuelled the opposition to the US-sponsored ‘nation-building’ 
project and the dismissed soldiers had the necessary training and weapons to do so 
actively (Hashim, 2003; Janabi, 2004; Qassab 2005; Al-Jazeer, 2004).  
 
The disbanding of the Iraqi Army, like the Ba’ath Party and Iraq’s ruling elite, was 
misguided and had direct consequences for the relationship between ethnic identity 
and security (Barak, 2007; Roth, 2004; Gordon 2004). Barak describes it as ‘the 
single most important action that induced Iraq’s inter-communal security dilemma’ 
(Barak, 2007;455).  The weakness of the emerging political parties coupled with the 
decreasing security environment encouraged Iraqi citizens to take responsibility for 
their own safety. The absence of an effective and legitimate authority thus prompted 
many Iraqi citizens to rally around religious leaders and communal militias, which 
were continually growing in the country.  Iraq’s prime minister, Iyad Allawi stated that 
‘since the state was developed in Iraq, institutions have disappeared and people 
have withdrawn into their clans and tribes (New York Times 2006)’. The dismantling 
of Iraq’s formal institutions, regime, and political elite aggravated the tensions 
between its major communities by making security their primary concern. While 
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dependence on clan or tribe for security occurred principally in rural areas, in the 
cities it was the communal militias that provided security (Barak, 2007). In addition, 
the reformation of the Iraqi security force resulted in ethnically homogenous units, 
made up mostly of Shi’as and Kurds. This increased Sunni apprehensions towards 
the new security sector and impinged on the willingness of Sunni leaders to 
cooperate on the political level (Filkins 2005).  
 
As the security vacuum grew, so did crimes perpetrated by opportunistic criminals 
and terrorists seeking to destabilise the country’s fragile security situation. 
Consequently, the Iraqi people sought out the security offered by their respective 
communities as they faced a decrease in security throughout the country. Al-Khoei 
(2012) suggests that the Iraq people did not turn on themselves in a sectarian 
conflict, and suggests that the ‘Sunnis and Shia of Iraq are not killing each other, 
instead, violent jihadists are killing both Sunnis and Shia’ (Guardian, 2012). Such 
groups are ruthlessly exploiting Iraq’s descent into political turmoil since the US troop 
withdrawal to further their own aims. Under these circumstances, it was logical for 
many Iraqis to resort to self-help: While Sunnis formed armed groups that engaged 
in ‘resistance’ against the US forces and their local allies, Shi’is and Kurds formed 
militias and joined Iraq’s new security sector, where they became dominant 
(Stansfield; 2010). Yet, all of these steps, designed to increase the security of the 
communities involved, exacerbated inter-communal tensions. The result was a 
country drenched in private militias and unstructured security forces, each acting in 
isolation to protect their own communities from criminals and terrorist acts. 
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The nature of the fighting in Iraq ‘evolved from a struggle between Coalition forces 
and former regime loyalists to a much more diffuse mix of conflicts, involving a 
number of Sunni groups, Shi’ite militias, and foreign jihadists’(CSIS 2007;3). A 
complex pattern of conflict has emerged which reflects a broader fight for sectarian 
and ethnic control of political and economic space (CSIS 2007). There is little 
cohesive sense of nationhood or common agreement on national Iraqi identity. 
Stansfield (2011;29) writes that political identities have been ‘broken by the initial 
chaotic devolution of power that afflicted Iraq in the first years following regime 
change, with these localized, sectarian and ethnic identities being ossified in a most 
brutal civil war, and then normalized as being the way politics works in Iraq in the 
post-US setting since 2011’. Consequently Iraqi politics now operates according to 
identities and the Chatham House report (2011) on Iraq’s future suggests that 
security in Iraq will depend ‘not only on the government’s success in reining in 
militias and strengthening the security forces, but on the perceived utility and 
effectiveness of participation in peaceful political processes, from elections to 
protests’(2001;3). 
 
Regardless of international attempts to stem the violence and establish the 
legitimacy of political institutions, ethnic and sectarian tensions continued to push the 
country further toward civil war (CSIS, 2007). Iraq now faces a complex mix of civil 
wars. Each conflict involves a different level and mix of violence. Each also involves 
political, ethnic, religious, and economic struggles for control of space and 
resources, as well as sheer political power (CSIS, 2007). In 2007 the Pentagon 
defined the conflict in Iraq as follows: Much of the present violence is focused on 
local issues, such as sectarian, political, and economic control of Baghdad; Kurdish, 
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Arab, and Turkmen aspirations for Kirkuk; and the political and economic control of 
Shi’a regions in the south (Department of Defence, 2007;8). The concentration on 
local politics means that each governorate in Iraq has its own specific conflict actors 
which generate threats to ethnic and religious groups in that locality. As such in the 
multi-ethnic northern governorates of Ninewa and Kirkuk, religious sectarianism, 
disengaged populations and rejection of the occupation is accompanied by ethnic 
competition for regional control.  
 
3.2.2 Current Context: Identity and security in the disputed territories 
 
Thus far this chapter has presented the contextual history to the regional dispute of 
territory in the north of Iraq, both administratively between Baghdad and the KRG, 
and symbolically between the ethnic groups in the region.   It has investigated how 
the regime change in 2003 simultaneously opened the door for administrative 
change in the region and fortified ethnic identities due to heightened insecurity and 
absence of political control. In this final section of this chapter the thesis will unpack 
the influence of these two factors on security and ethnic identity in the region.   
Due to the growing insecurity and heightened regional competition both minority 
groups and dominate ethnicities in the region have retreated into their own 
communities with increased ethnic enclaves and ethnically homogenous residential 
patterns (Rydgren, 2011). The perception of threat against religious and ethnic 
groups in the region is compounded by the absence of a functioning security service 
in the region which operates in the interests of all Iraqis. Numerous security and 
military groups are operating in both Kirkuk and Ninewa, each representing their 
ethnic groups and resulting in a lack of a unified command or operational structure.  
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For example there are the units of the Iraqi Army’s 12th Division in addition to local 
police forces and the Kurdish security and armed forces known as asayish and 
peshmerga. Mohammed Khalil al-Juburi, an Arab member of the Kirkuk Provincial 
Council suggests that “there is a security chaos in the disputed territories. Each one 
of the security groups acts on their own.... There needs to be a framework to 
address this.” (Interview AB10)   The political debate around security forces and their 
presence and power in the disputed territories is framed in terms of ethnic 
composition and access to equal protection for each ethnic group. The Turkmen and 
Arab representation have been vocal in their objection to the presence of Kurdish 
forces in the disputed territories, with the Turkmen calling for their own security 
forces to be created (Aswal al-Iraq, 2012)17. The declaration of distrust in the security 
forces (referring specifically to the Kurdish Asayish  forces) was justified by claims 
that the existing force was either infiltrated by insurgents or run by political parties 
whose wider political aspirations influence their dealings with other ethnic groups.  
Security has become framed by ethnic identity because each community has 
experienced threats to its continued existence in the region. The lack of national 
security structures and the continued ethnic competition over administrative control 
have fuelled inter-ethnic tensions over the last ten years. Return migration of Kurds 
is seen by Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk as an attempt by Kurdish elites in Erbil to 
influence the outcome of a future referendum, while Kurds view Arab hostility to the 
                                                 
17
 The Iraqi government has showed approval for the formation of a Turkmen armed force to protect the Turkmen residential 
territories, according to a Turkmen member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council. The Iraqi government has approved the 
recruitment of 500 Turkmen taskforce members as protection for the Turkmen residential territories of Kirkuk will be their main 
duty.Read more: http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2013/08/government-approves-turkmen-security-
forces/#ixzz2dBgKS4UM 
91 
 
return process as simply a continuation of Arabization policies.18 In the absence of 
reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the governorate and no exact data 
available due to frequent accusations of vote rigging and disputes over voter 
eligibility, each ethnic group is free to claim the majority status and instigate IDP 
movements to reinforce their claim.  Arab communities have accused the KRG of 
expelling them from their lands in the aftermath of the initial invasion and face 
continued aggression from Kurdish security forces (Interview, AB6; see Radwar; 
2010. 2013). In 2003 in the town of Khanaqin, PUK Persmerga reportedly expelled 
up to six hundred Arab families, comprising some four thousand individuals, 
according to Human Rights Watch (2006). Turkmen representatives also report 
increasing intimidation and threats, according to the latest report by the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front Human Rights Office in Kirkuk. The report states that there have 
been sixty eight targeted attacks of violence against Turkmen individuals or 
assemblies during the last 6 months alone in the North of Iraq (Turkmen Front, 
2013). Assaults are directed at Turkmen residential areas and businesses and have 
resulted in a climate of fear for the Turkmen communities in the Disputed Territories.   
 
The larger ethnic groups, Arab, Kurd and Turkmen, have all documented acts of 
targeted violence and denial of representation. In addition, other forms of “cleansing” 
have become at least as important as major overt acts of violence. The territorial 
dispute and wider political and religious conflicts have seen groups seeking 
domination over others or seeking to push the weaker side out of areas where they 
have the majority or have superior power.  These forms of “soft” ethnic cleansing 
include threats, physical intimidation, blackmail, seizure of property, raids on homes 
                                                 
18
 However, Kurdish return migration is not universally popular among all Kirkuk Kurds either, with some of them fearing a 
deterioration of interethnic relations. (Interviews KD 3; KD8, KD9) 
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and businesses, use of checkpoints to push other factions out, kidnappings and 
extortion, misuse of government offices and the police, and disappearances. Such 
incidences are frequently reported by Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs (See Human rights 
reports from; Human Rights Watch, SOIM, Kurdish Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, Assyrian Aid Agency, Minority Rights Group and others).  
 
The religious divide between Sunni and Shia has also lead to sectarian violence, 
with the targeting of places of worship and ethnically homogenous residential areas. 
In April 2013 a raid upon the protest site in Hawija, Kirkuk incited a wave of fresh 
violence across Iraq. The demonstrators were openly connected to the Baathist 
Naqshibandi insurgent group who oppose the current government (Musings on Iraq; 
2013). Government troops entered the camp under the pretext of searching for a 
criminal. During the encounter security forces used excessive force which lead to 
dozens of protesters’ deaths (Telephone Interview AB8; BBC, 2013). The 
government offered to form a fact-finding committee on the Hawija incident, to be 
chaired by the current Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlag. But the 
Education Minister Mohammed Tamim and Science and Technology Minister Abdul 
Karim al-Samarrai, both Sunnis, said they were resigning as a consequence of the 
events, bringing the total of Sunni ministers who have resigned since March to four. 
Iraqi Sunnis accuse the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of widespread 
discrimination, citing that they are targeted by the heavy-handed anti-terrorism 
policies.  
 
Additionally, opportunistic criminals who commit crimes motivated by greed but often 
interpreted through sectarianism exacerbate these divisions. The decreased security 
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in the region has led to increased unscrupulous crime, such as kidnapping for 
ransom and carjacking which are motivated by money but interpreted as acts of 
sectarianism. Organized criminals are faking a jihadist identity to mask a real motive 
of extortion and thievery (Amnesty International, 2011). Amnesty International (2011) 
report that Christians are regarded as rich and without protection, traditionally lacking 
tribal or militia links, making them easy targets for exploitation.  
Currently, minority groups find themselves to be disproportionately targeted for 
terrorist attacks motivated by ethnic and religious prejudice and criminality. This has 
led to high levels of emigration from the province, particularly among the Chaldo-
Assyrian community. Negotiating between being co-opted and being threatened, 
they have become vulnerable pawns in the wider dispute. A string of deadly attacks 
following the pull-out of US troops from Iraqi cities and towns in June 2009 exposed 
the continuing vulnerability of minority groups in the disputed territories. Four 
bombings, targeting Christians, Sabean-Mandaeans, Yazidis, Turkmen Shi'as, 
Shabaks and Kaka'is, took over 100 lives and left many hundreds more wounded. 
The defencelessness of minority groups is compounded by a lack of affiliation to a 
security force and impotency within the political arena. Furthermore, members of 
religious minorities are easily identifiable through traditional occupations and 
customs which are seen as in contradiction to strict interpretations Islam. For 
example, the sale of alcohol has been largely the domain of Christians and Yazidis, 
making them a target for Islamist armed groups and militias. The Iraq Sustainable 
Democracy Project (ISDP; 2008) reports that Christian groups in Ninewa believe 
persecution by extremists arose because they are perceived as co-religionists and 
collaborators with the Americans. Fear for their lives has driven a disproportionately 
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high number of members of minority communities to flee Iraq in recent years 
resulting in a distinct threat to the continuing existence of such groups in the region.  
3. 4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The ethnically motivated dispute over the six governorates in the north of Iraq has 
resulted in a perpetual state of limbo in the region. Iraqi politics have stalled over the 
issue of Kirkuk and a final administrative resolution appears to be out of sight. The 
ethnic basis to territorial claims has heightened the role of ethno-politics within the 
region and amplified the discourse over linguistic presence, cultural representation 
and minority rights. Communities are increasingly ethnically homogenous and retreat 
into themselves for protection.  The wider insecure environment, in which sectarian 
based attacks are frequent, and the disengagement of ethnically and religiously 
affiliated militias creates fear and  has served to elevate debates over territorial 
representation to the height of becoming an ethnic survival issue. 
 
Within this climate of insecurity, ethnic competition and fear, the diverse population 
of the disputed territories has continued with everyday life since 2003. All 
communities, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation require the provision of basic 
services and institutions. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine how the ever 
present issue of ethnicity has influenced the post 2003 reconstruction of the 
education system in the region; particularly in the more ethnically diverse 
governorates of Kirkuk and Ninewa.  
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Chapter 4: Iraqi Education through a Societal Security Lens 
4.1 Introduction 
  
It is the purpose of this thesis to determine what factors have influenced the 
development of education structures in the disputed territories post 2003 in order to 
approach the central research question of ‘How has ethnic identity influenced the 
education narrative in the disputed territories’. This investigation will be structured 
around the concept of societal security and the role identity protection has played in 
shaping education structures and schools. The need to protect identity in the context 
of the Iraqi disputed territories can be seen to have two fields of influence: firstly, the 
heightened role of ethno-politics within the region and the continued uncertainty over 
the final administrative status of Kirkuk; and secondly, the environment of physical 
insecurity subject to seemingly sectarian based attacks. The ethnically defined 
territorial and administrative dispute has resulted in ethnic groups fearing 
marginalisation should administrative power fall to another community, while a 
myriad of armed groups serve as conflict actors,  increasing these fears through 
targeted sectarian violence. The dispute over territorial control and ‘ownership’ of 
Kirkuk cannot be examined solely by analysis of contemporary events. Ethnic 
competition is based on historical claims and the region’s complex history of ethnic-
conflict and co-existence. Equally, the current role of identity in formal education 
structures cannot be investigated in isolation from the education system that 
preceded it. How education influenced identity in the past will undoubtedly have 
significant influence on how it is perceived in the present.  
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To understand the role of identity in today’s Iraqi education system the thesis must 
explore how education has previously been used to fortify or diminish ethic identity 
and culture in the region. The need for this understanding became increasingly 
apparent during the data collection period as interviewee’s depicted the current 
system’s evolution in direct reaction to the legacy of what went before. Therefore the 
following chapter will unpack the role of identity in education during the Ba’ath era 
and highlight the purpose bestowed on education in terms of building a collective 
Arab identity. The chapter will demonstrate that knowledge of this is vital to 
understanding the current educational operating environment due to the legacy of 
Arabisation policies which continue to shape education delivery.  
 
The chapter draws on both the thesis’s original interview transcripts and secondary 
documentation to demonstrate the Ba’ath regimes use of Arabisation policies 
through education, and furthermore to highlight the influence it has on the current 
education narrative. The first section will outline the education system which existed 
prior to 2003 under the Ba‘ath party. It will highlight the way in which ethnic identity 
indicators such as language and religion were managed within the education system 
from the late 1970’s to 2003, and explore the purpose conferred on education by the 
Ba’ath Party. The second section of the chapter will devote itself to demonstrating 
the contemporary significance of this legacy on the education sector narrative and 
current understandings of education’s purpose. 
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4.2 The role of education in Iraqi Arab Nationalism 
 
Iraq’s education system, established at the countries inception, offered both public 
and private paths eventually evolving to education becoming public and free at all 
levels, and mandatory at the primary level (De Santisteban, 2005). Shortly after 
hosting the 1976 Baghdad Conference for the Eradication of Illiteracy, in which Arab 
leaders and international experts discussed the potential for progressive educational 
reforms in the region, the Ba’athist-led Iraqi government passed the Compulsory 
Education Law. Children between the ages of six and fifteen were required to attend 
state schools; those who violated this law would have to serve time in state prison. 
This law helped raise the literacy rate in many governorates and strengthened the 
Iraqi government’s role as the chief maintainer and supervisor of the free public 
education system. The introduction of free education at primary, secondary, and 
university levels led consequently to UNESCO estimating that primary schools had 
nearly a one hundred per cent gross enrolment attendance rate in the 1980s (United 
Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, 2003).  
 
Additionally, the self declared secular educational system strongly supported 
women’s right to education. In the 1980s the primary education enrolment was split 
almost equally between male and female; forty seven per-cent female and fifty three 
per-cent male (UNICEF, 2003).  By 1991 thirty per-cent of Iraqi university faculty 
members were women. (This statistic is often highlighted in the literature in relation 
to the fact that it is higher than that of many western universities in 2000 – See 
Romano and Brown 2006; Muftah, 2013; ). Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, Iraq’s 
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national literacy campaign was recognized as an international educational 
achievement and literacy rates drastically increased from fifty two per cent-in 1977 to 
eighty per-cent in 1987 (UNESCO, 2003). As such, Iraqi education in the 1980’s has 
often been cited one of the best systems in the Arab world. Between 1970 and 1984 
Iraq’s education system was highly praised and by 1984, major accomplishments 
had been achieved, which include but are not limited to: 
• Gross enrolment rates close to one hundred per-cent 
• High level of gender enrolment parity  
• Illiteracy among the 15-45 age group declined to less than ten per-cent 
• Dropout rates were the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa [MENA] region 
• Education spending was six per cent of the Gross National Product [GNP] and 
twenty per cent of Iraq’s total government budget. 
(UNESCO, 2005) 
Yet the international community’s respect for the achievements of the education 
system failed to objectively assess the education provision in the country.  While 
universal access to education is indeed crucial, ensuring that it is of high quality and 
serves the interests of the community to which it is delivered must also be a top 
priority. However, acclaim for the Ba’ath party’s education programme was based 
solely on enrolment indicators and literacy rates. No assessment of the purpose of 
education or its resulting content was conducted.  Therefore inherent failings in the 
Iraq education system went internationally unnoticed. Under the Ba’ath party regime 
education was highly influenced by politically motivated state-building projects which 
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sought unification of national identity under an exclusively Arab banner. The Ba’ath 
goal of a unified ethnic identity had serious implications for education delivery to the 
populations of the ethnically diverse northern territories whose distinct mother tongue 
languages and cultural practices differed from the majority Arab identity in the South 
of the country. Kurdish, Turkmani, and Assyrian were all active mother tongue 
languages within the northern territories and each ethnic group equally had its own 
place in Iraq’s historical and geographical narrative.   
 
Within the region, mother tongue language has served as a key identity indicator for 
communities and the protection of language rights has been central to the 
negotiation of Iraqi education rights and regional political debate. Officially the right 
to education in a mother tongue language was constitutionally approved from the 
inception of Iraq. It has subsequently been subject to various governmental decrees 
to consolidate these rights. The spoken use of Kurdish and the publication of Kurdish 
literature were guaranteed by the 1932 constitution and in 1958 the Kurdish 
language was officially recognised as the second language of the country and was 
used and studied in schools and universities (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992:79). 
Furthermore, in 1970, following the first Kurdish-Iraqi war the Iraqi government and 
the Kurdish parties of the north agreed a peace accord which granted the Kurds 
regional autonomy. The accord recognised Kurdish as an official Iraqi language and 
amended the constitution to reflect this, stating that; “the Iraqi people is made up of 
two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality" (Iraqi Constitution). 
Equally the constitutional right to education in the Turkmen language of Turkmeni 
was further consolidated in 1970 with an Iraqi governmental decree (No (89) dated 
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24 January 1970) which granted the minorities their cultural rights, including teaching 
in their mother tongue.  
 
Yet when discussing education in the Ba’ath era with interview participants it was 
frequently stated that linguistically specific education was routinely denied to non-
Arab groups by the Ba’ath Party policies that were in contradiction to the 
constitutional rights promised them. Interviews suggested that the resolutions and 
decrees written into Iraqi political history were systematically ignored and overridden 
by prohibiting decrees which banned non Arabic language education. The ongoing 
conflict between the Kurdish region and Baghdad, coupled with the implementation 
of Arabisation policies in the region to solidify the central government’s control of the 
vast oil fields, resulted in the repeated denial of linguistic rights in the region.  One 
interview participant expressed his frustration of continual denial by stating that: 
 
‘Most of Iraq’s constitutions have stipulated the rights of the Turkmens to 
study in their mother tongue. And yet we were always denied.   The Divine 
Constitution in creating human beings in different mother tongues, which is a 
great miracle of the Almighty demands it. The Iraqi Constitution for 1932 
demands it. The dissolved Revolution Command Council Decree No (89) of 
1970 demands it. The current Constitution, Article 4/Fourth and the Universal 
Human Rights Regulations, demands it. And yet still always in Iraq the 
Turkmen are denied this right.’ (Interview TM3)   
 
The constitutional promise of language rights under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party 
are now viewed as a form of political placebo. Such rights were given to non-Arab 
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communities to placate and subdue them when their demands threatened to 
influence the perceived demographic of the oil rich northern governorates. It was 
presented by interviewees from minority ethnic groups that the Ba’ath party never 
intended to see such policies reach their full implementation. Despite moments of 
success, minority communities struggled with the ongoing animosity of the Iraqi 
regime, and failed to achieve continuous access to education in their mother tongue 
languages. ‘The promises were to keep us quiet, they were not honourable 
promises, there was no intention behind them. When we refused to be subdued they 
removed our rights altogether’ (Interview KD3).  
 
In 1974 the Iraqi government imposed a draft of the 1970 autonomy agreement 
which left the symbolic and oil rich Kirkuk under Iraqi government control. Kurdish 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani rejected the agreement and called for a new rebellion.  In 
the years that followed the central government stepped up its policy of Arabisation in 
the region until the all out genocide of the late 1980’s. The differential treatment of 
Iraqi citizens across ethno-sectarian lines was a defining feature of Saddam 
Hussein's regime. Consequently, in addition to the population movements and 
outright violence of the Saddam era, the ethnic narratives of oppression, from all 
communities, pay significant attention to this denial of educational rights (Kerkuklu, 
2007; Al-Hirmizi, 2005; Minority Right Group, 2011). Throughout the 1970’s and 
1980’s every attempt was made to use the education system of Kirkuk and the 
surrounding disputed territories to assimilate the non-Arabs in the area and to 
prevent their cultural development. Education became a deliberate vehicle through 
which the Ba’ath party sought to implement Arabization in the multi ethnic northern 
territories. In accordance with the planned systematic assimilation of the non-Arab 
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population, study in non-Arabic languages eventually became prohibited outright and 
constitutional promises were retracted. Education became centrally controlled 
through Baghdad, with the implementation of state sanctioned textbooks and 
teaching practices. The regime controlled the teaching of all subjects, using history, 
geography, and civics to enforce Ba'athist ideology. They forbade reference to Iraq’s 
multicultural makeup and as such ethnic historical narratives were omitted from the 
curriculum (Kerkuklu, 2007: 11).  
 
The Ba’ath Party strove to use education in their state building project and 
manipulated a curriculum which would facilitate this. The regime used schools to 
communicate with the population, dispersing an image of an Arab nation, and 
indoctrinating loyalty to the state. Individual institutions in the city of Kirkuk, and 
throughout Iraq, were deprived of making any decisions.  Non-Arab ethnic identity 
became the primary casualty in this propaganda war. The study of geography was 
used to legitimise the wider Arabization policies. Territorial name changes, from 
traditional names reflecting a particular ethnic group to Arabic names, were justified 
using geography lessons (Kerkuklu, 2007). Maps were re-drawn and ethnically 
based historical claims to territory were denied (Stansfield and Anderson, 2007). 
Equally, history omitted reference to the rich ethnic diversity in the north of Iraq, 
instead portraying an Arab centric representation of historical events. In the same 
spirit, non-Arab schools across the disputed territories were assigned Arabic names 
derived from Arabic heroes in order to facilitate changing their ethos and inspiring 
allegiance to the new Arab state. Specific examples of Turkmen schools subjected to 
such changes have been documented by numerous scholars and include the 
schools of Yieldezlar to al- Fajer al-Jadid, Yedi Qardash to Ba’ath and then to 
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Qadasiyya and Doghroloq to Omar Ben Addulaziz (Stansfield, 2009: 66). Several 
presidential decrees and directives from state security and intelligence organisations 
indicate that the Turkmen community was deliberately targeted in this respect 
(Kerkuklu, 2007).  
 
In addition to the use of the curriculum, the Ba’ath party employed a variety of 
methods to control languages in the education sector. Due to the concentration of 
ethnic populations, some school catchment areas had ethnically homogenous pupil 
intakes. In such circumstances teachers would automatically resort to using the 
collective mother tongue while in the classroom. In an attempt to prohibit this use of 
non-Arabic languages as the medium for national education instruction, Turkmani 
and Kurdish speaking state employed teachers were transferred to the south of Iraq 
and a variety of legislation was introduced to prevent them from seeking employment 
in areas populated by their respective ethnic groups, particularly Kirkuk City 
(Kerkuklu, 2007, Interview TM1, Interview TM5). A decree was passed which 
compounded this employment legislation by preventing Turkmen graduates in 
general, but particularly those who had graduated from Turkish universities, from 
obtaining employment in Kirkuk and the surrounding areas (Kerkuklu, 2007: 11). This 
served to not only prevent the use of Turkmeni and Kurdish languages but also to 
limit Turkmen graduates from Turkish universities using their non-Baath education.  
 
 
Furthermore, all civil servants, including teachers, were obliged to join the Ba'ath 
Party and were subjected to ideological testing and surveillance (Velloso De 
Santisteban, 2005: 63). This attempt to ensure that teachers of all ethnic 
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backgrounds followed the central government’s education agenda created a climate 
of ‘paranoia’ (Interview KD8) within schools. The state’s aim to foster an Iraqi 
nationalism based on Arab identity meant that ethnic identity issues were often 
cause for great concern within schools. Ideological observations were not limited to 
the teaching staff and often extended further into the student body. Schools were an 
important place of observation for the regime where teachers and students were 
being constantly monitored (Sassoon 2012, 116).  
 
Interviewees referenced a school policy that insisted that each class nominate a 
student representative to the Ba’ath party, a tactical tool which served to further the 
party’s influence and ability to observe student activities, including outward 
expressions of non-Arab ethnic identity. Anyone interpreted as not conforming to the 
Arab norm was frowned upon and, if reported through these various established 
channels, met with both aggression from Ba’ath security agents and also punishment 
through the school grading process. In the school environment traditional dress and 
languages were hidden for fear of reprisals. Consequently the school environment 
became ‘clouded by fear’ (Interview KD5) for many non-Arab students. One Turkmen 
interviewee stated that this fear was felt throughout his family, so that pressure to 
conform in order to gain educational achievement was also applied from within his 
own community: 
 
‘My mother wanted me to do well in school, she wanted me to be safe, get a 
good job. I could only do this if I acted and looked Arab.  If I rebelled against 
the system my grades would be punished, she didn’t want this, so there was 
pressure to conform from home too. Everyone was scared.’ (Interview TM6) 
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Annual School Registers were taken which served as a yearly inventory of all high 
school students in Iraq19. These registers, described in the Iraq Memory Foundation 
documents as the School Registers collection, documented pupils’ ethnic origin and 
commitment to the regime through data on political orientation, family reputation as 
well as other activities with political significance. Sassoon (2012;55) writes that ‘one 
main purpose of the School Register was the potential recruitment of these 
students.’ Consequently, the desire to mobilize and recruit went hand- in-hand with 
the need to control and coerce. Youth mobilization in the service of the party was a 
priority of the Ba’ath regime (Blaydes; 2013).  
 
Sassoon (2012, 54) highlights that the party recruited students at an early age.  
Secondary schools were targeted in this respect. Consequently, the regime retained 
tight control over educational attainment and this was based on party support. As 
party support was framed by support of Arabization and the Iraqi Arab identity, the 
education system favoured those students who registered themselves as Arab and 
did not portray outwardly a minority identity. Interview participants recounted 
personal accounts of unjustified exam failures and denied scholarship opportunities 
had they and their families not joined the regime and denied their ethnic origin. 
Therefore failure to join the party and register as an ethnic Arab during adolescence 
restricted career aspirations and social mobility in the future.20 The Ba’th party 
regime used the school system to control the political and social opportunities 
                                                 
19
 This is an annual accounting of the nationwide student population by the party with a focus on boys 
from ages 12 to 18. The entire School Registers collection consists of 162,628 pages (1,036 volumes) for years 
1983-2002. 
 
20
 One participant recalled an encounter with a lecturer at Mosul University in the 1980’s.‘Look Falah, it will be for your benefit if you join. 
If you sign for the Ba’ath Party, then you will not be sent to the front. You will not serve in the army for five or six years. You will go there 
just for six months and then you can continue with your studies your heart will not be with them. But it will be to your benefit.’ 
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afforded to the non-Arab ethnic groups of the north and ensure Arab control 
throughout the territory.  Within the school system this control was enforced with the 
threat of direct punishment in order to create a unified Arab national identity.  
 
School registration was not the only means of registration which adversely affected 
ethnic identity in the territories. The Ba’ath party used every opportunity to limit the 
parameters of self identification on official documentation. The very certification 
necessary to access education was also used to coerce affiliation with the Arab 
identity.  Communities were required to produce citizenship cards in order to enrol 
children in school. These cards included sections to affirm religious and ethnic 
character, yet the categories were restricted in order to change the demographics in 
the region to an Arab Muslim majority. For example, in 1977, the Iraqi regime 
stepped up its efforts to remove Assyrians and Turkmen from the Iraqi ethnic map; 
this is demonstrated by its decision to prohibit registration under these identities, 
forcing communities to choose between identification as Kurd or Arab in the 1977 
census (Assyrian Demographic Movement, 2008). 21 
 
Denied self identification on official documentation was an effective means to 
demonstrate a distorted Arab demographic majority in the region, but the regime 
sought not only to suppress minority identity in Iraq but also to prevent it from 
replicating or reproducing itself. The inclusion of policies which specifically targeted 
education in the Arabisation strategy ensured that non-Arab identity could not be 
                                                 
21 It is also important to note that policies did not only target non-Arab ethnic groups, they also oppressed minority religious groups within 
the Arab communities. Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, Sunni Muslims controlled the political power and were guilty of oppressing minority 
Muslim sects, in addition to the Shi’ite majority. Policies specifically targeted Arab religious minorities. Two examples are Revolutionary 
Command Council Resolution 201 of 2001, which mandated the death penalty for adherents of the Salafist branch of Islam (Wahhabism), 
and Law No. 105 of 1970, which prohibited the Baha’i Faith. Equally in 1975, Regulation 358 was instituted and those of the Baha’is faith 
were forced to change their religious identity records to “Muslim” (Department of State, 2007).  
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transmitted effectively from one generation to the next. Cultural resources were 
weakened due to the absence of ethnic history and cultural practice in the curriculum 
and mother tongue language fluency was eroded. Such cultural cleansing struck 
against the very core of the non-Arab communities’ societal identity. Amir 
Hassanpour22 (1993) notes that the forced foreign-language education and lack of 
political independence meant that the Kurds consequently found it difficult to develop 
a literate tradition in their native tongue23. While some communities managed to 
maintain a verbal use of their languages in the home, literacy in their native tongue 
was replaced with Arabic as a necessity for survival. Ethnic communities were 
divided by two linguistic authorities and adapted in order to survive, resulting in a 
varied mix of languages learned from birth within each ethnicity. The prolonged 
Arabisation policy resulted in the erosion of language as an ethnic marker. 
Consequently, not all members of Iraq’s ethnic groups currently have an ethnically 
traditional linguistic basis for identity identification.   
 
The 1980s Iraq war with Iran resulted in a diversion of state resources towards 
military spending and therefore an abrupt deterioration in social spending. 
Accordingly, the state budget allocation for education declined rapidly. From 1984 to 
1990 education was not only a source of conflict but it declined to levels where it also 
became a victim of conflict with damaged infrastructure and failed resource 
allocation. This combination of education decline and Arabisation policies adversely 
impacted the identity protection of the communities of the north.  Many ethnically 
                                                 
22
 In Knowledge, culture and power: International Perspectives on Literacy as Policy and Practice describes the struggle of the Kurdish people to promote their 
national language and education while under the control of successive hostile empires. 
23 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Sertac Bucak (1994)in “Killing a mother tongue – How Kurds are deprived of linguistic human rights” show 
how a clarification of concepts, here demonstrated by the concept of mother tongue helps in analysing lack of linguistic rights and in 
formulating the requirments for a universal declaration of linguistic human rights. Robert Phillipson and Tive Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) in 
“Colonial Language Legacies: the prospects for Kurdish” establish how the oppression of the Kurdish language is outstandingly severe, and 
emphasize the importance of language rights for liberation. They also consider whether the language policies of many states that were 
formerly colonies represent an example to follow. 
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defined NGO’s have released reports which suggest  that by 1990, the identity of 
minority communities in Iraq had all but been erased, to the point where foreign 
journalists unfamiliar with Iraqi history completely missed these hidden communities 
of the North (see human rights reports by Minority Rights Group, Assyrian Council of 
Europe, SOIM, Kurdish Human Rights Watch). Turkmen were rarely recognised and 
their suffering under-represented in foreign media (Taylor, 2004). Equally, journalists 
failed to recognise Assyrians as ethnically distinct from Arab Christians, reporting 
instead on the presence of only Arab Christians (rather than Assyrians or Assyro-
Chaldeans) (Lewis; 2003). Through repression and apolitical self preservation, the 
Assyro–Chaldeans lost their ‘ethnic and national identity, their sense of linguistic, 
historical, cultural and traditional kinship with other wider Assyrian groups eroded’ 
(Assyrian Council of Eurpoe, 2007;18). The smaller communities such as Yezidi and 
Shabak also conformed to majority identity norms in order to survive and their 
numbers were drastically decreased. By 2003, non-Arab identities in the northern 
territories had suffered extreme cultural degradation and languages and cultural 
practices were weakened to the point of collapse.   
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) discovered a failing education system which was deprived of qualified 
teaching staff. Large proportions of the professional classes were recruited into the 
armed forces and school infrastructures and resources were severely damaged by 
the 1990’s international sanctions (UNESCO, 2003). Enrolment had declined sharply 
during the 1990’s and the curriculum had remained unchanged for 20 years (Velloso 
De Santisteban, 2005: 63). The first act of the CPA was to abolish the existing 
national curriculum by decree on 7th July 2003 and begin a process of ‘de-
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Ba’athication’ of teachers. Pictures of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 
were removed from school buildings and his statements from textbooks, and more 
significantly all Ba’athist ideology was removed from school content (Velloso De 
Santisteban, 2005: 63).  All efforts were taken to remove Saddam’s indoctrination of 
the Ba’ath party Iraqi national identity. UN agencies stressed the importance of Iraqi 
ownership over the process of educational reform, cautioning that it must be up to 
the Iraqis themselves to decide structure and content of their future education 
system (UNESCO, 2003).   
 
4:3 Societal Security through the New Constitution? 
 
The removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 resulted in non-Arab ethnic groups 
becoming constitutionally free to defend their identity and presence in the disputed 
territories. The concept of Iraqi ownership of education as highlighted by UNESCO 
(2003) is reflected in the new constitution which guarantees the right to free 
education at all levels, primary, secondary, post-secondary and university, for all its 
citizens24. In addition it recognises the multi-lingual and multi-religious nature of Iraq 
and as such guarantees ‘the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of 
religious belief and practice such as Christians, Yezedis, and Mandi Sabeans’, as 
well as ‘the right of Iraqis to educate their children in their Mother-Tongue, such as 
Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian’ (Article 4).  As such Article 4 of the Iraq Constitution 
protects the right of all Iraqis to educate their children in their Mother-Tongue in 
                                                 
24
 . The Iraqi school system follows a 1+6+3+3 pattern, with one year of non-compulsory pre-school education followed by six 
years of compulsory primary education. Secondary education is divided into three years of ‘intermediate’ education, grades 7-9 
(Mutawassita  ةطسوتملا ) and three years of ‘Preparatory’ education grades 10-12 (Iidadiye ةيدادعا ). There are also schools which 
provide all 6 years of secondary education together (Thanawiya  ةيوناث ). These educational programmes are managed by the 
Ministry of Education, which is also responsible for vocational schools (grades 10-12) and teacher institutes (grades 10-14 or 
13-14), and for the Open College of Education 
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government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines25 and 
places emphasis on linguistic rights, stating that  “the Turkmen language and the 
Syriac language are two other official languages in the administrative units in which 
they constitute density of population” and that “each region or governorate may 
adopt any other local language as an additional official language.” (Article 4) 
 
These articles of the constitution recognise the key identity markers of religion and 
language, and attempt to declare ethnic groups free to celebrate diversity. However, 
despite these articles, the constitution has been widely criticised for its lack of clarity 
on matters of the ethnic and minority rights. For example; in its final version the 
Constitution states the following;  
 
Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of 
legislation: 
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam 
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. 
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms 
stipulated in this Constitution. (Article 2 of Iraqi constitution) 
 
And that..... 
This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi 
people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief 
                                                 
25
 As a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Iraq is now bound by 
international law to respect, and to provide protection for, its minority communities. The Convention obliges Iraq to ‘prohibit and 
to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law’ (Article 5). It further compels Iraq to ‘adopt immediate and effective 
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which 
lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical 
groups’  (Article 7). 
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and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean 
Sabeans. (Article 3 of Iraqi constitution) 
 
Article 2 enforces the Islamic nature of the country while Article 3 explicitly 
recognizes that ‘Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects’. As 
Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala point out (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 40–41), this 
clouds the role of religion in the state. It is entirely unclear how the ‘rule of Islam’, 
‘principles of democracy’ and ‘rights and basic freedoms’ are to be balanced against 
each other. Equally no clear definition of what they mean is provided. The 
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation and implementation of the religious rights 
of ethnic groups, coupled with the fact that a number of ethinc groups in the disputed 
territories share the Islamic faith,  seem to have resulted in language becoming a key 
identity marker for Iraq’s non-Arab groups who wish to fortify their distinct identities 
through the education system.  
 
4:4 The Reconstruction of Education: Constitutional Promises and the Legacy 
of Arabisation 
 
As a consequence of the previous oppression, mother-tongue language provision 
has become central to the education narrative and has enforced language as the key 
identity marker within the education arena. The right of Iraqis to educate their 
children in their mother-tongue, such as Turkmen, Assyrian and Kurdish has been 
translated to infer that all schools are entitled to equal state funding and resource 
provision regardless of their medium of instruction. This interpretation obliges the 
government to provide support for community language schools, and this appears to 
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be accepted by Baghdad in principle. Unfortunately the constitutional promises have 
not been expanded further to provide guidelines on how they can best be 
implemented. In the same way that many regional governance issues have been left 
ambiguous in the post-2003 Iraqi constitution, so too has the extent and implication 
of mother-tongue education rights (Bowring, 2012).  
 
Subsequently, in 2006 the central Ministry of Education Baghdad issued a 
memorandum of understanding to further clarify their position; it stipulated that if a 
minority community constitute more than 25 percent of the population then the 
government is obliged to provide some form of mother-tongue language instruction 
(GoI, 2006). Yet the extent of mother-tongue provision was not clearly specified, and 
consequently it has been widely interpreted to mean the provision of two mother-
tongue lessons a week within the standard curriculum, an interpretation which is 
rejected by many non-Arab communities (Interview Data). Therefore a push for fully 
immersive mother-tongue schools has occurred in response and a number of 
emersion schools have been opened through the expression of public interest to the 
central Ministry of Education. Fully non-Arabic medium schools must follow the 
affiliated curriculum of the Ministry and translated curriculum must be approved by 
committee. Once a school and its syllabus have been approved, a licence is granted 
and the school is deemed an official state school and is entitled to the relevant state 
support. Where possible, communities are pushing for this form of education, and 
fully immersion mother-tongue schools are being championed by education 
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representatives from non-Arab communities26, as illustrated by this Turkmen 
educationalist;  
 
‘I would like to refer to an important and realistic point, as the Turkmen 
nationality is the third nationality in Iraq, then why are pupils learning their 
mother tongue in two lessons per week? Is it enough to complete the 
curriculum? Why do the pupils of the fifth and sixth grades learn English in 
five lessons per week for example? (Interview TM9) 
 
Education within the disputed territories remains under the official control of the 
central Baghdad ministry, in terms of curriculum, examination and financial support. 
The Ministry of Education in Baghdad provides education for all levels of formal non-
tertiary education based on the Arabic medium standard curriculum and oversees 
all-end-of-year examinations. Despite having been reviewed post-2003, the central 
curriculum stands accused of being outdated and struggles to reflect the divergent 
positions of Iraq’s multi-cultural society (repeatedly confirmed in interviews with 
UNICEF staff, UNAMI staff, and education actor interviews). The Ministry of 
Education in Baghdad demonstrates its support for non-Arabic schools through the 
Minister of Kurdish Studies and other languages. This one position is appointed to 
oversee the provision of education in all languages other than Arabic throughout the 
country.  
 
This single minister employed under the Kurdish banner is to represent all other Iraqi 
groups, each with differing needs. The lack of recognition for other groups has 
                                                 
26
 Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians. 
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fuelled accusations that the central ministry is not committed to equality of provision 
for Turkmen, Assyrian and other minority groups. The unstructured nature of 
government support is reflected further within the governorates of the disputed 
territories. Each directorate has different regional management provision for the 
supervision of non-Arabic schools. In Diyala, where the population is made up of 
Arab, Kurd and Turkmen, a Director of Kurdish and other Nationality studies is 
present within the directorate to oversee both Kurd and Turkmen schools, without 
explicit mention of Turkmen school requirements. In Kirkuk there are individual 
Director positions for Assyrian, Kurd and Turkmen schools individually. Finally in 
Ninewa, the directorate has the standard director of Kurdish and other Nationality 
Studies, but under this position are officers each responsible for Turkmen, Assyrian 
and Yezidi schools. The differentiation in positions across the regions has caused 
complaint from non-Arab and Non-Kurdish communities. The uneven distribution can 
in part be explained by the increased international focus on Kirkuk elevating its 
position and forcing the issue of better management structures.  
 
With constitutional promises, and allocation of ministerial attention to the 
management of non-Arabic medium schools (even if deemed inadequate), Iraq has 
made the initial steps toward supporting an education system which acknowledges 
the ethnic diversity of its population. Yet the task of reconstructing education in the 
disputed territories and the achievement of quality formal education requires a range 
of influences, and language has clearly become a key factor. Conventional academic 
understanding suggests that mother-tongue language instruction is key to a child’s 
ability to achieve understanding in the classroom (Benson, 2004; UNESCO, 2007; 
Skutnabb-Kangas, 2013), but in multi-linguist societies, an understanding of the 
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dominant language is also crucial to a child’s development (Dyer, 2010). Yet in 2003 
the need for an education system which allowed children to achieve their educational 
potential, preserve their mother tongue and also prepare them with the dominant 
language skills required to operate in the wider society was lost. Instead, education 
actors (Ministries of Education and International actors) chose only to concentrate on 
only the provision of mother-tongue language and supporting calls for community 
language schools (Interview data).  
 
Therefore, in alignment with the constitution the Ministry of Education in Baghdad, 
the Kurdistan Regional Government and international observers, affirmed and 
supported indigenous rights to equal support for all communities who wish to pursue 
mother-tongue language education. Educationalists in the region actively pushed for 
mother-tongue instruction schools. However, this enthusiasm failed to acknowledge 
the erosion of mother-tongue language in the disputed territories. Mother-tongue 
language is defined as the language which the child has learnt from birth. In this 
sense, and from an education perspective, the importance of mother-tongue learning 
stems from an acknowledgement of better learning outcomes due to better 
comprehension.  However, as is often the case within Iraq, the situation in the 
disputed territories is more complicated and the thesis would like to draw attention to 
a number of contradictions that must be taken into account. Due to the historical 
legacy of territorial dispute and devastating effects of Arabization, not all members of 
Iraq’s ethnic groups have a linguistic basis as an identity marker. Ethnic communities 
have been divided by two linguistic authorities (Arab and Kurdish) and have adapted 
in order to survive, resulting in a varied mix of languages learned from birth within 
each ethnicity. In this sense, for some ethnic groups, the use of the term ‘mother-
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tongue’ is called into question and can be seen to take on a new meaning. ‘mother-
tongue’ comes to represent a language that is traditionally spoken by their ethnic 
group and not necessarily one in which a person of that group has fluency – a 
‘traditional language’. 
 
Therefore the Iraqi debate over mother-tongue education access is not clearly 
defined, terminology between local groups and international observers is confused 
between language of birth and the traditional language of ethnic community. This 
allows for cross interpretations, confusing the need for access to mother-tongue 
education for pedagogical reasons with the desire to revive or protect a traditional 
language for societal security reasons. There is no division between the debates on 
‘preserving Iraq’s cultural diversity’ through curriculum from those of ‘access to 
mother-tongue education’. Although the two debates are not mutually exclusive, 
clear lines need to be drawn in order to achieve a representative education system 
which serves each community both academically and culturally. Using an 
overarching terminology has confused the separate debates on language access 
and curriculum representation, and has led to an education structure which does not 
always best serve the academic interests of its pupils. A true mother-tongue 
education system aims to increase educational attainment and support the learning 
purpose within schools, whereas calling for schools which teach in a traditional 
language is pushing for a societal security purpose within schools. 
 
Mother-tongue education access is usually championed with the acknowledgement 
that instruction solely through an unspoken national language has long been rejected 
by educationalists, who equate this method to ‘holding learners under water without 
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teaching them how to swim’ therefore labelling it as a ‘submersion’ technique 
(Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). Therefore a policy of mother-tongue education based on 
bilingual programmes which use the learner’s mother-tongue language to teach 
initial reading and writing skills alongside academic content is often supported.
 
The 
second or dominant language, should then be taught systematically so that learners 
can gradually transfer skills from the familiar language to the unfamiliar one (Benson, 
2004). Bilingual education can also serve to provide empowerment through 
pedagogy by the incorporation of home language and culture in the school 
environment, increasing the self-esteem of minority students (Garcia, 1997; Giles & 
Weimann, 1987).  
 
Yet there are significant issues surrounding this pedagogical approach for the 
disputed territories. The complex history of ethnic manipulation in the region has 
complicated the provision of effective mother tongue education for Iraq’s 
communities. It is not as simple as is suggested by education officials both inside 
and outside the country. The opening of language schools which teach entirely in 
traditional languages (not mother-tongue) with the addition of the regionally dominant 
language in additional classes, does not serve the interests of the children who come 
from communities who have lost their linguistic identity marker. Instead these 
schools work in the same way as the dominate submersion schools, effectively 
hampering children’s academic progress. Calls for such schools much change the 
way we view the purpose of education in the disputed territories.   
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It is also important to note that the representation of each of these ethnic groups 
does not allow for a one-size-fits-all solution.  The intricate nature of Iraq’s cultural 
diversity and political history, coupled with the fundamental need to exist, has led to 
a multifarious network of both political and linguistic representation within each 
ethnic community. For example Kurdish and Turkmen families in Diyala, who as a 
result of Arabization speak Arabic in the home, but who want to have their children 
educated in their communities’ traditional languages, require a very different 
programme of education from that of children who speak Kurdish in the home and 
wish to enter the education arena with a familiar language. Because of the unique 
nature of the DIB’s and Iraq’s history of identity politics, any exploration of the 
provision of mother-tongue education cannot be a simple survey of languages of 
instruction and languages in the curriculum.  
 
In the KRG the system has benefited from the gradual introduction of the prevalent 
mother-tongue languages of Turkmen and Assyrian through the grade system for the 
past eighteen years. This has resulted in a three tiered school system with schools 
teaching in the dominate language of Kurdish and with the inclusion of mother 
tongue classes (but still ethnically defined by their addition language classes; eg 
Turkmen schools with Kurdish language instruction), full submersion mother-tongue 
instruction schools and schools which have both forms of class within them (see 
table 1). The mixed typology of schools with varying degrees of mother tongue 
language was necessary to overcome what the KRG Minister of Assyrian Education, 
Nasar Hana, noted was the ‘previous regime’s eroding of mother tongue and mother 
tongue comprehension because of the fear induced when speaking it’ (Interview 
AS1). Parents can opt for full submersion in mother-tongue instruction, with Kurdish 
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classes or dominate Kurdish with the additional mother-tongue classes to ensure the 
child’s familiarity with the traditional language. Within the disputed territories the 
process has taken a similar route, with schools developing along the similar three tier 
system.  However, without the gradual instigation of the language over eighteen 
years, more pupils are experiencing submersion through mother tongue instruction. 
A negative consequence of which is that this has resulted in increased submersion 
schools without the increased linguistic comprehension for some societal 
communities.   
These complexities have lead to a plurality of education institutions opening 
throughout the disputed territories to cater for the multi ethnic and multi lingual needs 
of the population. Consequently, different methods of mother-tongue instruction have 
arisen, varying from entirely mother-tongue education and traditional language 
submersion to dominant language instruction with the inclusion of traditional 
language lessons in the school’s timetable. This has also lead to a mixed 
understanding of what a mother-tongue school actually is. All schools in the disputed 
territories are now categorised by their linguistic provision.  Both Ministries of 
Education list numerous ‘Arabic’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Turkmeni’ and ‘Assyrian’ schools across 
the north of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the framing of the education system 
in terms of linguistic access would be somewhat misleading as schools using the 
dominant language as the medium of instruction, but offering additional traditional 
language classes are included under the linguistic head of their additional language. 
Schools appear to be classified on the grounds of the demographic composition of 
their intakes, which for the most part are ethnically homogenous. Therefore within 
each ethnic classification there are schools which provide different levels of Mother-
Tongue access. Hence school provision in the region can be seen to fall into one of 
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four models; Mother-Tongue27, including Turkmen, Assyrian and Kurdish schools, 
Dominant Language submersion schools or dominant language schools with 
traditional language provision (See Figure 4: Typology of schools). 
Figure 4: Typology of schools 
 
School Type Language of Instruction Additional Languages Taught 
 
Dominant language schools Arabic (DIB) 
Kurdish (KRG) 
English & Kurdish 
English & Arabic 
Mother-Tongue instruction 
schools 
Assyrian, (DIB) 
Assyrian (KRG) 
Turkmen (KRG 
Turkmen (DIB) 
Kurdish (DIB) 
English & Arabic 
 
English & Kurdish 
 
English & Arabic 
 
Arabic & English 
 
Arabic & English 
 
Dominant language schools 
which provide lessons in Mother-
Tongue 
Arabic (DIB) 
Arabic (DIB) 
Kurdish  (KRG) 
Kurdish (KRG) 
Turkish & English 
 
Assyrian & English 
 
Assyrian & English 
 
Turkish & English 
 
Dominant language schools with 
mother-tongue year groups and 
classes within them – teaching a 
translated curriculum 
 
Two Languages of 
Instruction in Each school 
but pupils opt into only 
one or the other. 
Eg Kirfi Turkmen school 
which also has two year 
groups who learn in 
Arabic within the same 
school 
 
 
 
Schools have become ethnically homogenous and therefore children are 
increasingly segregated by ethnic identity.  The causality of this can be explained in 
a number of ways: 
                                                 
27
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a regional assessment of language comprehension so for the purposes of this 
investigation schools teaching in a non-Arab medium will be refered to as mother-tongue (with the understanding of the reader 
that some of these will be traditional language submersion schools for their pupils. 
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 As a result of increasingly homogenous residential patterns and therefore 
catchment areas;  
 Because of mother-tongue necessity for educational attainment;  
 As a result of ethnic groups having mobilised in attempts to revitalise and 
protect their ethnic identities through the pursuit of both mother-tongue 
education and curriculum representation in homogenous schools.  
The following section will unpack further the role of societal security protection within 
the call for linguistic representations in education for the Assyrian, Turkmen and 
Yezidi28. It will illustrate how ethnic communities are negotiating the education arena 
in the shadow of Arabisation and how identity protection has significant influence.    
 
4:4:1 Assyrian Language Schools: Education to Revive identity 
 
                                                 
28
 While Kurdish education is equally affected by societal security and linguistic provsion its situation differs due to the regional 
backing of the KRG Ministry of Education. As such the Kurdish language schools across the disputed territories receive 
funding, resources, teacher salaries from the KRG and follow the KRG ministry of education curriculum. Having been 
subsumed under a ministry with the same linguistic medium of instruction its complexities are different and will be addressed in 
the next chapter under the subject of education defence. 
Photo: 3  
 
 
Assyrian 
Children in a 
school in 
Ninewa 
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The Assyrian community or Assyrian-Chaldo community are an ethnic group 
characterised by their religious and linguistic markers. Assyrians are a Christian 
group who speak a Neo-Aramaic dialect.  In modern Iraq the Assyrian population 
mostly inhabit the former Mosul vilayet.  “Although population statistics are woefully 
inadequate in northern Iraq, one estimate indicates that Assyrians number maybe 
133,000 or less than 1 percent of the Iraqi population”. (Gunter; 1990:86).  As 
previously presented, the Assyrian community suffered a loss of traditional language 
during the Ba’ath party Arabisation era, yet they actively advocate for access to 
submersion Assyrian language schools. Consequently, Assyrian schools can be 
found in Kirkuk and Ninewa and throughout the KRG. They are ethnically 
homogenous, due in part to the nature of their religious curriculum, and vary in their 
delivery of Syriac or Assyrian language instruction. 
 
The community is split in its pursuit of the traditional language revival through 
education. In Kirkuk the Assyrian community has acknowledged the erosion of the 
community’s fluency, and the associated implications of submersion education. 
Therefore they have abandoned mother-tongue language instruction schools as a 
result. Assyrian Educationalists in Kirkuk have rejected the need for Assyrian 
language schools in favour of Arabic instruction with the addition of traditional 
language and religious lessons. As one prominent Assyrian educationalist from 
Kirkuk explained; 
 
‘In 2003 we wanted to reclaim our language so we tried schools which taught 
all in Assyrian. But it didn’t work. The parents were not literate in Assyrian, the 
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children struggled and even the teachers encountered problems. We had very 
few resources and there were arguments over the alphabet. It was better to 
use Arabic, everyone could understand and it is better for the relationship of 
our community with its neighbours.’ (ASK1) 
 
In addition Assyrian educationalist in Kirkuk pointed to the limited options for pupils 
who graduate from Assyrian language schools, recognising that without Assyrian 
tertiary level education Assyrian pupils would have very limited future prospects 
(Interview ASK1,ASK2,AS8). Community leaders in Kirkuk suggested that Assyrian 
instruction would limit education attainment and further education options. 
 
‘If the education is difficult because we are not fluent in the language 
anymore, then our children will not go to university, they will be denied job 
opportunities and jobs, how is that good for us as a group? How is that good 
for the Assyrian people? No, Assyrians are smarter than that, we understand 
that to protect our community we need to do what is best for our children’s 
future prospects’ (Interviewee ASK2) 
 
The long term implications of Assyrian instruction submersion schools could hence 
create horizontal inequalities which would be to the detriment of the community as a 
whole. In Kirkuk the possible negative consequences of Assyrian instruction schools; 
submersion, lack of teaching resources29, erosion of social cohesion30 and tertiary 
education options, were all quickly identified and the community sought an 
alternative means of identity protection through the education system. The inclusion 
                                                 
29
 To be addressed further in the next chapter 
30
 To be addressed further in chapter 6 
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of traditional language lessons and religious instruction in schools was deemed more 
significant to protecting the societal security of the community (Interviews AS2, AS5, 
AS6).  
‘We need to teach our religion, this is not negotiable, our children suffer in 
state schools where Islam is the only religion taught. For language - lessons 
in the curriculum are good. That is all we need to show the next generation 
their culture.’ (Interview ASK1) 
 
Yet this stance appears to be unique to Kirkuk Assyrians as Assyrian communities 
across Ninewa (and in the KRG) are still campaigning for greater access to schools 
which provide submersive instruction in the Assyrian language. Ninewa’s Assyrian 
community differs from Kirkuk’s greatly in terms of population density. The three 
districts of Telkaif, Al-Hamandia and Shikhan, often referred to as the Ninewa  (see 
Figure 10: Map of Ninewa Plains), have heavy Assyrian and Christian populations. 
Interviewees in Ninewa governorate conversely provided the following collection of 
statements with regards to mother tongue access;  
 
‘As an indigenous people with an endangered language, we are entitled to a  
education in our own mother tongue, and not just to study it as a language 
beside a core-curriculum taught in Kurdish, which is the norm for other  
“Syriac” schools.’ (Interview AS3)  
 
‘It is our right to teach our children who they are, language is central to that, 
the last regime eroded this. Now we must build it back. How can we do this in 
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just a few hours a week? We need to commit to the language use and teach 
the main core subjects in the Assyrian langauge’ (Interview AS2) 
 
‘Our children should be proud to be Assyrian, they can’t be proud unless we 
celebrate who we are, how can we celebrate if we hide our spoken language 
from schools? We will not hide again.’ (Interview AS8kd) 
 
‘We need our own schools to protect us from losing our identity as we did 
under the previous regime and the proposal of two hours a week is not 
enough, why should we only study our language in side classes. No. Its not 
enough.’ (Interview AS6) 
 
‘Our children can learn this language, they will overcome. It is spoken in 
families, those who struggle will find support. It is not impossible. And it is our 
right, like that of the Tukmen and Kurds and Arabs. Why should we not have 
the same right?’ (Interview AS5)  
 
 
These statements demonstrate how the revival of the language is a priority for these 
educationalists. Pedagogy and future utility were not mentioned and when asked 
they changed the subject or reaffirmed the importance to the Assyrian people of 
maintaining an active use of Syriac. The linguistic legacy of the Ba’ath party’s 
Arabisation policies can be seen to be having a direct impact on the current 
management of the system. Assyrians in both Kirkuk and Ninewa can be seen to 
consider education to have a vital role in the revival of societal security. In Ninewa 
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this role has taken priority over educational attainment, changing the role of 
education entirely31.  In both regions education was presented by Assyrian 
educationalists as a necessary component in the ‘promotion of a lost pride in identity’ 
(Interview AS4) in the wake of Arabisation.  Central curriculum failed to recognise 
their existence and neglected their culture and religion. Ethnically homogenous 
schools are being sought so that the Assyrian community can use the education 
system to strengthen the future generations understanding of their cultural heritage.  
 
4:4:2 Turkmen Language schools: Education to maintain identity  
 
The Iraqi Turkmen claim to be the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, residing almost 
exclusively in the north and throughout the now disputed territories in an arc of towns 
and villages stretching from Tel Afar, west of Mosul, through Mosul, Erbil, Altun 
Kopru, Kirkuk, Taza Khurmatu, Kifri and Khaniqin. Before 2003, there were anything 
from 600,000 to 2 million Turkmen, the former figure being the conservative estimate 
of outside observers and the latter a Turkmen estimate (SOIMT: 2010). The 
Turkmen have actively sought to protect their distinct culture, having great pride in 
their linguistic origins, dress, poetry and folklore. As a consequence Turkmen 
heritage is an integral part of the region’s history and present day life. Many 
commentators have noted how the Turkmen language of Turkmeni has persisted 
against the odds and has survived as an active mother tongue in the region. 
 
                                                 
31
 It must be considered that Assyrian is still and active mother tongue for some families and regional villages. With no in-depth 
survey of languages it is hard to ascertain the degree of Assyrian language use. But interviews and reports from international 
agencies and ethnically affiliated research groups have documented the loss of league and everyday use. (Assyrian Council of 
Europe, 2010; Human Rights Watch 2008;SOIM, 2008) 
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Yet despite the presence of an active and functioning language (spoken as a third 
language by older generation Kurds and Arabs32), Turkmen language schools also 
provide a vivid illustration of the complexity of language issues in northern Iraq. In 
2004 Turkmen language schools began teaching various levels of Mother-Tongue 
Turkmani, from submersion to traditional language classes33. However, it was 
decided by community leaders in 2005 that the Turkish language would replace the 
use of traditional Turkmani in Iraqi schools34. Although the languages share a degree 
of oral similarity, Turkmeni uses the Arabic script for the written word and Turkish 
uses the Roman alphabet (see Figure 5: Turkmen Alphabet Examples). 
 
Figure 5: Turkmen Alphabet Examples 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The trilingual nature of many middle aged Iraqis in the disputed territories was presented frequently in 
interviews. Many references were made by interviewees from both Arab and Kuridsh communities to having a 
good understanding of the Turkmani language.  
33
 This information was confirmed through interviews with Turkmen participants. 
34 It was explained during interviews that when Dr. Ala’ Al-Deen Elwan resumed the position of the Minister of Education, a 
commission comprised of those concerned with the Turkoman education was established and met with him on 20 January 
2004 and 26 May 2004. During the first meeting, introducing the Turkoman education in the structure of the MoE was 
discussed. Some of the other topics of discussions were the need for education staff and the reason to use the new Turkoman 
letters in education. His Excellency, the Minister, expressed his consent to use such letters in the presence of Director of 
Specialized Supervision, Mr. Mohammed Khorshaid Omar, Mr. Farouq Fayeq Koblo and another person working at the 
office of the Minister. Following that, the two former Ministers of Education, Dr. Sami Al-Muthaffar, and Dr. Falah Al-
Soudani approved using these letters.  
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This decision has been justified by the Turkmen in a number of ways, firstly in terms 
of apparently inadequate range of vowel sounds and phonetics available with the 
Arabic script limiting its written reflection of the spoken form of the language35.  
 
“As the Arabic letters have failed to represent the entire Turkoman phonetics, 
Ottoman had to add six more letters to the Arabic letters to become thirty four 
instead of twenty eight. However, this addition was not sufficient to present all 
phonics. Thus, the Ottoman letters are not Arabic ones, and we can’t find 
them all in the Qou’ran. As such, Ottoman letters are for the exclusive use of 
the Ottomans only.” (Interview TM4) 
 
In addition, Turkish was declared to have further utility for the Turkman community in 
terms of educational attainment and intellectual pursuits. Teaching resources are 
easily accessible and there are more options in terms of tertiary education with 
greater international recognition36. As one Turkmen representative suggested;  
 
‘As no books or magazines are available in the Ottoman language since its 
fall, the educated persons who studied in Turkmen language will not find any 
type of publications to read, whether in his/her area of specialization or in 
other fields. Such publications are only available in Latin letters in Ankara and 
Istanbul libraries. These books [Turkmeni books] only discuss Islam, religion, 
ancient literature, and some old documents of benefit of specialized 
                                                 
35
 This was the majority opinion given by Turkmen interviewees and frequently received mention with regards 
to language. 
36
 Interview information provided by community educationalists and leaders rather than Ministry of Education 
Staff. 
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researchers only. Most of which were translated by using Latin letters for the 
utilization of the public.’ (Interview TM5) 
 
Cigdem Balim Harding, a senior lecturer in the Near Eastern Languages and 
Cultures Department at Indiana University, suggests that the current prevalence of 
satellite television and media exposure from Turkey, along with the absence of 
publishing in Turkmeni, may have already led to a standardising of the Turkmani 
language toward Turkish, therefore making it a preferable language for instruction for 
many adolescents associating with Turkish culture (Telephone interview, 20-01-11).  
  
 “Turkish culture popular culture is readily available through satellite television  
and the internet. This makes access to the Turkish language  very easy for 
young Turkmen. If they are seeking to reaffirm their own distinct identities 
then this would be a natural source through which they could seek a sense of 
wider belonging and self identification. If this is the case the Turkmeni 
language may have slowly standardised toward Turkish for the younger 
generations.” 
 
As relevant as these rationalizations may be it is hard to understand Turkmen 
education as a mother tongue or traditional language pursuit, due to the alphabet 
change. Unfortunately there has been no recent research on the Turkmeni language, 
and with differing reports from interlocutors on the ground, the debate remains open 
as to the level of comprehension of Turkmeni speakers in Turkish. The motives for 
this decision have been questioned by other ethnic groups in the region. With one 
Kurdish interviewee suggesting that; ‘the only motivation is to gain international 
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political support for their claims to the city, otherwise they could have used Kurdish 
or Arabic’ (Interview TM2). Interviewees from other groups questioned the status of 
Turkish as a mother tongue for the Turkmen community; ‘I understand Turkmeni, i 
have heard it since I was a child, I even speak Turkmeni.... but I do not understand 
Turkish, I can’t watch the Turkish Satellite (Television).. are not the same languages’ 
(Interview KD1). Yet the debate remains polarised with no further clarification.  
 
The Turkmen stance on medium of instruction for their community appears similar to 
that of the Assyrian educationalists in Kirkuk, in that they have recognised that 
education in their traditional language may hamper the progress and survival of their 
societal group in the longer term. However, rather than turn to the dominate 
language of their region for the medium of instruction, as the Assyrians have done 
with Arabic, the Turkmen have moved to standardise the Turkmeni dialect towards 
what they see as a more functional use of Turkish.  Regardless of the possible oral 
similarities of the languages, pedagogical implications for the written form of the 
language are undisputable. One indication of the impact on the students’ learning 
environment which was raised frequently in interviews was that parental literacy 
rates in Turkish are very low, with Iraqi Turkmen families being more familiar and 
literate in the Arabic script (Interviews). An indication of this is that Turkmen 
community leaders have called to the international community to help improve 
Turkmen adult literacy rates. Significantly, community leaders requested Turkish 
language lessons, and not Arabic or Turkmeni, be supplied by United Nations 
agencies. Interlocutors noted that the deficiency of the wider Turkmen communities 
reading and writing ability in Turkish has hampered the students’ home learning 
environment. (Interviews; TM8 and GN6). The Turkmen Directorate of education in 
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Kirkuk has even started Turkish language lessons for the community, in order to 
promote an understanding of the language in the wider society. In addition the 
ministry of education Turkmen officer in Ninewa has made repeated requests to the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq for the instigation of Turkish language 
classes for parents in the region. 
 
The use of Turkish in the education arena also has striking implications for the 
application of societal security lens to the Turkmen pursuit. It can be seen to initiate 
a loss of the tradition form of the Turkmani language, a cultural loss which is akin to 
the linguistic degradation imposed by the Ba’ath era. Therefore can the Turkmen 
pursuit of so called ‘mother-tongue’ education be viewed in terms of societal security 
protection when it is effectively eroding the linguistic element that has, until now, 
been preserved? Even though the Turkmen educationalists have stepped away from 
a collective shared traditional language the thesis proposes that the action can still 
be viewed through a societal security lens. This can be supported by the way in 
which educationalists framed the discussion of the language choice. 
 
Firstly the move to Turkish can be seen as a means to strengthen the collective ‘we’ 
identity by continuing to distinguish it from the other ethnic groups. Aligning 
themselves with the internationally recognised Turkish language can be seen as an 
attempt to prevent assimilation into the Arabic and Kurdish cultures through a 
regional linguistic necessity and maintain their continued presence. By linking with a 
language which shares the same linguistic Turkic roots, but has greater utility 
internationally, Turkmen can be seen to be reinforcing their identity through the only 
option available to them. The use of Turkish was presented as a natural progression 
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for the Turkmen, any suggestion that the oral languages were different was 
immediately rejected. Turkmen officials repeatedly, and without exception, referred 
to the language of instruction in Turkmen schools as Turkmeni. When questioned on 
whether they meant Turkmeni or Turkish, interviewees became uncomfortable and 
when the question wasn’t avoided, answers lacked any form of clarity; 
 
‘It is the language of the Turkmen people. It is our culture, you would not 
question the use of Kurdish in schools?’ (Interview TM10) 
 
‘Turkish is the Turkmeni language.’ (Interview TM5) 
 
‘They have differences but they are the same language.’(Interview TM8)  
 
‘They are not very different, I speak Turkmeni but I understand Turkish easily, 
it only in the written form that there is a difference we must address, spoken it 
is OK.’ (Interview TM2) 
 
‘The families will learn together literacy in Turkish, it is better to preserve the 
language.’ (Interview TMN).    
 
Some interlocutors took this further, referencing the important implications for 
Turkmen identity; 
 
‘The languages are the same and the use of Turkish only strengthens us. 
Turkish provides a better medium, and this way we keep our Turkmen 
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identities. If we do not evolve the language will not survive and we will teach 
Arabic to our children’’ (interviewee looked disgusted at this thought!) 
(Interview TM12) 
 
‘Verbally they are very similar. It is only the alphabet that has changed. We 
must evolve to preserve the Turkmen culture in the best way. It is for all the 
community best.’ (Interview TM6)   
 
‘The Kurds make false claims, they say that Turkish is different to stop us. 
They want us gone from this land. But the languages work together. We will 
keep our place in Mosul’ (Interview TMN )  
 
‘It is better to teach in Turkish with the new script. Or we have to learn in  
Arabic again. Some Turkmen choose this for their children. But I don’t think it 
is best.’ (Interview TM8).  
 
‘It is important the Turkmen do not die out of the region so we grow to 
maintain our presence. To not (be) assimilate(d), this is best for our children. 
Education can help us do this. We need schools which teach and reflect our 
culture, that way the children have self esteem and pride, which is good for 
learning.’ (Interviewee TMSJ)    
 
Not one of the thirteen Turkmen educationalists interviewed acknowledged that the 
use of Turkish was a culturally detrimental choice, rather it was presented as a 
means to strengthen Turkmen identity and maintain the presence of their identity in 
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the region. Access to teaching resources for non-majority communities in northern 
Iraq are sparse and the Turkmen community also bemoan the same curriculum 
omissions as the Assyrians. By moving to Turkish, the Turkmen community can be 
seem to be forging alliances capable of supplying teaching resources which reflect 
the history and culture of the Turkmen, strengthening the channels through which to 
teach the next generation about their history and culture. This was certainly an aim 
presented by a number of interlocutors who referenced that the printing of text books 
and teaching resources in Ankara enabled the Turkmen community access to 
ethnically appropriate curriculum (Interviews)37.  
 
4:5 Societal Security verses Pedagogy? 
 
Considering the complexities and varying needs of communities, the question must 
be asked why non-Arab educationalists are seeking increased access to submersion 
education structures in languages which children do not have fluency. There is a 
universal understanding that they are detrimental to learning outcomes and 
educational attainment. Why are non-Arab educationalists from Turkmen and 
Assyrian communities across the region calling for greater access to mother tongue 
language education when there is an accepted recognition that this may be 
detrimental to their academic attainment? In this sense we should turn to examine 
languages role in identity protection. Language not only strengthens the sense of 
belonging to a group but it can also serve to solidify or revitalise ethnic identity and 
loyalty (Fishman, 1989; Haarmann, 1986; Smith, 1998). Thus language must be 
considered to be a socio-cultural resource with which ethnic groups may unify and 
                                                 
37
 This will be addressed further in the next chapter. 
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separate themselves from the wider national identity. Each group can be loyal to its 
own divergent, linguistically constructed identity (Haslett, 1989; Scollon & Scollon, 
1981). 
 
The concept of societal security can help us to unpack the reasons behind this. 
Firstly the ethnic communities face a constant threat of persecution. As chapter three 
detailed, each ethnic group is facing a variety of overlapping threats from conflict 
actors in the region. This insecurity is coupled with the experience of past 
oppression. Using the logic of the societal security literature, such threats would 
increase the groups’ desire to fortify their ethnic identity to protect it from threat. As 
such the pursuit of so called mother-tongue education can be seen as a way of 
protecting societal security. Mother-tongue schools provide a route to ethnically 
homogenous schools which can teach ethnic groups shared history, culture and 
traditions in an exclusive manner. In this sense identity protection is being prioritised 
over the possible negative outcomes for pupils placed in submersion traditional 
language schools. As one Assyrian interviewee stated; 
 
‘Recognition of Assyrians in schools is right always denied, we need to 
ensure that we are not denied again. Our people want to survive, to live and 
not to disappear. It is our right. Schools.... so that they can know who they 
are, and not forget.’  (Interview AS6)  
 
This quote was gleaned during a question specifically regarding mother tongue 
schools. Language is an important factor in education provision in the disputed 
territories but it is also a means of achieving greater religious and cultural recognition 
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in the school system. For example, when asked why Turkish and not Arabic 
instruction was so vital a Turkmen education official stated that Turkmen children 
should ‘learn their history, in their language to strengthen their understating of who 
they are. This has been denied in the past through the use of Arabic. We won’t let 
this happen again’ (Interview TMN).   
 
Kaufmann (2006) suggests that a history of ethnic domination and a community’s 
past victimisation, can form the basis for a threat perception in the present. As such 
it can be suggested that the oppression of the Ba’ath era can be seen to have 
created a fear of the future, lived through the past (Pescis; 2006) within the 
education arena of the disputed territories. Demands and justification for mother 
tongue education were frequently framed in terms of fear of continued oppression 
and the injustice of what was previously suffered.  The shared experience of failed 
constructional promises and oppression have left Assyrian and Turkmen groups 
fearful for the maintenance, or in some cases actualization, of their rights within the 
education sector. Interviews with participants from across the ethnic spectrum 
framed their call for ‘mother tongue’ education in terms of protecting societal security 
in the face of past denial and the fear of future oppression. Therefore the securing of 
these rights has become a priority. Article 4 of the constitution provides legal 
grounding for the pursuit of state funded ethnically homogenous schools, and so 
language is the obvious vehicle with which to seek recognition. 
 
Thus, the demands for mother tongue education can be explained when seeing the 
driving force behind the pursuit as a form of cultural nationalism (Hutchinson 1994).  
The continued existence of an ethnic group in the face of threat can be seen as a 
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driving factor for choosing identity protection over pedagogy. Waever’s suggestion 
that identity can be protected ‘by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion 
and distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself correctly’38 is very 
evident in the post 2003 disputed territories. In an attempt to avoid assimilation, 
national minorities seek certain rights and powers that are needed to maintain their 
own culture by defining education institutions in terms of their own language.  
 
Yet not all calls are defined by language; the education narrative of the distinct 
ethno-religious Yezidi community can illustrate the bestowed role of identity 
protection on education provision without the element of submersion. The Yezidi 
ethnic group is split between those who speak Arabic and those who speak Kurdish. 
In the pursuit of security within the climate of fear and ethnic suppression, the Yezidi 
community have alternately claimed to be ethnically Kurdish and Arab throughout 
their history in the region. The patronage of the Kurds has shielded their linguistically 
compatible Yezidi neighbours, but in contrast the Arabic speaking Yezidi face threats 
to their existence from both religious extremists and Kurdish assimilation. There are 
many schools in northern Ninewa which are deemed to be ‘Yezidi’ schools by the 
district Directorate of Education, this reference is solely in relation to the 
homogenous ethnic nature of the school as opposed to the linguistically or ethnically 
specific syllabus provided. These schools can teach in either Arabic or Kurdish. 
 
The Arabic speaking Yezidi community do not have ethnically affiliated donors, 
political representation or ministerial provision to help shape their education 
provision. Homogenous Yezidi schools rely solely on the ministry under which they 
                                                 
38
 (waever etal 1993b 191) 
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reside, leaving them significantly more powerless to dictate the levels of cultural or 
linguistic education provision provided to them.  The choice of language of 
instruction is out of their hands. Yet within the Arabic speaking communities there is 
recognition of a traditional Yezidi language, a language which has been all but lost 
due to the political realities faced by the community throughout the years of identity 
politics. (It is important to note that the very authenticity of this language has been 
questioned by Kurdish speaking Yezidis.) Yet the revival and representation of this 
language is regarded as an important educational issue within this part of the 
community.  
 
Arabic Yezidi’s have accused the ministries of allowing their children to grow up 
‘without knowledge and pride in their heritage’ due to the neglect of religious and 
cultural curriculum which reflect their existence. The community leaders campaign 
for greater recognition and presence of Yezidi history in the school system. “We want 
to teach Yazidi sons in their old language and to revive it, as it has been neglected 
for hundreds of year.” (Interview YZ8). They suggest they will lose their ‘we’ identity 
through external threats, and wish to strengthen the means of cultural reproduction.  
Therefore the Yezidi community presented their access to education in the region 
framed by a need for further cultural representation. Arabic speaking Yezidi fear 
assimilation into the dominant Kurdish ethnic block, and perceive education to be a 
tool being used to prevent this (an issue unpacked in more detail in subsequent 
chapters). Consequently the Arabic speaking Yezidi have voiced the need for greater 
religious and cultural, as well as linguistic representation within the curriculum. They 
are calling for education which can revive, maintain and also to protect their identity 
from attack and assimilation, using increased representation in the curriculum to 
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resist assimilation and protect their ongoing presence in the locations in which they 
have demographic majority status.  
 
The position of education in most societies allows it to take on an important role in 
the socialisation of ethnic identity and in this sense offers an ideal means of non-
military defence when faced with threats to societal security. School curriculums 
provide a limitless opportunity to reproduce culture and ensure transmission to future 
generations. The subjects of History, Art, Music, Religious Education, Geography 
and Language enable the celebration of anything from ethnically specific poets to 
geographical interpretations of homelands and ancient battle victories. Each subject 
can be used to express a pride in ethnic identity and cultivate a sense of belonging 
to the group. However, education institutions can often become the first victim in the 
battle to protect societal security. Education can be used to weaken societal security 
and oppress minority representation. The curriculum and content are often used to 
deny shared history and oppress minority language rights. 
 
4:6 Inferences and Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has presented the role of identity protection in the formation of 
education both during the Ba’ath era and the post war reconstruction period post 
2003. The purpose of education was distorted by the Ba’ath Party policies in the 
disputed territories. The regime bestowed a number of key objectives to education 
which were not within the internationally understood remit of formal education. 
Firstly, education was used to enforce the notion of one united Iraqi Arab identity. 
References to the multi-cultural makeup of Iraqi demography were forbade and 
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religious and linguistic rights denied. In addition to the lack of representation self 
assertion as a non-Arab became a punishable offence and educational attainment 
adversely affected. Secondly, educational institutions were sources of control and 
observation, where the regime could monitor activity and loyalty to the state system. 
As a consequence, schools were used as a direct weapon in the weakening of non-
Arab identity.  Pursuit of education in this system resulted in the weakening of 
Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian, and other minority ethnic identities.    
 
In 2003 the education system was simultaneously a victim of conflict, suffering 
infrastructural collapse and overall neglect as a result of conflict and sanctions and a 
source of conflict, continuing to oppress the non-Arab populations of the north.   The 
reconstruction of the country saw a new Iraqi constitution which sought to address 
this oppression and promised the rights of all linguistic communities to education in 
their mother tongue language. This right was celebrated by the diverse populations 
of the north and a drive for schools using mother tongue languages as the medium 
of instruction has resulted. Yet, the constitutional article was never elaborated upon 
to provide educational guidelines on how mother tongue education should be 
delivered.   Consequently, current provision fails to take into account the complexity 
of language ability and rights in the territories. A lack of coherence in terminology 
over traditional community languages and mother tongue languages has led to the 
negative pedagogical implications for learning outcomes.  
 
When examining this outcome closely it becomes clear that the protection of societal 
security is a driving factor which has outweighed educational best practice.   Past 
oppression coupled with the wider environment of threat has resulted in education 
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having a triple significance for identity protection. Firstly it has significance in Buzan’s 
realm of cultural reproduction; all ethnic groups, whether in post conflict or not, 
seek to reproduce their distinct identity and pass it on the next generation. Secondly, 
with the particular experience of genocide and ethnic suppression experienced in the 
region, education has also become an obvious vehicle for the revival of cultural 
identity that has been eroded. Finally in the disputed territories ethnic communities 
are facing uncertainty and constant threat, in the face of assimilation or destruction 
education plays a role in the defence of ethnic identity, as demonstrated by Figure 6: 
societal security aims through education in the Iraqi disputed territories and Figure 7: 
Influence, intention and Impact. 
 
Figure 6: Societal Security aims through Education in the Iraqi Disputed Territories  
               
 
 
 
This triple purpose bestowed on education in terms of identity protection has resulted 
in its continuation holding great significance to the societal security of groups in the 
disputed territories. The difference is subtle but important, the motivation for 
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reproduction and continuation are not the same as revival and reaffirmation, equally 
defence takes on a new dimension, even if the method to achieve it is the same. As 
one Yezidi community representative stressed;   
 
‘It is the right of Yezidi people to be acknowledged in the curriculum, to teach 
all people about our history in Iraq. But is also more important because our 
history and language is being lost, we need education structures to revive it, 
education must maintain and renew us to prevent our assimilation.’ (Interview 
YD2 via email) 
 
Given the significant role of education in identity protection and securing societal 
security, the next chapter in the thesis will examine the question of what role ethnic 
identity plays in the current education narrative over provision. Having established 
the role identity has played in the structuring of the education system, the thesis 
moves on to examine how identity influences the wider education debate and 
management. The next chapter will explore any restriction to education delivery in 
the region and unpack how they are perceived by the community educationalists. 
The chapter will present the capacity gaps in the regions education system and 
discuss how the structure and purpose of the education system may result in 
education becoming party to the wider conflict. 
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Figure 7: Influence, intention and Impact 
                                                 
39
 This will be explored more in chapter 6 
40
 The use of ethnically homogenous schools as a means of security defence for pupils was raised infrequently in interviews, but it did come 
up.  it is an interesting point of investigation but was not prevalent enough to make it into the scope of the larger investigation. 
Influence Intention Education impact Outcome 
REPRODUCTION 
of ethnic identity 
 Secure the means 
of cultural 
reproduction  
 An aim of all ethnic groups, 
regardless of threat, is to 
secure the ability to pass on 
cultural traditions to the next 
generation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education is 
segregated 
along ethnic 
lines 
resulting in a 
system of 
separate 
school 
systems with 
homogenous 
intakes, each 
seeking to 
promote their 
own 
identities 
through 
curriculum 
and 
linguistics.  
REVIVAL of ethnic 
Identity  
 Re introduce 
native language  
 The loss of identity indicators 
under the previous regime have 
led to; 
 
 The use of Assyrian as the 
medium of instruction 
 
 The Yezidi campaign to 
revive and teach in Yezidi  
 
 Reinstate a lost 
cultural pride 
 The need to hide cultural 
identity and ethnicity under the 
previous regime have led to; 
 
 all communities 
seeking greater 
recognition of their 
cultural and 
historical presence in 
the region through 
curriculum; calls for 
recognition of 
historical victories 
and celebration of 
cultural figures. 
These calls are more 
prevalent then calls 
for pedagogical  
reform or updating 
curriculum in terms 
of science etc.  
 
DEFENCE of ethnic 
Identity  
 Prevent 
assimilation by 
strengthening 
culture 
 Demonstrate a 
regional presence  
 Protect pupils 
 As above, linguistic and cultural 
recognition have been 
prioritised.  
 
 The more ethnically defined 
schools the more evident the 
Assyrian, Kurd and Turkmen are 
in the region
39
 
 Find security in ethnically 
homogenous schools
40
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Chapter 5: 
Ethnically appropriate education; Threats and Survival 
 
5:1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we examined how the education system in northern Iraq was 
used to deny the existence of non-Arab identities under the Ba’ath party and how the 
issue of societal security and representation is central to the current evolution of 
education in the disputed territories. Chapter four demonstrated how education is 
increasingly perceived as a means of identity protection. Ethnic communities in the 
disputed territories are seeking to revive, maintain and defend ethnic identity through 
the education system in the region (sometimes at the expense of pedagogy and 
learning outcomes). This identity protection focus has consequently led to an 
ethnically segregated school structure.  
 
In this chapter the thesis examines the question; what role does ethnic identity 
play in the current education narrative? Having established the role identity has 
played in the structuring of the education system (school structures), the thesis 
moves on to examine in more detail how identity influences the wider education 
debate and the management and provision of education resources. In order to 
investigate this question a number of sources were consulted. The analysis draws on 
the collected interview transcripts to unpack the role that identity was given by key 
educational actors in the disputed territories during their interviews. Additionally, the 
chapter will draw on a number of media reports pertaining to education which were 
broadcast in the region during the data collection period.  The reports were 
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examined to determine if education issues were presented in terms of identity or 
societal security. Due to the conclusions of the previous chapter, the exploration will 
look for specific references to the revival, maintenance and defence of identity in the 
education narratives of both sources.   
 
This chapter will introduce how the issues of identity and societal security indeed 
feature in the discussion of education by both education actors and media 
representation. The segregation of schools along ethnic lines, coupled with the 
status of Iraqi education as in ‘a process of reconstruction’ (UNESCO 2011) have 
resulted in the issue of ethnic identity inevitably being raised in relation to resource 
management and ministerial support for the evolution of different community schools 
systems. Furthermore, resource allocation and representation in the education 
system was presented in terms of gaining access to the means of cultural 
reproduction and not just equal education standards. Societal security was frequently 
presented in relation to the capacity gaps of ethnically homogenous schools by 
education actors and media sources. The failings of the education system were 
demonstrated as preventing the development of mother-tongue or traditional 
language, cultural representation and religious recognition. For example, teacher 
shortages were presented in terms of insufficient numbers of linguistically 
appropriate teachers and resource provision in terms of translation and the 
representation of identity. 
 
Ethnic identity is consequently playing a central role in the debate over education’s 
reconstruction in the region.  The chapter will demonstrate how the role of identity in 
the education narrative has resulted in any lack of support for mother-tongue or 
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ethnically defined education systems being perceived as threats to the survival and 
continued existence in the region. Using the theoretical understanding of societal 
security the thesis will demonstrate how threats are presented in a securitising 
manner by educationalists. Therefore the chapter will demonstrate how different 
ethnic communities have interpreted restrictions to their education systems and 
taken strides to counter the limitations. 
 
The chapter will be divided into five sections. The first section will present the 
capacity gaps in the education system across the disputed territories and locate the 
debate within the understanding of threats to societal security. The following three 
sections will use the examples of different communities to explore: the presented 
threats, whether these threats have become framed by ethnic survival; and, finally 
how these threats are being countered or managed within these communities. The 
final section will review the findings and discussion implications for the role of 
education.  
 
5:3 Capacity Gaps or Intentional Threats to Societal Security? 
 
 
Photo: 4 
 
The picture shows 
a  school corridor 
in the  Ninewa 
governorate. The 
teachers reported 
struggling with the 
decay of the 
school building. 
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To explore the role that ethnic identity and societal security are playing in the 
education narrative of the disputed territories three points of significant importance 
must be emphasised; 
 
  Firstly, Iraqi education is in a ‘process of reconstruction’ (UNESCO, 2011) 
and therefore capacity gaps and infrastructural reconstruction are of primary 
concern. 
 
 Secondly, each community has effectively sought control of their own 
education systems in order to secure the means of cultural reproduction, 
coupled with residential patterns. This has resulted in ethnically homogenous 
segregated schools. 
 
 Thirdly, all schools, regardless of ethnic definition, are entitled to equal 
governmental support through the central ministry of education.  
 
Therefore across the disputed territories of Iraq ethnic groups are separately seeking 
to reconstruct schools, develop resources and build educational infrastructure for 
their own communities. This is taking place under the direction and support of the 
local education administrations. Consequently, this has effectively created an 
environment in which ethnic groups are able to compare the level of support 
received for their community with that of others, compete for resources between 
themselves and perceive capacity gaps in terms of deliberate attacks on their 
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community. The persistent status of Iraqi education as a victim of conflict has 
created low levels of teacher education and insufficient infrastructure which affect all 
education provision regardless of ethnic affiliation. Many of the issues raised by 
interlocutors during the interviews pertain to all language communities and are a 
result of Iraq’s suffering education system as a whole. Frequent reference to the lack 
of school buildings, overcrowding, lack of resources, undeveloped curriculum and 
unqualified teachers were made in interviews. All interlocutors reported the need to 
share school buildings in shifts. This has resulted in some instances to a three shift 
system operating throughout a day. Yet, the significant finding for this enquiry was 
that each ethnic community presented the neglect of their education system in 
relation to the means of cultural reproduction. Societal security protection was 
therefore central to all issues raised. Even standard education requirements were 
framed by ethnic need. 
  
 
In terms of basic education, capacity gaps can be found within three specific areas of 
management: specifying learning (curriculum), pedagogy (teaching methods) and 
resources. These three elements are normally a central part of education reform and 
the reconstruction process post-conflict. Often three key ingredients of any education 
reform proposal are to “modernize” the curriculum, to replace existing textbooks, and 
to improve the quality of teaching through improved teaching methods and 
investment in teacher education. Two of the most important aspects of this process, 
from a societal security perspective, are; who is involved in the decision making, and 
how is action implemented even between communities.  
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As the schools in the region are organised around linguistic markers, the provision 
for linguistically appropriate reforms are essential to the perception of equality in the 
reform process.  Equally, each of the three aspects of reform can be interpreted in 
terms of linguistic support. Cobarrubias (1984;71)  provides a taxonomy of state 
policy towards supporting minority linguistic groups in education. 
 
(1) attempting to kill a language; 
(2) letting a language die; 
(3) unsupported coexistence; 
(4) partial support of specific language functions; 
(5) adoption as a recognised  language 
 
Education reconstruction in the disputed territories falls within the last structure, and 
is seemingly in the best position to strengthen societal identity through schooling. 
Yet, although the last policy would seem to make education delivery in a community 
language safe; Skutnabb-langas argues that it is important to problematise this fifth 
category, as  there are cases where 'adoption as an official language' is not enough 
to support a language. He uses South Africa’s multilingual state policy as an 
example of a situation where, despite ·the 11 official languages in the Constitution, 
implementation does not seem to be forthcoming due to vast capacity gaps for 
delivery;                  
          
‘as many critical voices in South Africa are increasingly beginning to point out: 
'everything possible is being done to avoid bringing this to practical   reality'; 
'government is avoiding the issue at all cost'; 'even with the new   language-in-
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education policy, nothing, not a thing. .......'The policy/principle  is useless 
without an effective implementation plan, spelt out, monitored and regulated-
no soft options here at all' (2013; 304) 
 
This can be seen to be of direct relevance to the education delivery for minority 
groups in Iraq. Although the constitutional promises have been made, the political 
will, and therefore the capacity, to deliver is widely criticised and deemed insufficient. 
Correspondingly, gaps in capacity were overwhelmingly presented, not in terms of 
general lack of state education spending and resource management, but in terms of 
ethnically and linguistically specific resource failure, as demonstrated by Figure 7: 
Ethnically defined Capacity Gaps in Education Services.   
 
Figure 8: Ethnically Defined Capacity Gaps in Education Services  
 
 
 
 
Of even greater significance was the fact that capacity gaps were presented in 
relation to the wider political debate and deliberate hindering of their access for 
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sectarian or ethnic persecution reasons.  Capacity gaps could be understood in 
terms of the financial and infrastructural limitations of a ministry of education which is 
in a process of post-conflict reconstruction, yet they were overwhelmingly presented 
as attempts to suppress an ethnic group and challenge societal security. Intentional 
threats to societal security through the suppression of identity in the education sector 
can include direct threats, which use state policy to specifically assimilate ethnic 
groups, such as; the direct forbidding of non-Arab languages as medium of 
instruction, the prevention of teaching of religious or ethnic histories, the prohibiting 
of ethnic names for schools or the closure of places of education, as seen under the 
Ba’ath administration. Or more indirect methods which, despite policy to guarantee 
minority rights, see obstructions to their implementation through the lack of financial 
support, neglect of ethnically specific teaching resources, curriculum omissions, and 
obstructing the opening of mother-tongue schools (Jivraj, 2013). Both direct and 
indirect measures work to suppress identity and thereby prevent it from replicating or 
reproducing itself, as illustrated in figure 9: Attacks to Societal security through 
education. Due to the constitutional promises to minority right protection, the 
ethnically defined capacity gaps presented by education actors can be seen as 
indirect attempts to limit the development of mother-tongue and ethnically defined 
schools through denial of support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
  Figure 9: Attacks to Societal Security through Education 
 
 
 
An examination of educational equality within the segregated structure shows that no 
linguistic and ethnic education officials are satisfied with the provision given to 
them41. The current mother-tongue system is not supported in terms of ethnically or 
linguistically specific resources provided from the central Ministry of Education. 
Where resources are provided they are criticized for their lack of minority recognition, 
providing either Arab or Kurd centric representations of Iraq. The emergent theme 
from education specialists is one of deliberate inadequate support. A number of 
grievances surrounding the provision of ethnically specific resources have been 
raised and have manifested themselves in two main complaints about education 
‘inputs’. The first is in relation to the management provision of ethnic specific schools 
and the second is in reference to the provision of school resources. With the 
exception of a few private schools, all schools are classified as state schools, 
regardless of their medium of instruction, and are entitled to equal state funding and 
                                                 
41
 Every participant interviewed detailed numerous shortcomings in the provision to schools. Interviews and questions received 
via email between Feb – July 2009. 
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resource provision. Consequently, all schools, regardless of ethnic affiliation are 
provided with stationary kits and textbooks by the Ministry of Education42.  
However, despite the relatively equal distribution of textbooks among schools, an 
issue of provision inequality has arisen. All textbooks are printed in the Arabic 
language and are therefore seen to present an unfair advantage toward the Arabic 
language schools43.  The Kurdish autonomous region counters the disadvantage 
faced by the Kurdish language schools by supplying Kurdish textbooks, a fact which 
only accentuates the deficiency in other communities. (However this provision 
actually serves to hamper the educational attainment of Kurdish pupils in the 
disputed territories, an issue that will be expanded upon in more detail in the next 
chapter.)   The failure to print mother tongue language textbooks for the different 
communities’ usage has been perceived as a direct denial of their constitutional right 
‘to educate their children in their mother tongue’ (Article 4 of the Iraqi Federal 
Constitution).  
The state-provided Arabic textbooks come under criticism not only for their medium 
of instruction but also for their content. The textbooks provided are deemed in need 
of development to advance the inclusion of non-Arab history in the syllabus44. This 
critique is also prevalent in the Kurdish Autonomous Region, where Turkmen 
schools are deemed to receive inadequate Turkmen specific support, lacking 
representation of ethnically diverse history, culture and language (SOIMT, 2009). 
Firer (1998) addresses the dangers to societal cohesion from the omission of ethnic 
histories in relation to the representation of Arabs in Israeli textbooks. She identifies 
                                                 
42 UNICEF staff confirmed the distribution of stationary kits via asynchronous email correspondence. Received 27th August 2009. 
43 Interviews and questions received via email between Feb – July 2009. General view presented in majority of interviews. 
44 Interviewee 12 detailed annoyance at the lack of non Arab representation and likened it the previous regimes education provision. Received via email May 09. 
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the negative effects of the fact that Napoleon and the French Revolution occupy 
more pages than Arabs in history textbooks, leading to resentment and anger among 
the Palestinian community.  
When a region is contested, interpretations of inequalities will be politically and 
emotionally charged and have the potential to be elevated to points of ethnic survival 
and therefore securitised. Therefore, if the state fails to fulfil its social contract with its 
citizens by neglecting the provision of ethnically appropriate education or there is a 
perceived deliberate hindrance, then threats to collective identity are felt. 
Consequently, if collective identity is perceived as being under threat in the 
education arena, education can become an issue of conflict in the wider dispute over 
territory and co-existence. 
 
Equally, the perception of threats to societal security in the education sector will no 
doubt be influenced by the wider security environment.  As presented in chapter 
three, in the disputed territories physical insecurity based on ethnic identity is 
compounded by ethnic competition over that administration of the territories. Ethnic 
groups are facing depopulation through the deliberate targeting of people based on 
ethnicity by violent extremists leading to depopulations (fleeing and death), dilution of 
identity through adapting to the majority linguistic and cultural influences generated 
by fear of persecution, and, lastly, the deliberate attempts by majority communities to 
co-op small ethnic groups to secure numerical superiority on the ground.  All these 
threats are intrinsically entwined with one another, and threats felt through one 
avenue will influence how threats are perceived in the others areas45 (Lake & 
                                                 
45
 Lake and Rothchild’s (1996) rational choice approach to ethnic conflict suggests that perceived deliberate threats to the 
cultural identity of a group are taken as precursors to threats to their physical security. As such, communities who perceive a 
threat to identity are fearful for their survival and thus invest in protecting it (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). 
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Rothchild; 1996). Thus, perceptions of threat within the education arena will no doubt 
be influenced by how societal security is challenged in the wider environment and 
increase the importance of access to groups.  
 
Communities have reacted to the neglect of non-Arab education in a variety of ways. 
Each community has sought ethnically affiliated patrons who are able to support their 
schools with financial or practical assistance (see Figure 12: External Actors). 
However the level of support varies between groups and therefore so does the level 
of education provision. The following section of the chapter will present the case of 
Kurdish, Turkmen, and Assyrian education provision. The section will document the 
capacity gaps of each community and the perception of such gaps in terms of 
societal security threats. It will also explore whether educationalists have presented 
a securitised narrative around education; therefore raising it as an ethnic survival 
issue. It will examine the ways in which communities have mobilised to resist and 
counter the perceived threats to their education systems and therefore their 
continued existence. We will turn first to the Kurdish community as their provision is 
unique among non-Arabs in the region.   
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5.4 KRG Patronage in disputed territories Kurdish Education  
 
 
While Kurdish education suffers from the same neglect as the other non-Arab 
communities, its situation differs due to the regional backing of the KRG Ministry of 
Education. Kurdish education in Kirkuk falls officially under the jurisdiction of the 
central ministry in Baghdad; however, it is entirely administered by the KRG Ministry 
of Education. The position of Director of Kurdish studies and other nationalities is a 
Central ministry post, yet, in Kirkuk and Ninewa, the Directors receive their salaries 
and instructions from the KRG. The only contribution made to the development of 
Kurdish language education by the central ministry is the allocation of a desk space 
in the Directorate of Education’s offices in the administrative building. As such the 
Kurdish language schools in Kirkuk, and across the DIB’s receive funding, resources 
and teacher salaries from the KRG, and follow the KRG Ministry of Education 
Photo: 5 
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curriculum. This action is justified by Kurdish educationalists in terms of the absolute 
neglect of Kurdish education by the central ministry. 
  
Due to its strong presence in the region and regional autonomous area, the Kurdish 
language has survived as an active mother tongue for the majority of Kurdish 
families (Interviews KD x6). Therefore the justification of mother-tongue access can 
be seen in terms of comprehension in the class room and not traditional language 
revival or societal security. Therefore the KRG ministry has a strong case for 
intervening in the region. It was suggested that without the involvement of the KRG 
the Kurdish residents of the disputed territories would be forced to undertake 
education in Arabic, due to lack of support from the central ministry.  It was 
repeatedly stated that although the central ministry had made efforts to translate the 
Arabic curriculum into Kurdish, no attempts to print adequate numbers of textbooks 
were made. Equally, the training and appointment of Kurdish teachers has been 
neglected, forcing the KRG to employ teachers in schools across the region to 
ensure adequate delivery of education.    
 
The involvement of the KRG education ministry in the regions under the Government 
of Iraq ministry remit was justified with emotive language and presented as a 
necessity for the continuation of Kurdish education. Kurdish educationalists detailed 
the level of neglect which warranted such action. One Kurdish Ministry of Iraq 
education official stated that; 
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‘The central ministry have given us nothing... nothing! The Director of Kurdish 
language in Kirkuk, he gets his salary from Erbil not Baghdad. The only thing 
they gave him was a desk...... and a chair! (The interviewee threw his hands 
in the air and laughed at the total obscurity of it) All they give him is a space in 
the directorate office. How can he do his job like that? No pay, no resources? 
Without Erbil we would not have Kurdish schools, just Arabic.’ (Interviewee 
KD 2) 
 
“The KRG support has developed from necessity, Baghdad provide NO 
support… no teacher salaries, not my salary, no text books…. Just this 
desk…” (Interview KD Kirkuk) 
    
The framing of Kurdish education as being under threat was not uncommon; all of 
the Kurdish educationalists and community leaders consulted stated that it would not 
be possible to provide mother-tongue education if it were not for Erbil; ‘The Kurdish 
authorities acted because they had to... without their support the Kurds in Kirkuk 
would only have Arabic textbooks.’ (Interview KD3).  
 
Due to the wider political environment (as presented in chapter three) this threat was 
often portrayed as having a political purpose. It was suggested that mother-tongue 
education was required to safeguard the continued ‘existence of families in their 
rightful homes and villages’ (interview KD4). The political standoff over the 
administrative control of the disputed territories was deemed to have a significant 
influence on the support given to schools in the region. Article 140 calls for a 
referendum and census, this process places great importance on the demographic 
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composition of the region. As such the neglect of Kurdish education was often 
presented as a deliberate attempt to deny Kurds their place in the region and limit 
their numbers.  
 
‘They (Baghdad) make it hard for Kurdish education. For instance there are 
not enough Kurdish teachers under the Baghdad ministry to teach (in) all 
Kurdish schools. When they have a Kurdish teacher they send them to an 
Arab School, in an all Arab village. This is very frightening, today there is a lot 
of insecurity, travelling between community locations is dangerous and 
difficult so the teacher will not go to work...... should they have to travel 
through checkpoints?’ (Interview KD1) 
 
‘Kurdish language is unimportant to the centre and they think it is politically 
unnecessary in the region as they want to control the area and have the 
administration in Arabic. It is a continuation of the Arabisation policies of the 
past.’ (Interview KD8) 
 
Kurdish educationalists were vocal in their distrust for the Baghdad central Ministry 
of Education. Officials suggested that there would be no Kurdish education in Kirkuk 
if it were not for the intervention of the KRG Ministry of Education. They portrayed 
Kurdish identity as under threat in the region if it weren’t for the KRG.   This 
securitising speech is suggesting that without the involvement of the KRG, not only 
mother-tongue education but also the Kurdish ‘we’ identity would be under threat 
from a denial of support and attempt at assimilation. 
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Yet, despite the imperative for ethnic survival presented by the Kurdish officials, the 
involvement of two ministries in the Kurdish education system has proven incredibly 
problematic. By taking significant steps to improve the KRG regional education 
standards it has moved away from the central system. The KRG has a different and 
updated curriculum which also reflects the place of the Kurds in Iraqi history. Equally 
they have restructured the Kurdish school year; which has been divided into two 
semesters, each ending in final exams. In contrast, The Ministry of Education 
Baghdad continues with the old system which facilitates examinations at the end of 
the year and runs on a separate curriculum and timetable. The contributions of both 
ministries can therefore be seen to conflict in terms of the schools management. For 
example, despite following the KRG curriculum, pupils in Kurdish schools are 
required to sit their exams under the Iraqi Ministry of Education exams board. This 
exam board follows only the Iraqi curriculum and timetable; therefore pupils following 
the KRG curriculum are at an enormous disadvantage and their examination grades 
have been seen to be adversely affected as a result46.  
 
Further complications have arisen from the updated curriculum. Teachers who were 
familiar with the Government of Iraq Ministry of Education texts are now required to 
teach the new KRG syllabus. However there is no provision of additional training to 
familiarise teachers with the text or syllabus. This has caused the greatest concern in 
the newly introduced subject areas such as Geology (Interview, KD7, Kurdish Globe, 
10/2010). Pupil understanding is inevitably hampered if teaching staff are unfamiliar 
with the subject knowledge. Further curriculum issues arise from the additional 
language provision within Kurdish schools. The teaching of English has taken 
                                                 
46
 .(Kurdish Globe 10/2010).   
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precedence in the KRG curriculum over the study of Arabic. However, for Kurdish 
pupils residing in the DIB’s there is an obvious need to provide a more serious 
programme of Arabic study. Pupils require fluency and understanding of the 
dominant language of administration in the region. Reports from teachers in the 
Kirkuk governorate have suggested that Kurdish students are failing to achieve a 
reasonable standard in Arabic. This is due to the inadequate importance given to it in 
the curriculum and also the fact that teachers who are employed from the KRG often 
do not have a reasonable standard of Arabic themselves and struggle to teach it. 
The implications for social integration and conflict are obviously negative and will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter.   
 
Kurdish language schools have received very little of the support deemed necessary 
by the constitutional rights afforded to them.  This neglect has been presented by 
Kurdish education actors as not only a threat to the Kurdish mother-tongue language 
system, but also an intentional attempt to weaken the societal stability of the Kurds in 
the region. As such the achievement of Kurdish language education is regarded as a 
matter of societal security for the Kurds. Consequently, the KRG Ministry of 
education has stepped forward to provide support and funding and ensure its 
continuation. This support is centred around perceptions of threat and the need to 
ensure Kurdish identity. The mixed involvement of ministries has had adverse effects 
on the educational attainment of Kurdish students and additional implications on the 
wider issue of social cohesion and regional stability.  
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5:5 Turkmen educations’ co-ordinated response and resilience 
 
 
The Turkmen have not called for a distinct autonomous region like the Kurds but as 
long as political positions are divided between Arab and Kurd, they call to be 
recognised for their regional demographic presence. The Iraqi Turkmen maintain a 
historical claim to Kirkuk and, with Turkish assistance, have formed the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front (ITF) to challenge attempts at Kurdish control of the city.  Turkmen 
ethnic relations in the region have a complex history of conflict and co-existence with 
Arabs and Kurds. As sectarian tensions have mounted in the region the Turkmen 
have faced threats from a number of sources. Tensions between Kurds and 
Turkmen mounted following the toppling of the former regime and resulted in a 
number of inter-ethnic clashes occurring in Kirkuk. Turkmen groups accuse the 
Kurdish militia of having abducted Turkmen and Arabs, subjecting them to torture 
and often taking their lives47. Additionally violence carried out by Arab extremist 
groups has been seen to target the Turkmen community48. A referendum on Kirkuk 
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 Copied out news clips of Turkmen targeted attacks here.  
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was set to take place in 2007, but has not yet occurred. In the midst of competition 
for Kirkuk, Iraqi Turkmen express concerns that they are targeted by both Arab and 
Kurdish groups who seek to deny their demographic presence and remove their 
influence.  
 
In keeping with the Turkmens’ active position on protecting their distinct culture and 
historical claims to the city of Kirkuk, a large and growing number of Turkman 
schools have been opened across the region and in the city of Kirkuk, in particular. 
As discovered in the previous chapter, these schools are classified in official 
documentation as Turkman language schools, yet schools teach in Turkish and have 
a varying degree of Arabic used within them.   Regardless of the debate over the use 
of the Turkish language, Turkmen schools are still regarded as ‘mother tongue’ and 
thus remain under the remit of the Ministry of Education in Baghdad. Therefore the 
responsibility for Turkmen education is subsumed under the Ministry of Kurdish 
studies and other languages.  This administrative arrangement is one of the primary 
complaints of Turkmen educationalists. There is a call from Turkmen education 
specialists, from within the ministry and from education wings of political and social 
organisations, to establish a General Directorate in the Ministry of education in 
Baghdad to deal specially and officially with the Turkmen schools49. Without equality 
of government representation, Turkmens feel unable to take control of their own 
education and ensure it is in line with that of the other communities.  
 
Currently, Turkmen education actors feel they are neglected in terms of training, 
resource provision and curriculum alignment.  The Turkmen education officials 
                                                 
49 The establishment of a central Turkmen office in the MoE, was a desire echoed through interviews. Interviews and questions received 
via email between Feb – July 2009. 
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highlighted the lack of teacher training colleges and supplementary teaching courses 
provided for Turkmen teachers. These programmes are available in Arabic and 
sometimes Kurdish, but not Turkish. Equally, the lack of engagement between the 
ministry and Turkmen teachers with regard to updating pedagogy was seen to be 
deficient. The following are a collection of some of the statements pertaining to this 
issue; 
 
‘The ministry does not support us with any training courses. We are on our 
own. We have to train our teachers in Turkmen and pay their saleries or we 
would have no teachers. Only Arabic speaking ones.’’ (Interview TM7) 
 
‘We do not have enough teachers, I have asked for training and they (the 
directorate of education) do not reply.’ (Interview TMN5)  
 
‘We have a lack of conferences for Turkmen Language teachers in the 
Ministry of Education so as to keep them informed of any changes or 
developments... we cannot directly address the educational issues in the 
Ministry of Education. There was one  conference for Turkmen Language 
teachers... it was held in March 2005, and organized by the Ministry of 
Education,  Directorate of Kurdish and other Nationalities Studies.... but that is 
all. (Interview TMN/D)  
 
‘There is a lack of formal training courses in Turkmen language organized 
through Diyala Education Directorate Kurdish Section despite the existence of 
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Turkmen lecturers [who are currently] teaching Turkmen in the schools that 
have Turkmen Language Study Program.’ (Interview TMD) 
 
The provision of up-to-date teacher training programmes is absolutely vital to ensure 
the advancement of Iraqi pedagogy.  The status of Iraqi education as a victim of 
conflict has elevated the need for the provision of qualified teachers and the 
progression of pupil-centred teaching and classroom management (Creative Solution 
Interview)50. In light of the previous regime’s policy of assimilation and the following 
decline of the education environment, these training programmes have become 
essential to the education outputs for the region, and advancing post conflict 
reconstruction in Iraq in general. Iraqi teachers are often under-qualified and lack the 
knowledge necessary to advance Iraqi education toward international standards 
(UNICEF 2005). But we must consider that if teacher training courses are only 
available from the central Ministry in Arabic, Turkmen language teachers are 
‘effectively being excluded’ (Interview TM12).  With the planned expansion of Turkish 
language schools, failure to support the Turkmen education system through the 
provision of linguistically appropriate training becomes significantly more detrimental 
as the number of teachers using Turkish in that arena will inevitably increase. The 
level of education and pedagogy will be significantly lower in these schools without 
training support. 
 
Turkmen educationalists also referenced the complete failure of the government to 
print textbooks in the Turkish language. Mehmet Halil Imamoglu of the Turkmen 
Kirkuk ITF stated that “Baghdad do not print or translate books even though the 
                                                 
50
 Information provided by asynchronous correspondence with CREATIVE SOLUTIONS staff. Creative Solutions were the 
company used by USAID to aid the rebuilt of the Iraqi education system. Received March 15
th
 2010. 
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translations have been approved by a committee.” A SOIMT report equally criticised 
the central ministry’s support by stating that “although the federal constitution of Iraq 
guarantees the rights of all Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue in 
accordance with education guidelines, or in any other language in private institutions, 
these obligations have yet to be see full implementation.” The failure of the 
government to print Turkmani51 language textbooks has been perceived as a direct 
denial of their constitutional right ‘to educate their children in their mother tongue’ 
(Article 4 of the Iraqi Federal Constitution).  
The state-provided Arabic textbooks come under criticism not only for their medium 
of instruction but also for their content. The textbooks provided are deemed in need 
of development to advance the inclusion of non-Arab history in the syllabus. They 
are seen as deliberately portraying the Turkmen people in a negative light. 
 
“History books portray Turks as wrong doers and killers. This is the remnants 
of Saddam’s regime, but the bad information about Iran was removed so why 
not remove the bad against the Turks? I do not understand why we have not 
been supported in this way” (Interview TMN) 
 
‘Turkmen are not represented in these textbooks. They do not show our 
impact on Iraqi culture. Kirkuk is a Turkmen city, the citadel has the original 
settlement patterns of the Turkmen people, our history is everywhere.’ 
(Interview TM352) 
                                                 
51
 I will use the terminology of the Turkmen educationalists. Who referred only to mother tongue Turkmeni, regardless of the 
fact that schools use Turkish and this has been approved by the government.  
52
In reply to this an Arab community representative present in the room commented; ‘Everywhere but the schools!’ (Interview 
AB6) this lighthearted banter continued and demonstrated to me the fact that the problems described are presented at an 
official level and I rarely witnessed any animosity directed toward other community members; just their political or high level 
representation. 
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Unfortunately, interviews with Turkmen educationalists across the region revealed 
that the inequality is understood in terms of deliberate attempts to deny ethnic 
representation. Failure to provide mother tongue language programmes is viewed as 
an intentional effort to limit the use of the language as a means of instruction53.  For 
example in Ninewa, to counter the lack of available teaching courses which 
specifically use Turkmeni and progress the ability of teachers to use the language in 
schools, the Turkmen community have developed their own teacher training 
programmes.  But the Mosul regional Director of Education has refused to 
acknowledge the qualifications of those teachers who attend the additional privately 
run training course in Turkmen education. The rejection is justified on the basis that 
these teachers require more practical teaching experience. The validity of the 
argument is questioned by the Turkmen education officials in the region who 
reference the quality and training available to teachers of other languages such as 
English. The refusal to accept these additional teachers has been framed in terms of 
a deliberate obstruction to the Turkmen education system and Mother-Tongue 
language provision on the grounds of ethnicity, directly referencing their ethnic 
identity as cause or refereeing to the ‘injustice’ in the system: 
   
‘They say they need to teach more (gain more teaching experience), but we 
base our course on the English language teaching course. It has the same 
structure. And these English teachers are not asked to teach more. It is only 
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 Over three quarters of the interview participants noted a deliberate threat to the Turkmen education system. Interviews and 
questions received via email between Feb – July 2009. 
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the Turkmen teachers. (It is) only because we are Turkmen. There is no other 
reason that I can understand.’ (Interview TMN) 
 
‘The central Ministry of Education and the Diyala Education Directorate do not 
recognize Teachers who received “Merit Certificates”.  As such they are not 
[permitted] to participate in other development courses conducted in Turkmen, 
it stops the career and stops them teaching, we need to change this injustice.’ 
(Interview TMD1) 
 
Equally the failure to recruit Turkmen specialists or allow existing Turkmen teachers 
to transfer to regions of high Turkmen population density by the ministry was also 
presented as a deliberate attempt to hinder the use of Turkmeni. Accusations of 
ministries making ‘excuses’ and ‘not permitting’ teacher appointments reflect the 
interpretation of these actions by Turkmen educationalist;  
 
‘Recruitment of Turkmens who graduated from Teachers Colleges has not 
taken place since the collapse of the former regime in 2003 (in Dyala). This is 
despite the existence of Turkmen schools.  It is worth mentioning that 
according to the regulations in force,   priority and preference in recruitment 
must be given to them. However, they are currently teaching Turkmen 
language and have not been appointed yet.’  (Interview TMD, reading from 
prepared notes) 
 
‘The Turkmen language specialization is not mentioned when [the post] 
“Educational Supervisor or Turkmen Language Expert” is advertised. And, 
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when Turkmen ask for such posts the Education Directorate comes up with 
numerous excuses in this regard, therefore we have no Turkmen supervisors, 
just Arab.’   (Interview TMN)  
 
‘The Turkmen Language teachers are not permitted to be transferred from 
their schools to schools with Turkmen language’. The transfer process is very 
long and they make it not possible to move posts between schools.  (Interview 
TM7) 
 
The restrictions which are experienced in terms of Turkmen initial teacher training, 
career development and further training and the appointment of Turkmen teachers 
are seen as put in place to deliberately sabotage the development of Turkmen 
schools in the disputed territories. Equally the denied representation of Turkmen in 
the curriculum and the representation of Turks in the textbooks provided are seen as 
purposeful manipulations to deny the Turkmen’s place in the region. This is further 
compounded by the perception that the use of the Turkish alphabet is opposed by 
many state officials (Interview TM3).  
 
As with the Kurdish interpretation, restrictions placed in the way of the education 
system of Turkmen are viewed in relation to the wider political environment. 
Territorial disputes and sectarian politics underpin the accusations and shape the 
defence and support of Turkmen education.  One Turkmen education official stated 
that:  
The obstacles that are laid down by the politicians of different nationalities, 
such as the Kurdish, obstruct the process of learning in the mothers tongue – 
170 
 
whether these obstacles are through the ministry of education or through the 
provincial council in Kirkuk…….I think the obstacle is that the administration in 
Kirkuk greatly politicised by the Kurdish parties who control the administration 
since occupation54.   
This statement demonstrates the perception that the disregard of mother-tongue 
education is viewed as direct opposition to their linguist presence within the 
education system and therefore the region. Rightly or wrongly the Turkmen 
education elite regard themselves as not only ignored in terms of finance and 
support, but also as intentionally hindered in their pursuit of separatist Turkmen 
education structures.   
 
The failure to support mother-tongue language development by the central ministry 
has been countered by Turkmen educationalists in a very productive manner. 
Ethnically affiliated donors have been sought and now a variety of ‘foundations’ 
provide financial and practical support to Turkmen schools across the region. The 
entire central curriculum has been translated into Turkish, printed and distributed to 
schools in the governorate without assistance from the central ministry. Volunteer 
teachers and Turkish linguists provide training courses in Turkish for primary and 
intermediate stages of Turkmen education. In an attempt to counter the loss of 
language and increase the enrolment into Turkish language schools training courses 
have been provided for parents and community leaders in written Turkish in the 
Kirkuk governorate.  
                                                 
54
 Interviews and questions received via email June 2009. Also for further information see Education 
in Iraq. Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/a0f63109ac7c1280032a979?OpenDocument, 
accessed 22 May 2009. 
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The provision of external support for Turkmen education has come from a number of 
different actors. As such external influences on the Turkmen education system are 
varied. As opposed to the influence of one central actor on Kurdish education, 
Turkmen have a mixed range of influences which are regional specific between, 
Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala and the KRG. In terms of curriculum translation and printing, 
the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs, Ankara Waqf, translates the 
curriculum while the political party; the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) in Kirkuk, take 
responsibility for printing textbooks and distributing them to schools (Interview TM7). 
In addition to this support, thirty-day Turkmen teacher training courses have been 
organised with volunteer head teachers and linguists from groups within the 
Turkmen community. Courses are run in Al Araida and Telafar to give specific 
linguistic training to teachers (Interview TMX4).  In addition, to counter the current 
lack of appointments by the ministry the Waqf pay a $120 a month for ‘additional’ 
Turkmen teachers in the governorate. Consequently, there are currently 150 
voluntary teachers working in schools across the governorate, 24 in schools in Mosul 
and 126 in Telafar (Interview TMN). Yet the ministry refuses to take over the salaries 
of these voluntary teachers on the grounds that they did not qualify in state run 
teacher colleges (Interview TMN).  
 
With so many unregulated influences within the different separatist school systems, 
the possibility for purposeful manipulation occurs and within the fragile ethno-political 
environment the risk of outside donors and actors using education institutes for self-
serving nationalistic purposes arises.  Without the regulation of donated textbooks 
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the danger presents that numerous separate curricula will be present in the region as 
each ethnic group and its ethnically affiliated donor strives to teach its own 
representation of history, geography and culture. The dangers of this multiplicity of 
resources are demonstrated in Kreso’s (2008) analysis of the Bosnian curriculum. 
He found that students often learn to hate those who are ‘‘different’’ through separate 
curricula and history textbooks.  Equally, reliance on textbooks from outside donors 
carries with it the risk of politicisation of the curriculum; for example, Bharati (1992, 
cited in Bush and Saltarelli 2000 12) noted that in schools in Indian states controlled 
by the BJP, the principal extremist political party, BJP-sponsored textbooks “depict 
the Mughals as foreigners and oppressors, and interpret Indians’ achievement of 
freedom from English rule as but the latest episode in a long ongoing struggle to free 
India from foreign influences. Muslims are, by this interpretation, the contemporary 
incarnation of the Mughal pattern of dominance”. This danger is of particular 
importance in the disputed territories where the subjects of history and geography 
are open to conflicting interpretations by ethno-political influences. This will be 
looked at again in the next chapter. 
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5.6 Ninewa Plains; minorities resisting assimilation  
Figure 10: Map of Ninewa Plain 
 
 
 
(Taken from Assyrian Council of Europe, 2010) 
 
The Ninewa Plain is home to the most diverse range of ethnic and religious groups in 
Iraq. It is also stretched across districts which are under de facto KRG control, 
districts under GoI administration and districts with the influence of both centres. 
Consequently, education in the region is administered through a complicated mix of 
both the KRG and Ministry of Education Baghdad involvement. The area has both 
KRG curriculum Kurdish schools and central curriculum Arabic schools, as well as 
mixed-curriculum Assyrian language schools. Rather than the KRG taking 
responsibility only for the ethnically homogenous Kurdish language schools in 
Ninewa, the KRG Ministry of Education has taken responsibility for the districts which 
are under their de-facto control, such as Akre, Al-Shikhan and Tilhaif, while 
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simultaneously involving themselves in the education provision of other disputed 
districts under the banner of aiding mother-tongue language provision.  
 
Assyrian, Shabek and Yezidi groups in the region presented the education system in 
terms of the neglect of their ethnic representation. Frequent referral to insufficient 
curriculum representation, failure to train linguistically appropriate teachers and lack 
of textbook provision were heard from each community. These calls were aimed at 
both the centrally controlled directorate in Mosul and the alternative KRG curriculum.  
 
“The curriculums used in the Ministry of Education come from the central 
government. It’s in the Arabic language – and it’s a curriculum of a religious 
character. As for the curriculum used in the Kurdish region, it’s in the Kurdish 
language which has two different dialects – it’s not Yazidi, and that curriculum 
has a Kurdish nationalist outlook.” (Interview YZ3) 
 
The religious and ethnic minority community of the Shabek have opted for education 
in the Arabic language.  However, they do have a traditional language which they 
state has been neglected in terms of education access. ‘The Shabek language 
needs to be incorporated into the curriculum in order to preserve the cultural and 
ethnic heritage of the community’ (Interview SB1). This is currently hindered by the 
failure to provide teacher training courses in Shabek instruction as well as resource 
production.  
 
‘There are no courses available to teach the Shabek languages. About fifty 
per cent of the teachers teaching Shabek students are Shabeks, although 
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they teach in Arabic. There are many teachers and people ready to teach 
Shabek but they need training and a textbook. Soryia (interviewees daughter 
and active campaigner for Shabek rights) met with the Ministry of Education in 
Baghdad ‘a few weeks ago’ who informed her that if the community wished to 
have Shabek taught, they would support it, however, they must first provide a 
textbook which needs to be approved by the MoE.  
 
The community has since produced a dictionary and grammar textbook with the aid 
of community donations, yet the need for a pedagogical review and textbook 
production remains necessary. Corresponding to the Yezidi and Assyrian community 
consultations, discussion with education representatives from the Shabak ethnic 
group, highlight the suppression of Shabak education rights within the region through 
lack of support. In terms of the provision of linguistic materials for Assyrians, the 
central Education directorate in Mosul also fails to produce or subsidise linguistically 
specific textbooks. But linguistically specific resources for Assyrians are available in 
KRG Kurdish language Assyrian schools by the KRG. Having established a director 
of Assyrian education in Erbil, the resources in religion and culture are already 
designed and available to aid the teaching of Assyrian culture and history.   
 
In the Ninewa plain, lack of resource provision was framed in terms of complete 
oversight and neglect. It was presented as having potential ramifications for an 
ethnic community’s societal security in terms of the means of cultural production, but 
not as an intentional effort to eliminate Yezidi, Shabak or Assyrains from the region. 
However, a deliberate threat to the societal stability of groups was seen from the 
increasing encroachment of the Kurdish Ministry of Education.  When analysing 
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interview transcripts from members of the Assyrian community it became apparent 
that the primary threat to societal stability was viewed as coming from the KRG’s 
provision of resources and opening of schools.  It is viewed by many as an 
unwelcome interference which is not supporting Assyrian identity, but instead, 
attempting to subsume it under the category of Kurdish schools (Interview AS2). 
Allegations abound of financial incentives to enrol children in Kurdish language 
schools where minority groups claim the deliberate indoctrination of non-Kurdish 
children through educational programs (Assyrian Council of Europe 2010).  
 
There is little existing literature or academic research to confirm the issue, but many 
human rights reports originating from the ethnic groups in question claim that a 
process of Kurdification is taking place throughout the disputed territories. 
Accusations of Kurdish authorities fostering patronage relationships with minority 
groups in return for their linguistic allegiance have given voice to claims of a process 
of Kurdification from interlocutors. Assyrians, along with Shabak and Yezidi, consider 
their representation in the education system, and therefore their ethnic identity, 
under threat from both ministries of education; The neglect of the central ministry is 
viewed as preventing the development of their education system in terms of 
advancing cultural understanding and language rights, while the offer of ‘support’ 
from the KRG is regarded as an attempt to assimilate and indoctrinate children 
(Interview YZ2; AS; SB1).   
 
In response, the Assyrian Aid Society are working in the area of the Ninewa Plains 
and provide education support to Assyrian schools. They offer transport for children 
who reside in remote areas to reach Assyrian schools (rather than Arabic or Kurdish 
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schools with inadequate identity recognition), dormitories for them to stay in school, 
the salaries of additional Assyrian language teachers, transportation of textbooks 
(KRG curriculum) from the KRG to the region, translations and printing of textbooks 
for the MoI, and donations toward school upkeep. This support is seen to bolster the 
Assyrian communities’ access to ethnically appropriate education and counter the 
MoI neglect55.  Assyrian groups have been vocal in their accusations and calls have 
been made to the KRG to ‘cease the indoctrination of non-Kurdish children through 
educational programs in which they are made to glorify Kurdistan at the expense of 
their own ethnic identity.’(Assyrian Council of Europe, 2010). While community 
representatives have requested that “curricula be developed by specialists without 
prejudice to any components.” (Ivlin Anoya Oraha chaldo). In convergence, Shabak 
representatives stated that the Kurdish authorities should refrain from building new 
Kurdish language schools within Shabak villages as they require Arabic instruction 
and the KRG only intends to ‘eliminate our culture and language’ (Interview SB1). 
The process of active Kurdification is seen to be hindering the promotion and 
acceptance of their own cultural heritage through education (Interview SB2).  
 
A further point of concern for identity protection through education came forth from 
the Yezidi interviews; that of religious representation. Whereas the Assyrian and 
Christian communities are large enough to have create their own religious syllabus 
within either the KRG or Government of Iraq curricula, the Yezidi and Shabek 
communities have not yet been given this opportunity.  
 
                                                 
55 Interviewees were not vocal in the objection the KRG involvement in interviews, (although it was often inferred, no explicit mentions 
were made) most of the narratives revolved around a revival of ethnic pride and not around threat, subsequent email exchanges did refer to 
Kurdification though. This may be in part due to fear of speaking openly when in front of the interpreter.  
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“We can interfere neither with the central or regional curriculums. But we 
need the two administrative bodies to teach the curriculum of our religion as 
part of our educational goals to build a noble healthy child.” (Interview YZ3) 
“The curriculums in Iraq are not suitable for all. For example, the Islamic 
religious nature overshadows the curriculums in the centre. While the 
curriculums in the Kurdish region suffer form a nationalist Kurdish outlook, 
margalalizing the Christians, the Yazidis and the Maldaeans.”  (Interview 
YDT) 
 
The Islamic nature of the central ministry’s curriculum has received considerable 
attention and debate across Iraq. The competing Shi’aa and Sunni interpretations of 
Islam receive differing levels of attention dependent on who is teaching the class or 
directing the school. The call to review the religious character of the curriculum has 
been heard from not only in the disputed territories but also from Baghdad with 
regards to the nature of the Shia and Sunni representations within it. The influence of 
strict interpretations of Islam56 has been accused of seeping into the fabric of school 
culture: with the cancelling of Art and Drama classes, enforced use of the hijab for 
female students and dictated religious influence over school celebrations57. The 
nature of Islamic faith in the curriculum is causing friction across Iraq and has been 
subject to much debate.  Adeeb (2011) suggests that teaching Islam in an open and 
unprejudiced manner that accepts not one but all interpretations of Islam and Muslim 
history is the only way forward with the curriculum. Yet schools must also allow the 
                                                 
56
 The Arabic population of the disputed territories obviously does not suffer from a linguistic access or ethnic representation 
issue as their education lies under the direct jurisdiction of the Government of Iraq Ministry of Education. However, interview 
consultations and national. Although this identity struggle may not directly interact with the regions current political claims to 
territory it does warrant mention in terms of how Iraq is struggling to establish a modernized national identity. 
57
 Various newspaper reports have documented student protests and parental concern over the imposition of strict Islamic 
codes of conduct in schools post 2003. 
179 
 
religious freedom of non-Muslim students so that the Islamic faith is not imposed 
upon communities. 
 
The mixed administrative influence within the Ninewa plains, coupled with the large 
concentration of religious minorities, has resulted in identity and societal security 
inevitably becoming central to the education narrative of the region. The threats felt 
from both GoI resource neglect and Kurdish encroachment, and the attempted 
assimilation by the KRG, has led Assyrians and Turkmen to involve external actors 
in their education provision to ensure revival, maintenance and defence of their 
identity (see Figure 11). In contrast, the Yezidi and Shabek communities’ lack of 
larger allies means its only recourse is to campaign for greater recognition to revive, 
maintain and defend their identities within the education system. 
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Figure 11: Summary of Ethnic Community Capacity gaps, Perception and Action 
Figure 5.4 
 
Ethnic 
Group 
Capacity Gap / Threat 
 
Securitised perception Defence 
Assyrian   Insufficient  Curriculum Recognition; 
history, place in Iraq, culture and 
religious curriculums 
 Insufficient ministerial representation  
 No Assyrian language  text books printed 
by MoE Baghdad 
 No teacher training programmes for 
Assyrian teachers 
 Insufficient Assyrian teacher recruitment 
  No Assyrian teaching resources provided 
 
 Presented as Baghdad’s 
deliberate denial of their rights 
in order to deny their historical 
presence in Iraq. 
 
  Kurdish assistance presented as 
deliberate attempts to 
assimilate and co-opt the groups 
to increased demographic claims 
to the region.  
 KRG provide Assyrian language text books and 
teaching resources that are used in the KRG 
curriculum to Assyrians in Ninewa 
 
 Assyrian Aid Society work in the area of Nineveh Plain 
and provide 
 Transport for children who reside in 
remote areas to reach Assyrian 
schools  
 Salary of teachers 
 Transportation of text books (KRG 
curriculum) 
 Translations and printing of text 
books 
 Donation toward of school upkeep 
 Dormitories  
 
 Assyrian Democratic movement also provide levels of 
support. 
Kurdish  No support from Baghdad for Minister of 
Kurdish studies. 
 No text books published or resources 
supplied 
 No teacher training programmes for 
Kurdish teachers 
 Insufficient Kurdish teacher recruitment 
and inappropriate assignment  
 
 Presented as Baghdad’s 
deliberate denial of their rights 
in order to deny their historical 
presence in Iraq. 
 
 KRG Ministry of education has intervened in all 
Kurdish schools across the Disputed territories 
Turkmen   Negative  Curriculum Recognition 
 Insufficient curriculum representation of 
 Turkmen feel deliberately 
portrayed as negative or 
 Ethnically affiliated donors have been sought and now 
a variety of ‘foundations’ provide financial and 
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history, place in Iraq, and cultural history 
 Insufficient ministerial representation  
 No Turkish text books printed by MoE  
 No teacher training programmes for 
Turkish teachers 
 Insufficient Turkmen teacher recruitment 
 Teachers who received Turkmen 
organised training not recognised. 
  No Turkmen teaching resources 
provided 
 
neglected in outdated textbooks 
supplied by Baghdad. 
 A deliberate campaign is 
perceived to prevent the 
continuation of Turkmen schools 
by Arabs in Ninewa. 
 
 
practical support to Turkmen schools in Kirkuk.  
 The entire central curriculum has been translated into 
Turkish, printed and distributed to schools in the 
governorate without assistance from the central 
ministry.  
 Volunteer teachers and Turkish linguists provide 
training courses in Turkish for primary and 
intermediate stages of Turkmen education.  
 In an attempt to increase the enrolment into Turkish 
language schools training courses have been provided 
for parents and community leaders in written Turkish 
in the Kirkuk governorate.  
 
Yezidi & 
Shabak 
 No curriculum representation at all 
 No linguistic representation  
 No ministerial representation  
 Both groups feel intentionally 
neglected by Baghdad due to 
religious prejudice and facing 
assimilation intentional 
assimilation by Kurds.  
 International calls for support to Diaspora 
communities and human rights groups 
 The community has produced a dictionary and 
grammer textbook with the aid of community 
donations 
Sectarian debates 
Arab  Curriculum debates between Shia and 
Sunni communities over the 
representation and place of religion in 
the curriculum 
 Presented as a battle between 
the two groups for sole 
recognition – trying to limit the 
other. 
  
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Figure 12:  External Influence Actors 
 
Community 
 
Actor 
 
 
Influence 
 
Region 
 
Turkmen 
 
Dogramaci Foundation 
 
Established in 1951 by 
the Turkish Academic 
Ihsan Dogramaci funds 
Turkmen initiatives 
throughout KRG 
 
 
Teacher Salary 
supplements 
Teaching resources 
Buildings  
Curriculum translation 
Curriculum printing 
Curriculum Distribution  
 
KRG 
 
ITF 
Education Department 
of the Iraqi Turkmen 
Front 
 
 
Printing and distribution of 
Text books 
 
Kirkuk 
 
Waqf Ankara 
 
Through ministry of 
endowments and 
religious affairs 
 
 
 
Translation of Text books 
Voluntary teacher salaries  
 
Kirkuk 
Ninewa 
 
Turkish Teacher 
Training 
 
 
Teachers sent to complete 
Teacher training in Turkey 
- Specifically 
sciences 
  
 
Ninewa 
Assyrian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assyrian Aid Agency 
 
Humanitarian 
organization formed in 
2003 to aid the 
Assyrian population of 
Iraq 
 
 
 
Transport to schools 
Teacher salary 
supplements 
School upkeep 
Curriculum translation 
Photocopied textbooks 
Equipment supply 
Dormitories 
  
 
Erbil 
Duhok 
Ninewa Plains 
 
KRG  Ministry of 
Education  
 
 
 
Provision of the Assyrian 
language Text books from 
KRG curriculum 
 DIBS Arabic schools  
 
 
 
Shabek 
 
 
Community donation 
 
Dictionary and grammar 
books 
Ninewa 
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5.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter aimed to address the question what role does ethnic identity play in 
the current education narrative? The section illustrated how the education 
narrative, presented by those education actors interviewed and various media 
reports, prioritised two key factors. Firstly, the ethnically segregated structure of 
education provision in the region has resulted in education access revolving around 
issues of identity. Secondly, the status of Iraq as a post-conflict country, in the midst 
of reconstruction, has influenced the education narrative in the disputed territories 
focusing on issues of capacity development and restoration.  The combination of 
these two issues resulted in education being presented overwhelmingly in terms of 
the perceived capacity gaps of each ethnic group’s provision. The central ministry’s 
support, or lack of it, for non-Arab education is therefore key to the current education 
narrative. 
 
All the groups presented thus far in the thesis presented neglect of ethnically specific 
education. Ministerial representation, teaching resources and allocation of funds all 
came under criticism for unfair distribution. This denial of support from the central 
government has been viewed in terms of threats to the societal security of various 
non-Arab communities. The lack of support has consequently led to a limitation on 
the means of cultural reproduction for these groups, both linguistically and culturally 
thus placing their ‘we’ identity in danger. The role of education in reproducing, 
reviving and defending societal security in the face of the wider hostile political and 
security environments was clearly of great significance to all communities consulted. 
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The failure of the central government to support communities, in line with 
constitutional promises, was interpreted as a deliberate, indirect attempt to limit the 
presence of non-Arab groups in the region.  
 
The perception of an ongoing process of Arabisation has resulted in larger ethnic 
groups, Assyrian, Turkmen and Kurds, mobilising to seek external help to secure the 
vital means of societal security protection that education provides. Similarily, smaller 
minority groups, who view increasing Kurdish encroachment as a process of 
intended assimilation, have made frequent calls to the international community to 
support their traditional languages, religious freedom and culture rights within the 
education system. In the face of losing, or not actualising, ethnically specific 
education provision, ethnic groups have sought to defend their education systems by 
seeking ethnically affiliated and international patrons. Unfortunately, the inclusion of 
these external influences in the education system has led to a number of further 
negative consequences for the education attainment of non-Arab groups.  
 
The ongoing perceived threat from Arabisation has influenced the Turkmen 
educationalists to reject Arabic instruction in favour of the Turkish language. Seeking 
external support from Turkmen religious, political and social groups, the Turkmen 
education actors have instigated the use of a new alphabet to avoid what they regard 
as the spectre of assimilation that is ever present. Equally the distrust of the central 
ministry and its intentions over the administration of the disputed territories has led 
Kurdish leaders to take action which sees its pupils adversely affected by mixed 
administrative influence in Kurdish schools. Assyrian communities in the Ninewa 
Plain have taken the same militant stance over ethically specific education provision. 
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Using ethnically affiliated sponsors they have chosen to champion fully mother-
tongue instruction, regardless of the educational implications and future restrictions 
for Assyrian children. Turkmen, Assyrians and Kurds have sought to protect their 
societal security through the education system without consideration (or with little 
concern) for the educational implications. 
 
This demonstrates that societal security has taken precedence over pedagogy and 
attainment. If we return to the concept of societal security protection presented in 
chapter one, we can see that the issue of access to ethnically appropriate education 
has been presented as a security issue. All communities presented the threats to 
their education systems in terms of the removal of a means of cultural reproduction 
and a threat to their continued existence in the region. Hence education has become 
the subject of a range of securitising narratives from within the ethnic groups, each 
referencing injustices, deliberate threats and sectarianism.  Furthermore, education 
actors have not only introduced securitising narratives but also advanced into taking 
direct emergency action and thus securitising the issue of ethnically appropriate 
education access.   
 
Within securitisation theory what constitutes ‘extraordinary measures’ is defined by 
the adoption of action outside the political process and the normal realms of the 
issue securitised (Taureck, 2006). Therefore the extraordinary or emergency 
measure must be an action beyond the usual remit of the actor.  In this sense the 
emergency action is demonstrated by involvement of ethnically affiliated donors in 
the formal school system. Despite schools remaining within the state education 
system, community groups have sought private donors to counter the perceived 
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threats to education delivery. As such, the education system currently has a myriad 
of financial backers operating within the ethnically defined state schools. This 
involvement is demonstrated by two forms of intervention. Firstly, religious and 
political organisations with ethnic affiliation; these groups have stepped forward to 
provide culturally and linguistically appropriate textbooks and teaching resources. 
Secondly intervention from the KRG Ministry of Education within Kurdish schools 
under Baghdad’s control58. Both these actions constitute involvement beyond the 
state’s normal political procedures and demonstrate education’s move onto the 
security agenda. By securitising education, the issue has not only entered the wider 
political contest over territory, but also the presented opportunity to influence it. 
 
Where education is so closely tied to ideas of identity it can be manipulated by 
ethno-politics and used to serve the interests of political elites and nationalist 
extremists (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000:19). The securitisation of ethnically specific 
education has opened the door for this possibility. When the regional audience 
enabled education actors to take emergency measures they granted them 
extraordinary power over the issue at hand. The labelling of a problem as a ‘security 
issue’ may result in little or no assessment or regulation imposed on the 
implementation of the emergency measures taken (Collins, 2005). Therefore there is 
                                                 
58
 In a declaration of support for Kurdish families within the DIB’s the KRG Ministry has taken over the 
management of Kurdish schools within the region. However, the districts of Kirkuk, Hamdaniya, Baladooz, 
Telafar, Sinjar Khaninqin  and Makmour remain under the central jurisdiction of Baghdad and the KRG has no 
legal entitlement to set education agendas. Yet, the KRG provides their KRG curriculum, text books, teacher 
salaries and technical support. Unfortunately this emergency action and interference in schools outside their 
jurisdiction has led to a number of detrimental consequences for Kurdish schools. While pupils and teachers 
remain under the central exam and training boards they are teaching and learning a vastly different curriculum, 
with obvious consequences for pupil achievement and teacher delivery.  
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an inherent danger that by approving external influences in the education system, 
ethnic communities are forfeiting their authority to determine the legitimacy of future 
actions undertaken by the donors. As such by securitizing the issue of education the 
DIB’s audience and education actors have jointly contributed to placing it ‘beyond the 
realm of reasonable public scrutiny’(Grayson, 2003). In this sense Grayson provides 
a useful analogy involving Frankenstein’s monster to warn how dangerous 
securitisation can be59. This evolution of education and the influence of education 
over it is demonstrated in figure 13, below. The following chapter will explore both 
the negative impacts of the securitising education in the region and unpack 
educations relationship the wider territorial contest and ethnic dispute.  
 
Figure 13: The role of Identity in the education narrative of the Iraqi Disputed 
Territories 
 
                                                 
59
 Waever also recognised the negative implications of securitisation and was quick to emphasise the importance of de-
securitisation. He observed that once a security issue is declared and accepted the elite ‘can easily use it for specific, self-
serving purposes [and this] is something that cannot easily be avoided’ (Weaver 1995: 54, 55).   
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6. Education’s interaction with conflict 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to determine what factors have influenced the 
development of education structures in the disputed territories post-2003 in order to 
approach the central research question of ‘How has ethnic identity influenced the 
education narrative in the disputed territories?’. In the preceding chapters the thesis 
has demonstrated how identity has played a central role in the Iraqi education 
system for decades. The state-imposed Arabisation policies of the Ba’ath era sought 
forced assimilation of non-Arab identity in order to gain control of the population in 
the northern governorates. Post 2003, identity reproduction, revival and defense 
have been central to the creation of an ethnically separate education system across 
the territories.  
 
Consequently, any restrictions to the delivery of education are viewed by ethnic 
groups as deliberate threats to their linguistic or ethnic representation in the 
education system, regardless of the shared restrictions across the communities. Due 
to the role given to the education system to protect identity, these threats are seen to 
endanger the communities’ continued existence in the region. Accordingly, access to 
ethnically appropriate education has been subject to securitizing speech by 
education and community actors, who present education access as under attack in 
their constituencies.  In reaction to such threats, emergency action is taken by 
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communities to protect the reconstruction (or construction) of education for non-Arab 
communities in the disputed territories. Subsequently, the system is now subject to 
the actions of numerous independent actors who support delivery and whose 
influence is unregulated and often in detriment to educational attainment. 
 
This chapter of the thesis will present a critical analysis of the role of identity in the 
education system from a conflict perspective. It will highlight the consequences of 
education’s role in identity protection on the wider problem of ethnic fragility and 
territorial conflict. It will examine how education and the conflict interact and draw on 
the theoretical literature to demonstrate possible further triggers for conflict. The 
chapter will be structured around three main themes: social cohesion, equality and 
political manipulation. Each theme will be explored with attention to both 
unintentional conflict triggers generated by the current system, intentional 
manipulations of the education system by political actors which result in conflict 
triggers and finally an assessment of possible future triggers which may be 
generated by the current system.  
 
The first section will locate the discussion in the literature; the subsequent sections 
will examine the issues of social cohesion, equality and political manipulation in turn. 
This chapter will conclude with an examination of the findings. 
 
6.2 Locating the Argument 
 
The education provision in the region falls under the definition of a separatist school 
system, characterised by ‘separate institutions each serving different constituencies 
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with relatively homogeneous populations’ (Smith, 2003). Such structures can present 
themselves in a myriad of guises. The historical, geographical and political contexts 
within which they operate are of great significance and therefore debates over the 
use of separatist structures is highly context dependent (Smith 2010). The divided 
societies which necessitate separatist structures exist in a number of conditions: the 
peaceful educational pluralism of Canada and Belgium, the complicit character of 
separatist schooling in Bosnia, and the imposed nature of apartheid in South 
Africa60(Davies 2008). Gallagher’s (2010) investigation of education in divided 
societies states that ‘the distinction between separate systems, in which minorities 
are obliged to use their own schools (such as apartheid South Africa, or the southern 
states of the U.S. prior to 1954), and separate systems, in which minorities run their 
own schools as a matter of choice, is important.’ Education in the disputed territories 
has evolved from a sought form of separate school structure. 
 
Communities which wish to avoid assimilation in the school system often turn to the 
structural system of education in order to achieve protection for their societal identity. 
Yet the character of separate schools has been accused of creating conflict and 
Gallagher also highlights that ‘whether schooling systems are segregated or 
separate, there is evidence that such systems can have a detrimental impact on 
social cohesion’ (Gallagher 2010).  Ethnically defined separate school systems are a 
common theme in conflict-affected countries. The relationship between conflict and 
                                                 
Notes: 
60 The minority rights group (MRG) argue that the right to separate schools for minorities is compatible with international 
standards on human rights, but that an important distinction would have to be drawn between those situations where separate 
schools are imposed which they classify as segregation.   
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schooling based on identity indicators such as language, ethnicity or religion has 
been explored by a number of education and emergencies commentators (See 
Gallagher 2010; Smith 2011; Davies 2009; Brown, 2010; Bush & Santerelli, 2000). 
Although not proposed as a root cause of conflict, ethnically separated education is 
present in many conflict affected countries, such as: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Guatemala, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. This suggests that 
there is a relationship with conflict at least. Smith (2010; 11) suggests that an 
explanation for the prevalence of separate schools in conflict-affected countries is 
that ‘the institutional structures reflect and replicate the political, social and cultural 
divisions within broader society’ (Smith 2010:12). 
 
Thus the retreat toward shared identity indicators in conflict affected countries can 
have significant influence over inter-ethnic relations. Gallagher (2004) suggests three 
hypotheses to explain the negative impact of separate schooling in Northern Ireland, 
where schools are classified along strict religious lines – Protestant or Catholic. 
Firstly, the cultural hypothesis suggests that separatist schools enhance community 
divisions by introducing potentially opposing cultural environments. Secondly, the 
social hypothesis suggests that regardless of what is taught, separate schools serve 
to emphasise and validate group differences and hostilities, thereby encouraging 
mutual ignorance and suspicion. Gallagher’s third hypothesis suggests that separate 
schools are much less important than other factors to community division, and that 
socioeconomic factors may be of greater influence in the interaction between division 
and social disturbances. In terms of the last hypothesis it is necessary to emphasise 
the causality between separate schooling and horizontal inequalities. If separate 
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schools provide different levels of educational support they can in fact be the cause 
of such socioeconomic differentiation.  
 
Although the separate education system in the disputed territories has been sought 
for reasons of identity protection, and not imposed, it has generated a number of key 
issues which interact with the wider conflict. The post-conflict position of education in 
the region has also served to exacerbate the system’s potential to contribute to 
conflict and inter-ethnic tension through neglect and insufficient support. The 
separate education system is going through a process of reconstruction (or 
construction for those which previously suffered assimilation) post-2003; although 
ten years have passed, Iraqi education is still plagued by insufficient resources and 
infrastructural failings due to the persistent political wrangling and ongoing conflicts 
present in the country. Berchaut (2012) emphasises the need for sensitivity to 
conflict factors during the reconstruction of education, suggesting that even greater 
attention must be paid to both the physical (infrastructural) and ideological 
(depoliticisation) needs of education.  
 
The previous chapters illustrated  how infrastructural capacity gaps, and failure to 
provide funding, has led education and community actors to not only introduce 
securitising narratives into the debate over support for separate schools, but also 
advanced into taking direct emergency action to protect ethnically appropriate 
education access.  The consequences of this can be seen to influence the degree to 
which education interacts with the wider conflict. Unregulated influences within 
separatist school system raise the possibility for further purposeful manipulation and 
within the fragile ethno-political environment. The risk of outside donors and actors 
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using education institutes for self-serving nationalistic purposes arises.  In this sense 
external actors in the education system may bring a political dynamic to their 
involvement with schools. If external forces are allowed to act, without regulation, it is 
possible that each of Gallagher’s three hypotheses exacerbated for political purpose.  
 
These events can be understood in relation to the concept of securitisation.  Thus, it 
is necessary to consider the three stage process required to securitise an issue that 
is presented in the literature: securitising speech, audience acceptance, emergency 
action. State education (which fulfils its given purpose of protecting a group’s societal 
security) has been presented as under threat. These threats have been accepted by 
the community in so much as parents have accepted language and curriculum 
choices (which can only be justified in terms of identity protection and not pedagogy). 
Consequently schools have been opened up to the influence of outside actors, who, 
under the banner of ethnic cultural rights, language and identity, have taken actions 
which are outside their traditional remits. In terms of the securitisation literature this 
final stage of mobilizing resources to overcome the threat can be interpreted as 
adopting the extraordinary measures presented by Buzan (1998:21).  Community 
leaders presented the threat from state education to the group’s societal security, the 
audience accepted the presence of the threat, and emergency action was taken in 
the form of allowing non-state actors to provide support to state schools.  
 
The concept of securitisation within the societal security realm is not unproblematic, 
and its incorporation within the education theoretical framework is not proposed as 
conceptually neat. But, as discussed in chapter one, it provides an analytical tool 
with which to examine the process which has led to ethnically specific education 
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becoming engaged with the inter-ethnic tensions in the region. To understand 
education in terms of securitisation we must accept that education actors are 
selected to represent their community and that the securitizing move is within their 
remit. The issue of who has legitimacy to instigate the securitisation of an issue is 
one of the most contested elements of the proposed securitisation process. 
Commentators differ with regards to their conclusions on whether issues can be 
securitised by non-elite actors, such as NGO’s and media sources. For the purposes 
of this investigation we will apply a widened definition of securitisation actors, such 
as the media, NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs) and political elites, (as used by 
Watson (2011)) to included elected community representatives and ethnically 
defined educationalists. 
 
Collins (2005) states that when an audience enables an actor to take these 
emergency measures they grant the actor extraordinary power over that issue. The 
labelling of a problem as a ‘security issue’ may result in little or no assessment or 
regulation imposed on the implementation of the emergency measures taken 
(Grayson 2003). Collins suggests therefore that ‘there exists, therefore, the danger 
that having granted the actor the right to implement extraordinary measures, the 
audience forfeits its authority to determine the legitimacy of future actions 
undertaken by the actor’ (2005). As such, by securitizing the issue, the audience and 
actor have jointly contributed to placing it ‘beyond the realm of reasonable public 
scrutiny’ (Grayson 2003).  As discussed earlier, Grayson provides a useful analogy 
involving Frankenstein’s monster to warn how dangerous securitisation can be 
(Grayson 2003). Collins states that it is a valuable metaphor for securitization 
because ‘it not only captures the loosening of constraints on the elite that allows 
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them to act almost with impunity, but it also visualizes just how powerful the 
securitizing actor can become’ (Collins, 2005). 
 
It is possible to apply this understanding to the on-going external involvement of 
actors in Iraqi education. Turning to an example that the thesis has already 
demonstrated, we can see that by accepting the KRG involvement in schools in the 
disputed territories (because it was portrayed as necessary in order to maintain 
Kurdish language education access) Kurdish communities have granted the KRG 
power to act outside its remit. But by granting this control, actions have been taken 
which are beyond the control of the community and are detrimental to the Kurdish 
pupils’ education attainment. For example, the use of KRG curriculum despite falling 
under Baghdad’s examination remit.  
 
Within the education arena the involvement of external actors (who are only 
concerned with their own ethnic group’s education) can lead to an abuse of power 
which seeks to pursue its own vested interests. This can lead to a number of 
negative outcomes. As such, the new external influences in the education system 
have the potential to de-prioritise the issue of social integration between groups in 
favour of promoting distinctiveness and divisions and fortifying mother-tongue 
language use. Therefore negative consequences are generated in an unintentional 
manner through the separation of ethnic groups in the education arena to secure 
societal security reproduction, revival and defence. This could take the form of a lack 
of inter-ethnic integration, inequality and grievance and the possibility of generating 
future economic horizontal inequalities through the specific technical issues which 
have hampered attainment through language choices and curriculum use. In 
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addition, the opening of education to outside actors can allow the purpose of 
education to be manipulated to serve the interests of political elites and nationalist 
extremists. If emergency measures are granted within the education arena and that 
power is abused it can lead to wider repercussions for the rest of society and 
interethnic relations.   
 
Therefore, taking into consideration both the literature on education and conflict 
sensitivity, and the concept of securitisation, the following sections will address the 
key areas in which the education system in the disputed territories of Iraq can 
interact with the wider social fragility and inter-ethnic relations, social cohesion, 
inequality and grievance, and finally political manipulation. 
 
6.3 Separate education and social cohesion 
 
Social cohesion is often a term used when referring to ethnically contested and 
divided societies. However, the expression is widely used but rarely defined within 
the literature. Factors such as a relatively harmonious society, high levels of civic 
cooperation and trust, tolerance, and relative equality are all central to debates. 
Jensen uses the following definition: ‘The term social cohesion is used to describe a 
process more than a condition or end state …it is seen as involving a sense of 
commitment, and a desire or capacity to live together in harmony.’(1998, p.1) 
Siddique (2001) suggests that social cohesion can be described as ‘the glue that 
bonds society together, promoting harmony, a sense of community, and a degree of 
commitment to promoting the common good’ (2001;2). Thus, weak societal cohesion 
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increases the risk of social segregation and exclusion, and has the potential to erupt 
into violent conflict (Siddique 2001).  
 
Education’s role in the socialisation of identity factors and its significance in building 
national unity, place it at the heart of creating social cohesion for societies. Bush and 
Saltarelli posit that education can play a direct role in the creation of positive inter-
ethnic relations and thus forge social cohesion between groups (Bush and Saltarelli 
2000). In the Iraqi disputed territories, social cohesion can provide a bedrock for 
conflict negotiation and management. However, elements of the emerged school 
structure can be seen to be adversely limiting this potential and serving to work 
against any attempts to achieve social cohesion.  
 
6.3.1 Curriculum; Omissions and Manipulations. 
School curriculums provide a medium for the transmission of knowledge between 
generations. Therefore it can be seen as an ‘extremely powerful tool to promote 
particular political ideologies, religious practices or cultural values and traditions. 
Every area of the curriculum carries values with the potential to communicate implicit 
and explicit political messages. Language, literature, history, geography and the 
place of culture and religion are just some of the areas that often get drawn into 
controversy.’ (Smith, 2010;17)  How a curriculum presents issues of identity can 
have a great impact on social cohesion. Smith (2005) underlines that education 
content, in particular the specific subjects of history, geography, culture, art, music, 
and religious education plays key role in post-conflict education reconstruction. This 
is because school curriculum provides students with a narrative of the ‘past and 
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visions for the future’ (Paulson, 2011). This in turn allows them to locate themselves 
and their communities within the context of present conflicts and contestation.  
 
Consequently, in 2008, the Iraqi government began a complete curriculum review 
under the guidance of UNESCO. The process was due to conclude in 2012; however 
the satisfactory completion of the curriculum has evaded educationalists. Despite the 
difficulty of the task, the ministry announced that “the education ministry follows the 
same strategy in all Iraqi schools – we do not differentiate among our pupils and we 
do not discriminate against religion or sect, the ministry is doing its best to spread 
forgiveness and brotherhood” (IWPR, 2010). The new Islamic curriculum aimed to 
“emphasise forgiveness and mercy” (Interview ABA4). The IWPR reports that the 
education ministry also specifically instructed teachers to avoid contentious issues 
which may create conflict (2010). The need for a curriculum review was met with 
general consensus from most Iraqis, removing the Ba’ath ideology and creating an 
inclusive curriculum was the objective. Yet the resulting changes to the curriculum 
resulted in ‘debates that reflected the very rifts in Iraqi society that the curriculum 
sought to address’ (Islamopedia). 
The persistent pattern of ethnic conflict and co-existence in the disputed territories 
has consequently created conflict over interpretations of national and local histories 
for curriculum reviewers working post-2003 (Interview UNICEF2). Negotiating a 
national curriculum in Iraq faces many challenges and consent over history, religion 
and geography texts have yet to be reached in Iraq. As one Arab educationalist 
commented: 
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‘We need a council with members of all Iraq’s people to help design a new 
curriculum for history, we have met with UNESCO, but no final conclusions 
were made. It is hard to show Iraq’s history and keep everyone happy. Battles 
have winners and losers. No one wants to be shown as the looser in history. 
We need to find a way to teach history in a neutral way. I have proposed that 
this could be done through Art, all communities have famous poets and 
authors who can be used to show history and identity….. and without conflict’ 
(Interview AMAB1).  
Controversial historical events have remained particularly problematic. Most histories 
relating to Israel, the Kurds, the United States, the Iran-Iraq war and the first Gulf 
War, for example, were deleted rather than rewritten in the haste to redistribute 
books after the invasion (Interview KR4). A satisfactory solution was never reached, 
and many modern historical events simply remained out of the curriculum, a situation 
described by a US advisor to Iraq as going from “one-sided to no-sided” 
(Islamopedia; accessed 2013). Currently, history textbooks that were printed in 
2009-2010 still omit these topics, with the exception of Israel, whose relation to 
Palestinian history is emphasized. Schools do not have a curriculum to teach about 
any region outside of the Middle East. The contentious nature of the 2003 
invasion/occupation/liberation has seen unresolvable tension over its portrayal and 
the language used to engage with the topic.  
The history curriculum remains centred around “Arab and Islamic History” 
(Interviews) and the historical presence of both Turkmen and Kurds in Iraq’s 
narrative is deemed unrepresented. Equally the religious and ethnic diversity of the 
north of Iraq is not reflected through any subject curriculum, causing discontent and 
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resentment within non-Arab and non-Muslim communities. Non-Arab groups in 
Kirkuk and Ninewa complained that both the central curricula of Baghdad and the 
KRG  lack representation of minority groups in terms of history, art, music, religious 
education, geography and language. Each group, Assyrians, Kurds, Turkmen, 
Shabek and Yezidi, all stated that they want to strengthen their presence in the 
curriculum.  Understanding of their identities, though the celebration of ethnically 
specific poets, artists and histories was deemed a constitutional right. This issue was 
presented in terms of protection of identity within groups, but it must also be 
considered that without a shared and representative curriculum, groups fail to 
understand or learn about their ethnic neighbours. This in turn creates what 
Gallagher refers to as ‘opposing cultural environments’ (2008) within schools. Thus 
the emphasis is placed on the unknown differences between communities and not 
on any form of mutual dependence or understanding. The curricula’s general failure 
to provide pupils with an understanding of one another in order to foster group 
tolerance is accompanied by the possibility that the school system is fostering 
unregulated and opposing curricula, therefore pushing communities further apart and 
encouraging mutual ignorance and suspicion which can feed into wider negative 
interactions in the social and political domains. 
 
With the omission of modern historical events and denial of Iraq’s indigenous 
diversity, it is possible that within the ethnically separate system each community will 
resort to presenting their own conflicting interpretations of history. Graham-Brown 
points out that the control by an ethnic group of history curriculum often leads to “the 
construction of a version of history ... which heightens the role of that group at the 
expense of the others ... Suppression of events or cultural ideas ... viewed as 
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subversive or divisive is also common”(Graham-Brown, 1994;28). Therefore the 
curriculum and content can be used to deny shared history and create a picture of 
the ‘other’ which can hamper social cohesion (Staub, 1989). Thus how these issues 
are portrayed can in turn affect peace across the region. Numerous accusations 
were made during interviews that in the disputed territories history was already a 
matter of group interpretation. In the absence of a workable curriculum the subjects 
of history and Islamic education have to come to be reflections of the classroom 
teachers’ ideology as opposed to a unified syllabus. The ethnically homogenous 
nature of schools has added to the acceptance of this improvised, ethnically biased 
presentation.  As one Assyrian education specialist noted:  
 
‘The teaching of history in the schools here (Kirkuk) depends on the school 
and the teacher in charge. It is the same with Islamic classes, it is about the 
teachers’ belief. Who is to complain when all the pupils are of the same 
community’ (Interviewee AS2). 
 
Correspondingly and number of other interviewees made similar accusations:  
 
‘Turkmen teach Turk history, Kurds teach Kurdish history it is all separate. I 
do not think that a Kurdish teacher would choose to teach my history would 
he? No, I think not.’(Interviewee ABA2) 
 
‘We need to teach our own histories, it’s our right now under the constitution. 
We are part of Iraq’s history and that should be recognised.’ (Interviewee 
TMN) 
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‘They each teach their own history.’ (Interview AB6) 
 
Such comments were frequent within interviews, but always directed at members of 
different ethnic groups. Educationalists and community leaders were quick to 
suggest that other groups were presenting politicised representations of history 
within schools, but were not forthcoming when asked about the nature of their own 
curriculum. Equally, samples of donated teaching materials were not easy to come 
by. Therefore, the thesis could not ascertain the degree to which the curriculum has 
been distorted, it can only present the anecdotal evidence provided in interviews.  
Yet the presence of external actors in the education system, who are acting out of a 
desire to strengthen societal security, heightens the risk of politicisation of the 
curriculum and the nurturing of a ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ mentality.  In this sense, the 
curriculum may pose a direct threat to the future stability of the region and inter-
ethnic relations through the corrosion of social cohesion. 
 
The thesis has demonstrated that schools are being harnessed for their ability to 
reproduce culture and ensure its transmission to future generations. Each subject 
can be used to express a pride in ethnic identity and cultivate a sense of belonging 
to the group.  Equally, the new education actors with political affiliations may use 
their influence to project their representation of history. Without the regulation of 
donated textbooks the danger presents that numerous separate politicised and 
conflicting curriculum will be present in the region as each ethnic group and its 
ethnically affiliated donor strives to teach its own representation of history, 
geography and culture. The dangers of this are demonstrated in Kreso’s (2008) 
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analysis of the Bosnian curriculum. He found that students often learn to hate those 
who are ‘‘different’’ through separate curriculum and history textbooks.  Equally, 
reliance on textbooks from outside donors carries with it the risk of politicisation of 
the curriculum: as illustrated by Bharati’s (1992) example of extremist sponsored 
textbooks in India. This danger is of particular importance in DIB’s where the 
subjects of history and geography are open to conflicting interpretations by ethno-
political influences. It is possible that the curriculum is being used to fortify ethnic 
identity at the expense of promoting social cohesion and interdependence. 
 
Religious components of the curriculum have also proven to be deeply contentious, 
not only in terms of the under-representation of non-Muslim faiths, but also the 
portrayal of Islam itself. In an endeavour to cultivate a more unbiased religious 
curriculum than the entirely Sunni one used under Saddam Hussein, additional 
content on Shi’ism was included. Yet the amended material was immediately decried 
for now posing a sectarian bias against Sunnis and therefore withdrawn. Since 2003 
the Islamic Studies curriculum has been subject to a recurrent cycle of revision, 
rejection and withdrawal. Each bout of changes has faced accusation of political 
motivation, and a significant number of politicians and religious leaders have been 
drawn into the high profile debate (Throwing the Old Textbooks Out). The 
accusations span the religious and political spectrum with accusations of both Sunni 
discrimination and Sunni bias.  The debate continues and many consider the 
curriculum not finalised. 
One of the most provocative issues within the debate has been the portrayal of 
prayer in primary education. Despite the Sunni focus of the Ba’ath regime, a report 
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by Islamopedia states that the instructional images for prayer within Islamic 
education during that period were ‘ambiguous and could not be identified with either 
the Sunni or Shia sects’ as elements that would distinguish the prayer as belonging 
to either of the two were conspicuously missing’ . Yet this was modified in a 
subsequent review after 2003 and the modified Islamic studies textbook portrayed 
two boys praying side by side in accordance to Sunni and Shia guidelines 
respectively.  This amendment was justified in terms of seeking a more inclusive 
approach, but as the Islamopedia report suggests: 
‘The move backfired and triggered a wave accusations that the changes were 
politically motivated and that the Shiite-led government was deliberately 
“fostering injustice and sectarianism” by differentiating between the Sunnis 
and Shiites. Parents and teachers accustomed to instruction under the 
Saddam regime, especially Sunnis, expressed concern that “teaching more 
than one way of praying might confuse children and “lead to discrimination 
and sectarianism.” …. Politicians and religious authorities immediately joined 
the dispute, a fact that only fuelled existing accusations that changes to the 
curriculum were politically motivated.’ (2011) 
The dispute entered the mainstream political arena when Iraqi Prime Minster Nouri 
al-Maliki accused the Education Ministry of distributing the books without his consent 
(Muftah, 2013). He announced his grievance that the new Islamic studies curriculum 
could worsen sectarian relations and stated that it should be focusing on “the shared 
aspects of Islam” (Muftah, 2013). Once more, the textbooks were retracted and were 
replaced in 2010-2011 with images which where nearly identical to those used 
during the Saddam era that could not be identified with either sect (see Figure 14: 
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Iraqi State textbooks). In May 2011, a new educational reform plan was announced 
by the Ministry of Education Baghdad, with a targeted completion date of 2020. 
However, the way in which history and religion actively engage students to learn 
tolerance and promote social cohesion remains to be seen. 
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       Figure 14: Iraqi State Textbook representations of pray 
                  
          
 
 
Another curriculum issue raised in interviews which has the potential to directly affect 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony, and therefore conflict and social cohesion, is 
the presentation of jihad in Islamic studies. Jihad is a central tenant of the Islamic 
faith. Yet, despite the fact that lessons on jihad in the new books are nearly identical 
to those they replaced, Mithal al-Alusi, a former independent Sunni legislator argues 
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that that the term jihad should be removed from textbooks altogether. He suggest 
that  “there would be a new Taliban in Iraq when current generation of students 
graduate.(IPN)” due to the misinterpretations and manipulation of some Islamic 
studies teachers. Nouri al-Maliki echoed such fears but stressed that jihad did have a 
place in textbooks because of its centrality in Islam, yet he also felt that the lessons 
on jihad were unclear and needed to be clarified for students who might misinterpret 
them, leading to violence (See: Iraqi Schoolbooks Criticized for Sectarian Bias). 
Hence, the presentation of jihad directly impacts the lives of non-Muslim groups in 
Iraq.  
Anecdotal evidence from schools and education actors suggests many teachers 
exercise their own judgment in the classroom, placing less emphasis on parts of the 
curriculum that may conflict with their own views. There is a clear danger that the 
concept of jihad can be interpreted to mean the obligation to fight unbelievers, and 
therefore non-Muslims. The wave of violence against non-Muslim minorities in the 
north can be seen to be fuelled by such interpretations from wider society. The risk 
that Islamic studies can be used to advocate violence against non-Muslims in state 
funded schools has obvious implications for the future of minority faiths within the 
region. Shabaks, Christians and Yezidi’s already face increasing persecution and 
violence across Kirkuk and Ninewa. To allow an institutionalization of the concept 
that faiths are incompatible and therefore must eliminate each other would be an 
unimaginable travesty that the education system must guard against. Yet, external 
actors, low levels of teacher training, and ethnically defined schooling provide a 
complex number of entry points for education to manipulate identity indicators and 
enter the conflict.  
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Iraq’s history and religious curriculum negotiations are not unusual and sit with other 
well-known examples of contest over how to represent contentious issues. Rwanda 
postponed the teaching of history for ten years following the genocide (Freeman et 
al., 2008) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina three parallel education systems that each 
maintain distinct historical narratives has evolved (Jones, 2011). How history and 
religion are portrayed has influence over how we define the ‘other’ and how 
understanding of ethnic groups is achieved. The portrayal of Islamic theology, 
historical claims to territory, linguistic rights, cultural reproduction, representations of 
inequality and oppression, all prove to be complex and controversial topics in Iraq, 
which can impact on social cohesion.  
 
Due to the ongoing negotiations (or lack of) over the administrative fate of the region, 
issues of geography, history and cultural representation hold even greater 
significance within the disputed territories.  While the contest continues, portrayal of 
ethnic histories holds emotive value and can be seen to be linked with wider 
territorial claims and justifications.  Each ethnic group in the region varies in their 
geographical interpretations of homelands and ancient battle victories and 
experience of genocide. Issues are contentious enough in a post conflict society, but 
with the added territorial contest which is occurring in the disputed territories, history 
can be an extremely sensitive topic. The historic claims to territory (as presented in 
chapter three) can each be enforced through the curriculum if schools fail to provide 
varying accounts of history and critically objective teaching. While education serves 
the purpose of fortifying ethnic and religious identities, the curriculum will continue to 
pose a grave danger to social cohesion and ethnic tolerance. 
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6.3.2 Societal Security Dilemmas  
 
'It is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what 
initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about what is feared the 
most (Herz 1966)'61 
 
 Regardless of what is actually taught in schools, the very perception that curriculum 
may be used to downplay ethnic claims to the region may itself interact with the 
conflict. The separate management of schools by ethnically defined ministry staff 
and various external actors, means that each community is unaware of what form of 
ethnically specific history it taught by their neighboring community. Therefore a fear 
that another community’s curriculum may be denying your existence, and claim to 
have historical rights to administer the region, can in turn influence communities to 
reinforce their own ethnic narratives. By combining the concepts of the societal 
security with that of the international relations theory of security dilemmas, Paul Roe 
suggests the possibility of what he calls an (inter-) Societal security dilemma. ‘The 
actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its own 
identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the end, decreases the first 
society’s security (weakens its identity) (Roe 2003).’  
 
The lack of education evaluation and monitoring, coupled with the heightened threats 
to physical security and administrative dispute, has resulted in the perception that 
the strengthening of one identity group is done to the detriment of another. As one 
Arab educationalist stated: 
                                                 
61
 Herz, John, International Politics in the Atomic Age. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). P.241 
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‘The schools are all separate, so they (the Kurds) can teach that we have no 
place here. There was forced migration of Arabs under Saddam, but also 
there are Arabs who have always lived in these territories... and the Turkmen 
too. But in these schools for only Kurds they do not teach this, they teach that 
Kirkuk has only a Kurdish history.’ (Interview ABK) 
 
Equally, the Assyrian population are fearful of the impact of the central government’s 
curriculum on the portrayal of their existence in the region, as one Assyrian 
community leader in Erbil stated: 
 
‘We are not represented in Arab schools, so we must teach our children of our 
ancestry ourselves. We need our own schools as the other community 
schools choose to deny us.’ (Interviewee, AS5). 
 
The schools of other communities were portrayed as posing a threat to the societal 
security of different groups. Roe suggests that if societal security depends on the 
use of language, religion, or other cultural practices, as suggested by Buzan (1997), 
then non-military means would be the most likely form of defence against such 
perceived threats.  The strengthening of identity can be achieved through the 
educational pursuit of what has become known as ‘cultural nationalism’. Hutchinson 
(1994) describes the purpose of cultural nationalism as ‘the moral regeneration of 
historic community, or in other words, the re-creation of their distinctive national 
civilization (Hutchinson, 1994). Furthermore, he emphasises the establishment of 
‘cultural societies and journals’ which educate communities of their common heritage 
211 
 
‘of splendour and suffering.’ Cultural nationalism endeavours to stress the identifying 
feature of a group such as language, religion and history (Allter, 1994).  
 
This nationalism, although innocent at first recognition, does hold with it the potential 
to underplay and under acknowledge the need for mutual dependence within multi-
ethnic communities. By strengthening identity through culturally nationalistic 
education projects which emphasis difference, historical animosity and religion, 
education can push communities further apart and rather than strengthen a 
community’s position, can actually hamper it by weakening inter-community 
relations. The separate nature of the system can create an environment in which the 
nature of cultural nationalism and ethnic nationalism become undistinguishable and 
communities are left with irresolvable uncertainty about their neighbour’s use of 
education. The ambiguity of nationalist projects within schools can prompt an action - 
reaction processes from other communities ‘they are teaching their version of 
events, we should teach ours.’   When coupled with contradictory and vague rhetoric 
and poor channels for inter-group communication, it can lead to the assumption of a 
worst case scenario, provoking measures and counter-measures which attempt to 
enforce a group’s cultural existence by denying its neighbour’s cultural existence and 
claims to the region. 
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6.3.3 Language Learning: The Positive use of a Lingua Franca 
 
 
Social interaction and cohesion is somewhat dependent on a shared means of 
communication. Unfortunately the picture presented in the previous chapters 
demonstrates that within the region, the importance of ethnic interdependence has 
been forsaken in favour of strengthening group identity. As such, little priority has 
been given to learning the lingua franca within mother-tongue schools. The 
submersion language schools, such as the Assyrian, Turkmen, Kurdish and Arabic 
institutions, have been accused by regional academics and journalists of failing to 
place the learning of a dominate lingua franca high on the curriculum62. In trying to 
revive or support the use of their traditional language, educationalists and their 
external donors fail to provide pupils with sufficient language classes in the dominant 
regional language that they need in order to function in wider society.  With the 
increasing linguistically separated nature of schooling, the maintenance and 
cultivation of a lingua franca is of significant importance to both social cohesion and 
access to the bureaucratic administrations of the state.  
 
 
The issue of medium of instruction was detailed in previous chapters and 
demonstrated how four separate languages of instruction are being used within the 
disputed territories: Arabic, Assyrian, Kurdish and Turkish (categorised as Turkmeni 
in official documentation). Regardless of the previous debates over the pedagogical 
and educational  attainment implications of the uses of languages, it is necessary to 
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 Information gathered in interviews with Iraqi Academics and journalists both in Amman and Iraq  
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highlight that the teaching of an additional dominate lingua franca within the 
curriculum is an absolute necessity in terms of the future interdependence of 
communities, both socially and economically. Language education has been shown 
to entail sociocultural products beyond purely linguistic outcomes. Language plays a 
crucial role in social interaction and the transmission of cultural and social values 
(Fishman, 1970, 1997; Safran, 1999). If the four communities have no shared means 
of communication, the risk of inter-ethnic social cohesion drops dramatically. 
 
In such circumstances intergroup relations can be improved by the introduction of 
bilingual education.  The majority linguistic group benefits because bilingualism 
would not only allow for greater intellectual enrichment, but also provide the social 
outcome of greater cultural integration and pluralism. Two comprehensive studies by 
Genesee and Gandara (1999) and Slavin & Cooper (1999) examined the influence 
of bilingual and cooperative learning on prejudice, discrimination, and the acquisition 
of new cultural understanding. Genesee and Gandara demonstrated that bilingual 
education can be used to structure significance attention to matters affecting 
intergroup relations and thus improve intergroup attitudes and relationships. 
Correspondingly, Slavin and Cooper point at the importance of emphasising 
pedagogical factors, such as cooperative educational approaches, so to create the 
necessary circumstances to address cultural relations. 
 
Yet, the system uncovered in the disputed territories offers minority children a choice 
between education in the minority language accompanied by some formal teaching 
of the state language, which tends to leave children with insufficient command of the 
state language, or education in the state language which tends to leave little room for 
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learning the minority language. The monolingual model of education, combined with 
a low level of language teaching and traditional teaching methods, does not meet the 
requirements of the whole population. Coupled with the ethnically homogenous 
nature of school structure, the low levels of teacher education and poorly designed, 
inappropriate curricula, we have a strategic planning dilemma. On the one hand it is 
necessary to provide linguistic rights to all communities across the DIB’s and to 
support the community rights presented in the constitution; yet on the other hand, 
there are the rights and benefits of society as a whole which requires the fostering of 
inter-communal harmony and inter-dependence as well as a common language of 
communication 
 
Unfortunately, bilingual education systems are not accepted practice, yet academic 
literature unfailingly reports the pedagogical advantages of bilingual as opposed to 
monolingual education, advocating a mother-tongue bilingualism which provides 
children with both their cultural foundations, pedagogical advantages and ability to 
thrive in the wider society, and the process of social interdependence (INEE, 
2013)63. To achieve this with any success there needs to be a steady introduction of 
the dominant language throughout the system (UNESCO 2007). Instead, what we 
can see in Iraq is a variety of schools which teach in mother-tongue throughout the 
pupil’s academic career and offer instruction in second languages. Turkmen 
educationalists confirmed their recognition for the importance of a lingua franca and 
frequent reference was made to the importance of Arabic within the curriculum in 
interviews (yet no acknowledgment of the need for Kurdish). Yet, they were unable 
to provide a consensus on the hours of instruction provided for pupils in Turkish 
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 .(see reviews in Baker 2001; Cummins 2000; CAL 2001): 
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submersion schools in Arabic instruction. Equally, Arabic schools were also accused 
of failing to provide adequate Kurdish (Interview KD7; KD9) and Kurdish of 
insufficient Arabic.  
 
Further complicating this difficulty is the fact that KRG administered schools have 
chosen to prioritise the use of English in the curriculum over Arabic. Currently the 
KRG afford English the same amount of teaching hours as Arabic, and there are 
plans to expand on this in the future (Interview KD1). In addition to this choice, the 
quality of Arabic language instruction within Kurdish schools in the DIB’s has been 
highly criticised by teachers, with one Kurdish teacher from the governorate of Kirkuk 
stating that ‘The Arabic teacher at my school is Kurdish, from the KRG not Kirkuk, he 
doesn’t speak Arabic well, so the children don’t learn. They [the pupils] live here but 
they can’t speak Arabic. It’s a big problem.’ It was suggested in interviews that the 
unwavering stance of the KRG on incorporating Kirkuk into the Kurdish region has 
resulted in the assumption that Arabic will not be the language of administration and 
therefore unnecessary. This politically motivated decision fails to take into account 
the need for the existing population to be able to communicate with their Arabic 
neighbours regardless of the administrative outcome. This linguistic segregation of 
children in the district can only have negative consequences for future integration 
and conflict resolution. 
 
Further impacting the efficiency of dominate language learning is the status of 
education in post-conflict reconstruction. The need to share buildings and provide 
schooling in shifts dramatically cuts the hours available to schools for each element 
of the curriculum. This issue is most prevalent in Kurdish language schools in the 
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disputed territories. Figure 15; Language hours in KRG managed schools illustrates 
the reduction in secondary language instruction. 
 
 
Figure 15: Language Hours in KRG Managed Schools. 
KRG Curriculum Language hours per week 
Kurdish medium schools Primary Secondary 
Kurdish 6 4 
Arabic 4 5 
English 4 5 
 
Reduced in the DIBs 
Kurdish medium schools 
DIB’s 
Primary Secondary 
Kurdish 5 3 
Arabic 3 4 
English 3 4 
M/T   
 
 
6.3.4 Contact and Interaction 
 
The connectedness of everyday citizens to those groups who are culturally different 
helps determine their susceptibility to ethnic mobilization (Phillips, 2009). Numerous 
academic investigations have supported the idea that increased inter-group contact 
can support better ethnic relations.  The Contact Hypothesis, in its various 
formulations and elaborations, suggests that inter-group contact- which takes place 
under the conditions of status equality and cooperative interdependence- while 
allowing for sustained interaction between participants and allowing for the potential 
forming of friendships—might help alleviate conflict between groups and encourage 
change in negative intergroup attitudes (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1976; Pettigrew, 1998).  
 
One Kurdish interlocutor stated that although identity protection was a priority, he felt 
that it is only a stage in the region’s history. He stated that the presence of 
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intermarriage between ethnic groups and the history of co-dependence across 
communities would serve to create the necessary conditions for social cohesion:   
 
‘People need to celebrate who they are.. before it was forbidden so they need 
it (now)… it tells ‘you didn’t beat us…. We are back stronger. If we use 
schools to teach our own language and history.. it will separate people yes, 
but maybe it won’t be forever…. We can find our way back to each other. 
People in Kirkuk have always lived together. I have brothers who are Turkmen 
and Arab! But now we need to take again our identity then in the future we will 
come back.’ (KDA)  
 
Yet, on closer inspection this optimism appears to have flaws; firstly the increase in 
residential ethnic enclaves (Rydgren and Sofi, 2011), coupled with the school 
segregation is removing the opportunity for young people to mix across ethnic lines. 
Without channels for social interaction, which were previously forced upon groups 
through the policies of assimilation, the people of Kirkuk are no longer ‘living together 
as the interviewee had suggested was always the case. The rates of intermarriage 
have fallen drastically post 2003 (Interview data), and the previously integrated 
nature of the disputed territories has deteriorated. 
 
Therefore the separate nature of the school system can be accused of harming the 
wider inter-ethnic relations. The sought separate education system of the disputed 
territories negates the possibility for contact conditions to be met within the education 
system. Firstly, it is preventing not only the integration of pupils, but also of parents, 
who are denied the opportunity of inter-ethnic mixing at the school gates, as 
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discussed earlier. Many investigations have focused on the positive influence of 
school exchanges between separate identity-based schools and such programmes 
have been instigated in a number of post-conflict environments to promote social 
cohesion (see work on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Cyprus and more). 
However, simple interactions between schools would not be beneficial as the second 
condition of ‘conditions of equality’ is also missing. The unequal provision of 
schooling between ethnic groups has created grievance and will be addressed in the 
next section. 
 
 
6.4 Equality 
The previous chapter developed how each ethnically categorised non-Arab school 
system fails to receive adequate support from the central ministry. This failure of the 
state to uphold its obligation to its citizens can have further consequences for the 
wider environment by undermining the government’s legitimacy. The adoption of 
measures that cannot be implemented, for example because of a lack of funding or 
human resources, undermine faith in the Iraqi State Institutions’ capacity to address 
the problems citizens face in this, and other, areas. As a public good provided by the 
state, education plays a vital role in establishing state legitimacy for the general 
population. The state’s commitment to all Iraq’s ethnic groups can be symbolically 
represented through its commitment to ethnically diverse education access. The 
inadequate support for the education system across the disputed territories has 
served to undermine the central government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public as 
the central ministry in Baghdad stands accused of not fulfilling its constitutional 
obligations to support mother-tongue education access to non-Arab minorities. A 
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World Bank survey conducted in 2011 indicates the causal relationship between 
insufficient services, inequality and violence. Participants from the six countries 
surveyed named poverty/poor education and justice/inequality/corruption as the two 
primary drivers of conflict (World Bank, 2011, p.9). Thus, such discrimination in the 
allocation of public spending has led to serious unrest in many conflict affected 
countries (International Crisis Group, 2012, (World Bank, 2011, p.9). 
 
There is an established understanding in political science that relative deprivation 
(Gurr, 1970) and the resulting feelings of grievance can instigate internal conflicts. 
Stewart (2000) expanded on the application of inequality and grievance within an 
ethnically homogenous population (vertical inequality) to introduce the notion of 
horizontal inequality, “severe inequalities between culturally defined groups” 
(Stewart, 2002, p.3). When such inequalities are perceived to be horizontal, and 
therefore defined by identity markers such as language, religion or tribe, the 
mobilisation of groups for the purpose of collective action is a risk that can lead to 
ethnic conflict and sectarian fighting (Murshed, 2008). Such horizontal inequalities 
can be found in the economic, social, cultural, security and political realms (Stewart 
2010). Brown (2011) highlights the significance of inequality within society by 
reflecting on three main areas:  
 
 Economic: GDP per capita as an expression of socio-economic differences. 
 Political: relative inclusion or exclusion from political participation and power. 
 Cultural: ethnicity, religion, and gender as potentially culturally divisive.  
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For Brown the presence of all three of these criteria is especially ‘‘incendiary’’ (Brown 
2011, p. 193). Education has a place in the achievement of equality in all three 
realms and is therefore seen as important in either maintaining or alleviating 
situations of inequality. As such, Smith suggests that ‘‘conflict-sensitive education 
systems’’ which aim at empowerment rather than social control (2005, p. 379), are 
necessary to achieve equality between groups. Brown emphasizes several important 
factors which determine how education can achieve this: language of instruction, 
cultural representation and the context for particular forms of decentralization, 
notably economic ones. 
 
 
In this regard the current education structure and management in the disputed 
territories can be examined in terms of its interaction with these horizontal 
inequalities. The thesis has already begun to present the experience of horizontal 
inequalities in two areas: the previous section on social cohesion highlighted 
disputes around the cultural representation in education; and demonstrated the 
horizontal inequalities of cultural representation in education and chapter four drew 
attention to the inadequate political structures within the ministries and the horizontal 
inequality of ministerial and political representation between groups. Therefore this 
section will now concentrate on examining the consequences of horizontal economic 
inequalities in the education sector. Two streams of economic influence can be seen 
to be at play within the education sector: firstly immediate grievance generated from 
unequal economic investment into each ethnic group’s school system; and secondly, 
the future repercussions of such unequal funding between communities in terms of 
economic earning potential. 
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The disparity in funding investment between communities is reflected by the 
resources that they receive. The central ministry in Baghdad is obliged to provide 
textbooks (received to varying degrees, but in the wrong languages for non-Arabs), 
stationary kits and the basic running costs of the school and teacher salaries 
(received in varying degrees but additional resources are needed if linguistically 
inappropriate appointments are made). As the last chapter demonstrated, the 
capacity gaps being experienced in the education sector are felt to differing degrees 
throughout the communities. Educationalists portrayed a funding system that was 
regionally and horizontally differentiated. Yet a clear consensus was provided that 
even when resources are received they are ‘vastly inadequate’ (Interview TMN2). It 
is worth restating at this point that the entire Iraqi education system is suffering from 
the status of victim to conflict and therefore lacks infrastructure and funding. 
However, the move toward separatist education institutions has allowed education 
officials to become representatives of their respective ethnic communities and, as 
such, examination of the overall education system has been lost. Thus, education 
officials and community representatives are presenting all obstacles to funding 
ethnically specific education access in terms of a societal security threats. 
 
As discussed earlier, one issue which threatens to exacerbate the neglect and 
disparity of funding from the central ministries is the involvement of external actors in 
the system. This extreme measure has created further levels of inequality in the 
funding and support received by ethnic groups.  The Kurds have an active and 
financially stable ministry of education in the KRG to support the building of new 
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schools, the development of the curriculum, the employment of teachers and other 
educational needs. The Turkmen have political, ethnic and religious allies which can 
support the school systems with teacher training programmes and curriculum 
translation and printing (but to a lesser degree to the Kurds), and the Assyrians are 
drawing on their own ethnically affiliated NGO’s and religious groups for support. 
Each external actor has a varying degree of influence and resource capability. This 
has further exacerbated the divisions of funding inequality that are already present 
between Arab and non-Arab, and also between the education systems within the 
non-Arab communities.   
 
Therefore, in terms of investment, if schools in the region are ethnically homogenous 
and receive different levels of support from the state and affiliated actors, it goes 
without saying that each ethnic group could potentially be receiving a different level 
of education. If teacher qualifications, teaching resources, and economic investment 
are not equal between schools, pupil attainment will be differentiated accordingly. 
This can create grievance and resentment toward neighbouring ethnic groups. The 
potential of education to contribute to the wider conflict through grievance over 
perceived economic inequalities in the state education system is significant and was 
indeed prevalent in interviews with educationalists. Kurdish, Turkmen and Assyrian 
groups made frequent reference to the lack of central support given to their ethnically 
defined separate schools, and showed resentment to the sought external support of 
their neighbours. Perceptions of such injustice have contributed to conflicts erupting 
in Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000).The perceived inequality 
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of resource provision suffered by all communities has created accusations and 
resentment which can only serve to exacerbate interethnic tensions:   
 
The Turkmen open schools everywhere, they have better funding, they call 
them Turkmen schools but sometimes they are mostly Arab students, but it is 
Turkmen money so they can do this. (Interview KD1) 
The Kurds have better schools because of the KRG. We have to survive on 
our own. (Interview AS2) 
This resentment is compounded by the absence of channels of communication 
between schools. The lack of transparency in educational funding and received 
resources can be seen to be contributing further to the societal security dilemma 
discussed earlier in this chapter, and the non-regulation of actors is creating hostility 
toward the unknown motivations behind the expansion of other communities’ 
schools. As each community prioritises its own education provision over its 
neighbours, creating vast disparities in terms of support, education actors question 
the purpose and intentions of its neighbours’ education systems. The implications of 
this climate are that inequalities between actors have the potential to spark old 
conflicts or create new ones. Each group is able to look at its education provision in 
relation to other groups and see disparities which can cause grievance and ethnic 
tension.  
 
The second point of horizontal economic inequality in education is the impact it has 
on future interaction with the job market by each ethnic group. Taking a theoretical 
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leap into the future, the continuation of these input inequalities could create further 
conflict. Each of the ‘input’ inequalities addressed can result in the provision of 
differing standards of education within the separatist structure. Consequently, this 
could lead to differentiated educational outputs for each ethnic group in the region. 
Such variations in achievement between ethnic groups could in turn create wider 
economic horizontal inequalities within the region. This was the case in Northern 
Ireland where a government-sponsored study in 1973 revealed that unequal funding 
arrangements were creating inequality in educational outputs, with Catholic school-
leavers, on average, receiving lower qualifications than Protestants and hence 
diminished job opportunities. State schools, overwhelmingly attended by Protestants, 
received full state funding, whereas independent Catholic schools had to rely largely 
on their own resources (Gallagher, cited in Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). In the Iraqi 
disputed territories pupils from different ethnic groups may leave education with 
horizontally differentiated achievements and qualifications. Such horizontal inequality 
in provision will therefore have the potential to influence future employment 
opportunities. The current system has the real potential to create a society in which 
one ethnic group receives a superior education to another due to the external 
support for education and in turn dominate the competition in the job market.  
The potential for inequality of education achievement, shaped by ethnic affiliation, is 
further compounded by a number of technical education delivery issues in the 
disputed territories. The driving purpose of education to protect societal identity has 
led to a number of complexities in delivery which in turn are affecting education 
attainment for each of the ethnic groups;  
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The choice of medium of instruction, as highlighted in chapter four, may have 
adverse consequences for a generation of students from certain ethnic groups. The 
introduction of Assyrian language submersion schools coupled with the de-
prioritisation of a lingua franca will potentially restrict Assyrian pupils’ access to 
higher education (as there are no Assyrian language universities in the region). 
Equally, the use of traditional or adapted languages in education can affect overall 
attainment of pupils, as with the use of the new Turkish Roman alphabet for 
Turkmen pupils who are more familiar with the Arabic script.  
 
Curriculum choices are also influencing pupil attainment across the school system. 
In Kurdish schools the use of KRG curriculum is adversely affecting student 
attainment in the Baghdad controlled exams, leaving a generation ‘without the 
qualifications needed to get jobs and succeed’ (Interview KD9).  
 
In the same way the central Baghdad curriculum is accused of creating horizontally 
unequal results between religious defined groups. The inclusion of Islamic studies as 
an examination subject is deemed to give an unfair advantage to the Muslim 
population. Non-Muslims in schools following the central curriculum are excused 
from Islamic studies, but are unable to take up their own religion as a subject to 
replace it in state schools. This has created an issue of discriminatory practice. 
Islamic studies is a core exam subject which contributes to the overall grade of the 
student. It is also considered an easy subject for Muslim students in which they can 
‘pull up their wider grades’ (Interview YZ6; NP). For followers of other religions such 
as Christians, Mandaeans and Yazidis, the only option is to skip Islamic education 
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and for students to boost their grade by better performance in other subjects.  The 
Ministry followed the old regime's procedures and has not provided non-Muslim 
students with classes related to their own religions. Even communities who do not 
request religious recognition in the school system object to this disparity. Mandaeans 
and followers of certain other esoteric religions, do not learn about religion until they 
reach maturity. Yet the community is opposed to having Islam included in the school 
exam curriculum; "What we want from the ministry is to add a new subject as easy to 
obtain good grades in as Islamic Studies to help other students raise their average." 
(NP)  
 
In short the emphasis on societal security protection in the education sector has 
resulted in a number of ways in which education can lead to grievance and 
resentment due to economic horizontal inequalities; Firstly the government’s failure 
to recognise education’s significant role in identity protection has led to a neglect for 
school support and therefore grievance from communities over education funding 
inputs. Secondly the acceptance of external actors in the education arena (to support 
societal security provision) has further enhanced the funding disparities and 
grievance between communities. Thirdly, these actions have led to a possible 
differentiating of education attainment between communities, leading to inequalities 
in economic earning capability and future horizontal inequalities in the job market. 
Finally, the inequality in attainment is compounded by a series of technical decisions 
taken to enhance societal security protection, but at the expense of pupil 
achievements.   
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Figure 15, below, demonstrates that these inequalities in the education system have 
the potential to create grievance and resentment at each stage of the process, over 
unequal school funding across the communities, over the subsequent unequal 
education attainment, and finally the possible economic division in the labour market. 
 
  Figure 16: Economic Horizontal Inequalities – Education in the Iraqi Disputed 
Territories 
 
 
 
6.5 Political use 
 
The degree of influence that the perceived resource inequality will have on the 
conflict can be exacerbated further if it is deemed to be the result of a deliberate 
threat to the ‘we’ identity of communities (Waever, 2003). Unfortunately, interviews 
228 
 
with regional educationalists revealed that the inequality is understood in terms of 
deliberate political attempts to deny non-Arab or non-Kurdish communities a place in 
the region. The decade of armed conflict and insecurity has resulted in significant 
instability within the social and political realms in Iraq. Consequently state institutions 
are struggling to function and party-based politics have spread into all public sectors, 
including education. All educational stakeholders are affiliated with, or influenced by 
ethno-politics and have their own political and economic interests in education.  A 
political economy analysis of the education sector highlights the extent to which such 
political affiliation and motivation may impact on educational provision. The political 
economy analysis is concerned with ‘‘the distribution of power and wealth between 
different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and 
transform these relationships over time’’ (Collinson 2003, p. 3). In a post-conflict 
situation, such an analysis of education examines both ‘‘the political and the 
economic aspects’’ of education and conflict and ‘‘how these combine to affect 
patterns of power and vulnerability’’ in the education sector (Collinson 2003, p. 3). In 
short, the vested interest of political parties has the potential to influence education: 
how it is managed and for what purpose. 
  
One of the major impacts of the territorial contest is the increased politicization of the 
education system. Representation in the education sector has become an important 
arena to reflect political struggles (as we have seen with the curriculum debates over 
the representation of Shia and Sunni in Islamic studies). The involvement of political 
parties in education is not unexpected, as Apple (2004, p. 61) observed, education is 
a ‘‘political act’’ and schools are ‘‘caught up in a nexus of other institutions—political, 
economic, and cultural—that are basically unequal’’.  However, in the context of the 
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Iraqi disputed territories, the political involvement in education is predominantly 
influenced by the territorial contest. Interviews with educational stakeholders across 
the region made reference to the use of education for the purposes of demonstrating 
regional presence by the larger competing ethnic groups.  Ethnically affiliated 
political parties have a vested interest in opening schools categorised by their own 
identity indicators in regions in which they are laying territorial claims. Political parties 
have mobilized support for the opening or maintenance of schools based on ethnic 
association rather than on educational policies that serve the best interests of 
children and inter-ethnic relations which foster a fair society for all (as discussed with 
reference to technical issues presented through language and curriculum choices). 
 
Interviews with educational stakeholders in the disputed territories indicated that 
many ordinary functions—including educational management, teacher training, 
teacher recruitment and redeployment,—all involved political intrusion. In the 
disputed territories the political role of education is even more dynamic. In terms of 
the three major competing ethnicities, Kurd, Arab and Turkmen, linguistic 
representation through schooling can be seen to aid credence to their claims over 
demographic majority and historical ownership of the city. Without substantial 
representation in the region, each groups fears it will lose control over the territory. 
The fight for Kirkuk is a numbers game which demands representation on the ground 
due to the omnipresent anticipation of article 140. A battle for linguistic supremacy 
can be seen to be fought in order to demonstrate this. As such, protecting mother 
tongue education access can be seen to be enforcing their claims to administrative 
control and therefore safeguarding their future societal security in the region.  
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This became apparent in interviews with perceptions of government hindrance and 
ethnic communities adopting education as a means of political and territorial 
defense. In this respect one Arab education official suggested that in Kirkuk the 
Turkmen open schools as a ‘Screw you’ to the Kurds’, regardless of their pupils’ 
language requirements and that is why they complain of underfunding (Interview 
AB2). Equally, accusations of official channels blocking requests for resource 
allocation and funding, and the deliberate prevention of teacher transfers from 
dominant language schools to mother tongue community schools, abound. When 
discussing school funding in Ninewa governorate, one Turkmen Education official 
suggested that Baghdad ‘does not fund the school just because it is a Turkmen 
school, it is sectarianism.(Interview TM9)’  As such, failure to provide funding for 
minority language programming is viewed as a deliberate political attempt to limit the 
use of that language as a means of instruction64. Frequent mention was given to this 
deliberate political interference. Interview participants recounted numerous examples 
of what they perceived as intentional political obstruction of the development of their 
schools. 
 
Such perceptions can be unpacked from how the interviewees presented the issue 
of resource neglect. Due to the absence of non-Arabic teacher training courses and 
teacher appointments, many communities have instigated teacher training 
programmes themselves. The Turkmen community in Ninewa have been particularly 
active in this respect, as discussed previously, teachers aretrained in Turkmen 
community funded institutes (the funding for which was not clarified despite repeated 
                                                 
64 Over three quarters of the interview participants noted a deliberate threat to non-dominant  education delivery. Interviews 
and questions received via email between Feb09- march11 
231 
 
requests) and working, on a voluntary basis, in Turkmen schools. Yet the 
government has refused to appoint these teachers to state paid positions, on the 
grounds of insufficient classroom experience (not qualifications). Instead, 
appointments within Turkmen schools seem to prioritise Arabic speaking teachers, 
this has been viewed in terms of sectarian aggression by many Turkmen 
educationalists; 
 
‘The ministry does not accept our teachers; there is no reason for this. The 
only reason is that the director in Mosul wants to remove the Turkmen [from 
the region]. He wants to limit our schools. We have to struggle {against} this 
opposition to us.’  (Interview TM10) 
 
An even more sinister use of education for nationalist purposes has been reported 
by minority communities across the region. In Ninewa, ethnic minorities perceive the 
opening of Kurdish language schools as a predatory act by the KRG, suggesting that 
the KRG education programme strives to ‘eliminate other cultures and languages’ 
(Interview YZ6) and achieve the illusion of linguistic dominance on the ground. 
Rather than the KRG taking responsibility only for the ethnically homogenous 
Kurdish language schools, here the KRG Ministry of Education has taken 
responsibility for the district which are under their defacto control, such as Akre, Al-
Shikhan and Tilhaif, while simultaneously involving themselves in the education 
provision of other disputed districts under the banner of Kurdish language instruction. 
However, in this highly political and fractured environment, this has been interpreted 
by some groups as an attempt to bolster the presence of Kurdish speakers in the 
contested regions. Allegations abound of financial incentives to enrol children in 
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Kurdish language schools where minority groups claim the deliberate indoctrination 
of non-Kurdish children through educational programs (Assyrian Council of Europe, 
2010). There is little existing literature and research on this issue, but many human 
rights reports originating from the ethnic groups in question claim that a process of 
Kurdification is taking place throughout the disputed territories. Accusations of 
Kurdish authorities fostering patronage relationships with minority groups in return 
for their linguistic allegiance have given voice to claims of a process of Kurdification 
from interlocutors.  
 
Correspondingly, the KRG has just announced plans to open 14 new Kurdish 
language schools in the Yezidi and Shabak populated district of Sinjar. This initiative 
has been created under the premise of alleviating overcrowding in the Kurdish 
language schools in the region65 but minority community groups reject this basis and 
state that they are being forced to send their children to Kurdish language schools 
despite speaking Arabic in the home (Interview YZ/SB/AS). Anecdotal evidence 
presented a picture of intimidation and even imprisonment for those parents who 
requested Arabic instruction for their children or campaigned for traditional language 
elective subjects. In this respect education access in the northern Ninewa 
governorates was presented as contributing to cultural cleansing. The regional 
acceptance of the KRG taking emergency measures to protect Kurdish language 
instruction in the DIB’s has provided a cloak for a nationalistic agenda to be played 
out in the multi-ethnic north of Ninewa.   
 
                                                 
65
 The Ministry stated that it currently only has 184 Kurdish language schools in the region with over 
31000 pupils. However Sinjar is heavily populated by the Yezidi and Shabak communities who do not 
all speak Kurdish 
233 
 
Education in the region can be seen to be manipulated for ethnically defined political 
purpose. This use of education can in turn feed into the wider conflict and create 
inter-ethnic dispute and resentment. Forced assimilation and aggressive education 
policies to demonstrate regional presence are both drawing education discussions of 
quality and towards a purpose which does not acknowledge pedagogy or pupils’ 
futures achievements in the wider society. 
 
6.6 Final Remarks and Conclusions  
 
This chapter of the thesis has presented a critical analysis of the role of identity in 
the education system from a conflict perspective. It has unpacked the consequences 
of education’s role in identity protection on the wider ethnic fragility and territorial 
conflict; and demonstrated how education and conflict interact to create possible 
further triggers for conflict.  
 
The chapter has presented the points at which education may enter the wider 
conflict, by influencing inter-ethnic relations and deliberately manipulating the 
purpose of education for mal intent (see figure 17: Education System Conflict 
Triggers in the Iraqi Disputed Territories). Limited social interaction and inter-ethnic 
contact is further exacerbated by the separate education structures, each serving 
different ethnic communities.  Curriculum can serve to enforce difference, through 
history and religion, and failing to prioritize the need for a shared lingua franca to 
promote interdependence between ethnic groups. Furthermore, the inequality of 
provision and variation of educational funding input and support has created a 
system which may generate grievance and resentment across the ethnic 
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communities. Each theme has generated unintentional conflict triggers and opened 
the system to outside influences. 
The impact of ethnic identity on the education system can be seen to be interacting 
with the wider conflict in a number of detrimental ways. 
 
Figure 17: Education System Conflict Triggers in the Iraqi Disputed Territories  
 
 
 
The securitization of education and the subsequent influence of outside actors in the 
education arena are responsible for creating technical issues with negative side 
effects and allowing political influence. Gray’s Frankenstein analogy appears to be 
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very apt in the disputed territories, whereby power has been given to actors with the 
aim of protecting the threatened means of cultural reproduction, yet this action has 
allowed the misuse of that power to occur (see figure 18: Frankenstein’s Monster in 
Iraqi Education).  When reflecting on the overall research question and asking how 
ethnic identity has impacted education, we can see how the securitization of 
education access in order to protect the means of cultural and ethnic reproduction, 
has adversely affected not only the education system, but also the wider inter-ethnic 
relations in the region. 
 
 
         Figure 18: Frankenstein’s Monster in Iraqi Education 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction                                  
 
The issue of the disputed territories and their peaceful resolution has become pivotal 
in the reconstruction of Iraq. The tug-of-war between the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad continues to play out 
through increased rhetoric and military manoeuvres in the region. The Iraqi political 
process continues to stall over the issue of disputed territories and tension between 
Iraq’s ethnic groups is mounting. The strain between Kurds and Arabs has reached 
the point where thinktanks like the International Crisis Group have raised the 
prospect of clashes between the Iraqi army and Kurdish peshmerga forces 
(CrisisGroup; 2009, 2011). The resolution of the issue has become viewed as a 
ticking bomb: to intervene will cause conflict and to abstain will allow conflict to 
develop. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq have suggested the need to 
explore a range of ‘confidence building measures’ within the region (UNAMI 2008).i 
Within these measures is the recognition of public services delivery, language rights, 
and the distribution of government posts.  Each of these issues can be interpreted at 
the level of formal education, yet little has been done to explore education’s potential 
to build or destroy inter-ethnic confidence. 
 
Despite the growing recognition of education’s potential negative influences in post-
conflict settings, and the significance of identity in post war Iraq, there was a 
complete absence of scholarly analysis in terms not only of the emergent formal 
education system in the disputed regions, but also the purpose bestowed on 
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education and its possible interaction with the wider conflict. Therefore the thesis set 
out to explore how identity has impacted on the post-conflict reconstruction of 
education in the Iraqi disputed territories by addressing the central research question 
of: how has ethnic identity influenced the education narrative in the disputed 
territories? To inform this question the thesis asked; 
 
 What role did ethnic identity play in education provision prior to 2003? 
 What role has ethnic identity played in the formation of formal education structure 
in the region post 2003? 
 What role does ethnic identity play in the current education narrative? 
 What is the relationship between education and the wider ethnic conflict and 
fragility? 
 
Through these questions the thesis strove to provide a better understanding of the 
purpose and function of the reconstructed school system in the governorates of 
Kirkuk and Ninewa, and how education interacts with issues over identity. This 
chapter will conclude the overall investigation by first addressing the empirical 
findings and providing synthesis of findings in relation to the posed research 
questions. Secondly, it will place the research within the context of the broader 
Conflict in Cities project and examine the contributions of the thesis to the Conflict in 
Cities research objectives. The subsequent section will examine the implications of 
the findings in terms of theoretical approaches to the examination of post-conflict 
education reconstruction, then moving on to address the implications for education 
reconstruction policy in Iraq and make recommendations for ways forward. Finally 
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the thesis will conclude with an examination of the areas identified for further 
research in this area.  
 
7.2  Research Questions 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the 
respective empirical chapters: Chapter 4 - Iraqi education through a Societal Security 
Lens, Chapter 5 - Ethnically Appropriate Education: Threats and Survival, and 
Chapter 6 – Education and Conflict in Iraq. This section will synthesize these findings 
to succinctly answer the main research questions posed.  
 
Research Questions 1 and 2; 
 What role did ethnic identity play in education provision prior to 2003?  
 And how has this influenced the role ethnic identity has played in the formation of 
formal education structure in the region post 2003? 
 
As demonstrated in section one of chapter four; prior to 2003 the Ba’ath party used 
the education system in the north of Iraq to deny the existence of non-Arab identities 
and build Iraqi Arab nationalism. The purpose of education in the disputed territories 
was distorted and bestowed with a number of key objectives which were not within 
the internationally recognised remit of formal education. Education was used to deny 
ethnic diversity and provide a site for observation and control over the population. 
Consequently, ethnic representation in the Iraqi education system post-2003 has 
become an emotive issue. The inclusion of ethnic and cultural identity indicators has 
become a central focus in the process of education reconstruction as ethnic 
communities seek the rights previously denied them. The previous oppression of 
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non-Arab identities has left a lasting legacy which impacts greatly on the way in 
which education is viewed post-2003. 
 
Chapter four went on to show how, in order to guard against the future denial of 
identity indicators within the centrally controlled education sector, the school system 
has subsequently become separated, with schools categorised in terms of their 
ethnically homogenous intakes, often linguistically. However, the thesis has shown 
that the influence of Arabisation on identity indicators has created complexities in the 
delivery of education based on linguistic markers. Not all communities have retained 
fluency in the traditional languages of their ethnic groups and as such de not benefit 
academically from the organisation of the school structure. Consequently, it is has 
been possible to demonstrate that identity protection has taken precedence over 
pedagogy and formal education attainment.  Education is increasingly perceived as a 
means of cultural reproduction and therefore deemed a method of protection for 
collective identity. Chapter four demonstrated how ethnic communities strive to 
revive lost cultural indicators, maintain a presence in the region and defend their 
presence in the territories through these separate education structures, even at the 
cost of the quality of the education delivery.   
 
Research Question 3;  
 
 What role does ethnic identity play in the current education narrative? 
Chapter five illustrated that due to the segregated nature of the school system, the 
education narrative in the region revolves around two central, interlinked ethnic 
themes: the right to ethnically specific and appropriate education services - in terms 
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of language and culture- and the capacity gaps which limit the delivery of ethnically 
specific education, such as teaching resources, teacher training and curriculum.  It 
has been demonstrated that each ethnic community is facing its own specific 
challenges to the delivery of education which is seen to adequately protect identity 
and act as a means of cultural reproduction. Due to the significant role of identity 
protection and revival given to education (as demonstrated in chapter four), 
restrictions in access are frequently perceived to be deliberate attacks against the 
communities identity and therefore conceptualised in terms of the group’s continued 
existence in the region. Consequently, educationalists from each community have 
been heard to introduce securitising speech into the education narratives, raising 
education to the status of an ethnic survival issue. 
  
Accordingly, education actors have sought enterprising ways to address such 
threats, and have enrolled help from ethnically affiliated external parties who are not 
responsible to the education ministries. Thus, this emergency action has resulted in 
a number of outside actors, each with their own vested interest, being drawn into the 
state education system to support schools. Chapter five unpacked how this action 
has had a number of implications for both the technical delivery of education and 
also the possible educational outputs of communities. Curriculum choices and the 
fortification of identity can be seen to be having negative impacts on educational 
outputs. The presence of such external influences has therefore opened the 
education system up for potential nationalistic manipulation, and also ensured that 
ethnic identity continues to be central to the narrative over education access and 
provision. 
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Research Question 4; 
 
 What is the relationship between identity, education and the wider ethnic conflict 
and fragility? 
Chapter Six directly addressed the impact of ethnic identity on the education system 
and detailed how it can be seen to be interacting with the wider conflict in a number 
of detrimental ways. The education system has entered the wider conflict at  various 
crucial points. The school system limits the social interaction of children and parents 
from different communities, and provides children with an educational experience 
which enforces difference and prioritises the preservation of identity over inter-ethnic 
dependence and social cohesion. Additionally, schools fail to prioritize the need for a 
shared lingua franca to promote communication between groups. These issues are 
compounded by the differentiated and unequal provision of funding inputs across the 
system due to ministerial neglect and varying levels of external support.  The 
resulting horizontal inequalities have created grievance and resentment between the 
communities over education issues. Each point of entry has generated unintentional 
conflict triggers, and also has opened the system up for intentional manipulation by 
nationalistic political actors. The relationship between education and conflict is 
undeniable and has the potential to encourage further ethnically defined tensions. 
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Overriding Research Question;  
 
How has ethnic identity influenced the education narrative in the disputed territories? 
The central research question has been unpacked throughout each of the sub- 
questions to demonstrate how education structures in the region have been shaped 
by the pursuit of ethnic identity protection in the post-conflict environment. The lack 
of infrastructure and the administrative contestation have contributed to creating a 
prominent security based narrative within the education arena with ethnically 
appropriate schooling being viewed as under threat.  Education access has not only 
been influenced by the ethno-political arena in which it is operating, but its provision 
has also been elevated to an issue of ethnic survival, with the potential to hinder 
wider political negotiations. 
 
Education reconstruction in post-2003 Iraq has been shaped by the omnipresent 
influence of ethnic affiliation and identity politics. The legacy of past oppression and 
fear of future uncertainty has led ethnic communities to endow education with a 
central role in cultural reproduction. The preservation of identity has taken 
precedence over pedagogy, with schools disregarding standards of good practice in 
terms of mother-tongue languages in favour of achieving homogenous institutions. 
The interpretation of education as a societal security tool has resulted in its provision 
holding significance within the wider political contest. When limitations to education 
are perceived, they are interpreted as threats to the group’s ‘we’ identity and as such 
emergency action is taken to protect them. Such emergency action has involved the 
external support of ethnically affiliated actors within the state education system. This 
influence has opened the door for the manipulation of education structures by 
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nationalist and extremist groups for their own purposes. Figure 19 demonstrates the 
overall interaction in a schematic illustration, to show the overall interaction between 
the two key issues of identity, conflict and identity.  
 
Figure 19: Education and Idenity in the Disouted Territoires 
 
 
7.3 Conflict in cities and the contested state 
The project to which this dissertation contributes, Conflict in Cities, seeks to 
understand how contested urban environments can absorb, resist and potentially 
play a role in transforming the territorial conflicts in which they are situated. 
Furthermore, the project seeks to advance an understanding as to how heavily 
contested societies may become viable cities for all inhabitants.  
The thesis engaged with a number of the research questions posed by the project: 
 How structures and institutions may bolster cities to withstand state struggles  
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Firstly the thesis explores how education institutions actually work in practice within 
the contested urban society, identifying how they may damage inter-ethnic relations, 
and highlighting how they may in turn bolster them. The dissertation has taken an 
overview of two contested Iraqi governorates with attention to the Conflict in Cities 
project city of Kirkuk. The aims of the thesis are very clearly defined in that I do not 
seek to analyse Kirkuk city specifically, but the research and its findings will be of 
relevance to academics and practitioners working specifically on the cityscape. The 
aim has been to advance a wider understanding of how education can interact with 
identity and the ethnically defined territorial conflict across the disputed territories, 
and not purely within the isolated location of Kirkuk city, where a research culture is 
already quite prevalent. The intention has been to look at education reconstruction 
through the theoretical lens of societal security and take a fresh approach to the 
evaluation of education institutions and their role in urban conflicts.  
 
 How the conflict affects the everyday life of citizens, and how do they as active 
agents continue to cope or resist. 
The thesis interacts with the question of how territorial conflicts can affect the 
everyday lives of citizens by focusing on education provision. Using education as a 
conflict analysis lens, rather than the issue of governance or power-sharing, allows a 
focus which has wider impact, reaching even citizens who shy away from political 
realms. This has demonstrated how even politically inactive citizens can use 
institutions to resist threats and protect community identity in the midst of identity-
conflicts.   
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 How aspects of everyday city life havebeen used by conflict protagonists and 
managers.  
Finally the thesis addresses the last question of how everyday life can be co-opted 
by conflict actors, demonstrating education’s key role in ethnic relations, co-
existence and interdependence. Education is often targeted for manipulation during 
times of ethnic fragility. The thesis demonstrated how education has been co-opted 
for political purposes across the disputed territories and highlights this impact on 
everyday life. The research has therefore served to open the debate over how 
resource management in conflict affected cities can be a cause of intergroup conflict. 
 
The Conflict in Cities project has contributed to a variety of aspects of conflict 
analysis and has approached conflict management through a variety of lenses 
ranging from architecture and archaeology to sociology, geography, and political 
science.  In this dissertation, I focus on explaining the interaction of education with 
the problems of the violently contested society, widening the examination further. 
 
7.4 Theoretical Conclusions 
 
Education in conflict-affected areas has been examined in terms of its negative 
impact on wider conflict by a broad array of commentators. Yet, in terms of 
international practitioners and educationalists in conflict affected countries, the same 
practical indicators and assessment tools are still prevalent: enrolment figures, 
school buildings and textbook supply are often prioritised over evaluations of 
education’s interaction with conflict. Contextualisation of education policy remains an 
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often neglected process in conflict affected countries. Therefore the thesis strove to 
shift the emphasis from standard evaluation of education services in the disputed 
territories to one which examined education’s wider role and community impact.  
Correspondingly, the thesis has demonstrated that education sector reform 
management by the international community, in post-2003 Iraq, focused solely on 
basic indicators and therefore failed to engage with educations potential for social 
transformation and inter ethnic peace building. International practitioners and 
educationalists in Iraq continued to rely on the same practical assessment indicators 
and detrimentally do not engage with educations potential to a) be affected by, and 
b) affect the conflict.  
 
In addition, the thesis sought to address a second theoretical limitation in the 
education in emergency literature: one that emerges from the lack of attention to 
causality.  Seldom are the impacts of negative education traced backward to identify 
the conceptual parameters of their inception. The academic literature surrounding 
education in conflict asks ‘how’ far more frequently than it asks ‘why.’ The thesis 
would advocate that in order to address the root causes of conflict a shift of focus is 
necessary, to one which focuses on causality rather than just outcome66. Therefore a 
more innovative approach to analysis is required. Conflict triggers can be generated 
when the purpose of education differs from that of the internationally accepted norm, 
as with the role of identity protection in education in the disputed territories. In this 
respect a wider scope to analysis is required.  
 
                                                 
66
 The recent use of a political economy analysis by some scholars in the field of education in conflict affected 
countries can be seen to start to address this theoretical shortcoming (see Pherali, 2012 and Novelli UKFIET 
presentation). However, this thesis has demonstrated that not all negative societal consequences of education in 
conflict affected countries are driven by deliberate intent or vested interest. 
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In the same way that the origins of conflict have been widely examined academically, 
the origins of negative education policies should be unpacked to provide more clarity 
to educationalists involved in a countries post-conflict re-construction processes.  In 
order to address the negative interactions of education with conflict we must first 
have a clear understanding of their origins. The continued use of traditional 
education indicators, such as desk counts and gender enrolment, have failed to 
acknowledge the purpose of education in the disputed territories, just as it failed to 
acknowledge the purpose of the Ba’ath party regime’s education programme in the 
1980’s. As the thesis has attested, in divided and contested societies, education 
holds a powerful influence over ethnic interaction and the peaceful resolution to 
conflict. The thesis has used the societal security lens to identify not only the 
negative interactions of education with conflict, but also how these interactions have 
evolved through the role of identity protection and the perceived threats and lack of 
support. Understanding these factors can help to mitigate their impact.  
 
This failure to concentrate on, and understand, the driving factors behind education’s 
management (or mismanagement) has lead to a neglect of education’s potential to 
build peace. Education has the potential to develop the tools necessary to sustain 
the relationships and linkages vital to peace-building between ethnic communities, 
while providing crucial space for integration. Yet there is an absence of common 
understanding and no consensus over what constitutes peace-building education. 
Neither is there a common strategy for implementing it. The United Nations has 
struggled to define and operationalize the concept of peace-building education 
(Smith, 2010)ii, and consequently most education programming in post-conflict 
contexts is planned without an explicit recognition of education’s peace-building 
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capabilities.  The thesis would suggest that by focusing the attention to questions of 
why and not how this can be achieved more easily. 
 
A conflict sensitive analysis of education is being championed by organisations like 
the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and UNICEF’s 
Peace-building Education and Advocacy programme (PBEA), but their efforts have 
yet to be mainstreamed into standard practice and remain unfocused and broad in 
their application, failing to influence everyday education assessment methodology. It 
is therefore the recommendation of this research that monitoring systems to detect 
and demonstrate the purpose of education and its potential to influence conflict to be 
further developed. In short, scholars must work toward bridging the gap between 
academic understanding, origins of action and real world practice to ensure that 
education in fragile environments is shielded from potential manipulation and 
unintentional negative consequences.  
 
The following section will lay out a number of policy recommendations specific to the 
region. These recommendations have been generated by the thesis’ adoption of a 
focused conflict analysis approach to education assessment. It has used this to 
unpack not only how education has evolved, but also why. By using this approach it 
is hoped that the policy recommendations are firmly grounded in the principle of ‘do 
no harm’. 
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7.5 Policy Recommendations and Ways Forward 
 
This thesis has been underpinned by an adherence to the following considerations: 
education provision should strive to preserve the rich ethnic diversity of Iraq; 
education policies should not create future inter-ethnic hostility or produce negative 
societal effects for an ethnic group and therefore do no harm; and, that education 
design and structures should be adapted to the Iraqi context and reality. The findings 
of the thesis emphasise that it is necessary to address the root cause of education’s 
inability to support schools in protecting societal security. Once schools are able to 
adequately provide the means of cultural reproduction for their communities, it will be 
possible to remove or monitor outside influence and also instigate methods to 
mitigate the impact of segregation. Before education actors can think about 
harnessing education’s potential to build peace, it is necessary to ensure each ethnic 
community has a strong representation. Achieving this will strengthen any attempts 
to foster interdependence and co-operation between groups. In short, it is necessary 
to remove the threats to societal security through education before progress can be 
made.  
 
However, this requires political will and economic commitments. Hence, while the 
thesis can recommend a number of technical and policy suggestions on how to 
tackle the delivery of education in the disputed territories, their implementation will 
ultimately depend upon the sustained political will to resolve the different issues in a 
fair, transparent and non-discriminatory fashion. Therefore, first and foremost, the 
political commitment to find solutions that will benefit the peace, and overall stability 
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of the region, whereby pedagogy and minority rights are prized over territorial 
representation, is required. 
 
Equally, in order to harness education as a force for peace in the disputed territories, 
a commitment to significant financial and human resources is necessary. And of 
equal importance is that these resources need to be equally distributed and 
sustainable. Despite the constructional changes, the Ministry of Education has failed 
to durably support the development of non-Arab education in the region. In light of 
the thesis findings, we can see that this has resulted in the opening of language 
schools without proper regard for best practice, educational pedagogy, or provision 
of the necessary resources. These limitations have led to further frustration amongst 
the population, as well as decreased education quality and provision, which can lead 
to future horizontal inequalities. Correspondingly, due to the significance given to the 
constitutional promises around identity representation in education, this lack of 
support has resulted in the school system becoming open to outside influences.  
Commitment to equality of funding is paramount. 
 
In addition, there is a need to clarify administrative responsibility. Currently, there is 
no one single institution or body in charge of education in the disputed areas and 
overlapping jurisdictions have contributed toward the problems documented in the 
previous chapters.  The region’s administrative uncertainly must be acknowledged 
and as such a special status given to the responsibility of education matters in the 
disputed territories. This is critical in terms of technical delivery as well as with 
regards to ensuring that the education system does not influence the wider political 
debate and tension within the region. If one central body is responsible for managing 
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the education system, there can be some degree of regulation of input from the 
various parties to ensure that while the school is functioning to protect societal 
security it is not being exposed to further nationalist aims. 
 
This thesis does, however recognise that support for separatist education structures 
does carry with it a dilemma: the structures chosen to defend societal security 
through education can both foster unintentional ethnic bias and allow the 
interference of deliberate antagonistic nationalistic parties. Therefore, it is necessary 
that educational strategists in the region consider the needs of the community 
alongside the requirements of the wider society for systems which promote co-
existence. The need to strengthen the societal security of the community groups in 
the region is undeniable following years of oppression and assimilation. Equally, the 
need for cultural representation is essential to generate an equal footing for inter-
communal co-operation. Yet education’s central goal of supporting societal security 
must be achieved with an acknowledgement of the need for policies which insulate 
the separatist structure from the problems highlighted in this thesis. This insulation 
would attempt to prevent the education system from becoming party to the wider 
conflict.   
 
Therefore the education sector must primarily develop a greater acknowledgement 
of identity protection as a goal of education and therefore treat the educational rights 
of each community with equal respect and fair resource allocation to defuse growing 
tensions in the education arena, and prevent outside manipulation of education. In 
the specific environment of an ethnically diverse and contested territory such as the 
disputed region, encouraging the segregation of the community through linguistic 
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access to education can have numerous detrimental societal affects as previously 
discussed in chapter six. So it is necessary to take advantage of the point when 
identity issues within education interact with social relations to create a space for 
constructive nation-building around shared, common identities. School and 
classrooms can provide space in which people of different origins can be brought 
together and taught how to live peacefully. To formulate a way forward, policy 
makers must be aware of this opportunity and also acknowledge the reality in which 
they are working. To impose a dominant language or cultural framing on education in 
the region would be academically detrimental, as well as serving to create an 
ideological battleground which would further divide communities;  to support further 
segregation through the current system would serve to further divide communities 
both linguistically and socially.  
 
Therefore, an alternative middle ground must be found. Policy makers must create 
education policies and programmes which not only protect the rights of all ethnic 
communities, but which also strive to promote ethnic and religious harmony. There is 
no single answer to the question regarding how best to reconcile these objectives. 
The situations in which minority language communities exist vary from district-to-
district and the priorities of parents for their children's education will depend on many 
factors, including political affiliation, maintenance of traditional language under 
Arabization, and the weight given to their children's acquisition of the skills needed to 
participate in the wider society. Yet, they do share the need to preserve distinct 
ethnic identities. But whatever the precise balance, the clear need for all minority 
children is to acquire real fluency in at least two languages – namely the mother-
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tongue and the state or majority language- while enjoying the degree of integration 
that promotes community relations. 
One of the possible ways of solving the problem is the introduction of bilingual 
models of education. Most bilingual education programmes have two goals; the 
acquisition of the language of the country and academic success; and the continuing 
development of the heritage language. There are several different types of bilingual 
education program models and taking into account the findings of the research and 
the wider political environment of the region, the thesis would recommend that a 
variety of models would need to be explored and implemented according to linguistic 
and regional need. Demographically mixed areas such as central Kirkuk will no 
doubt require a different form of bilingual language provision to the homogenous 
Arabic district of Al-Hawiga.  
A phased move toward bilingualism in the disputed territories would require 
advocacy and policy formulation, teaching/learning processes and curriculum-
content development, and community participation and ownership. It would no doubt 
face opposition from minority language communities who have already established 
mother-tongue secondary education across the region. Therefore, the thesis 
recommends a gradual move toward a more integrated education system through 
the introduction of pilot schemes in the more demographically mixed areas and 
general steps toward the principle of bilingualism in existing mother-tongue schools. 
Considering the political environment, such a move away from the existing amount of 
mother provision in secondary education would create resentment and would not be 
accepted within the political arena. Therefore, concentration on improved language 
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curricular and teacher training would provide a basis for which schools in mixed 
areas to develop the foundations for future moves to a more integrated system.  
 
The need to revise the curriculum so that it portrays the true diversity of Iraqi society 
is high on most Iraqi educationalist agendasiii and the failure to provide one common 
core curriculum which ensures ethnic representation is highly problematic. In the 
absence of a consensus, one option for exploration may be the use of elective 
classes in the traditional languages and religion of students within their catchment 
areas. This may help to alleviate this tension. It is therefore essential to develop a 
standardised syllabus for each religion and language present in the DIB’s which is 
printed and distributed by Ministry of Education and available to all schools on 
request and not as a matter of student quota. The study of local languages and 
religions should be available to non-community members. This would not only 
support the aim of achieving a representative curriculum, but also cater for those 
families whose home language is not their traditional language, or families who 
prefer to have majority dominant language instruction accompanied by traditional 
language acknowledgement.  
 
These recommendations were presented to UNAMI at their request in 2012, along 
with a series of quick impact project proposals (Appendix 11) which would begin to 
address the issues highlighted in this research. In addition, I have recently been 
invited to present these recommendations and the findings of this project to 
educationalists in the region at a UNICEF sponsored workshop focused on 
harnessing education for peace-building in the disputed territories.  
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7.6 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
As is often the case with research projects, this PhD generated a number of 
additional questions in addition to the findings presented. It is worth restating that the 
objective of this project was to investigate how identity has influenced the education 
narrative in the region.  In doing so the thesis has been able to unpack the driving 
forces of education and the subsequent possible entry points into the wider identity-
based conflict. Yet each one of these entry points would benefit from further 
examination. Unfortunately such research undertakings were beyond the scope of 
this study. Each of these avenues of conflict has the potential to be examined in 
further detail with the employment of different methodologies, and each would 
warrant a PhD thesis in their own right.   
 
The scale of the education and identity debate in Iraq is as extensive and 
multifaceted as the overlapping conflicts that people are forced to navigate in 
everyday life. Hence the above recommendations would benefit from further 
attention to generate achievable development targets with regards to education 
management and identity representation. There is need for more case studies at the 
local level to allow further assessment of local dimensions of education. Exploring 
the following as research strategies can help to facilitate the attainment of this goal: 
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 Regional Language Surveys; although general consensus was presented that 
traditional languages in the region have been degraded – from both across and 
within communities – it would be beneficial for an extensive investigation into 
language use in the region for the purposes of informing the pedagogical design 
of language programmes. Clear categorisation of mother-tongue and traditional 
language is required, and as such further investigation is needed. 
 
 Cultural Material Review; the presence of actors, external to state education, in 
the system is of great significance to this investigation. Although samples of 
materials were presented to this investigation it was not within its remit to perform 
a full content-based review of such materials across all communities. Such a 
review would shed further light on the extent to which external actors are acting in 
nationalist interests and polluting the school system. 
 
 Teacher Ideology: the thesis was unable to investigate the impact of  teacher 
ideology in the class room. An investigation of classroom practices would provide 
an additional avenue for exploration. However these were not issues within the 
remit of the study.  
 
7. 7 Concluding Remarks 
 
‘We teach our children about themselves and about their neighbours in schools and 
in the home. If the parents teach hatred and the school teaches hatred, hatred is all 
that we have. Education in Iraq isn’t just about a humanitarian need; it is about how 
Iraqi’s will move into the future, together or apart.’  
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(Taken from an interview with an Iraqi Academic based in Amman) 
 
The interaction between education and identity has been a neglected subject in the 
Iraqi disputed territories. The thesis speaks to both practitioners and researchers 
working on or in the disputed territories of Iraq to try and address this neglect.  It is in 
this respect that the thesis contributes to two fields of understanding. Firstly, and 
most significantly, the thesis presents the first scholarly exploration of the purpose 
bestowed on education by education officials in the disputed territories post-2003. It 
demonstrates the role of identity protection in education provision and its 
consequences for the wider identity-based contest, as well as the resulting opening 
of education structures to possible political manipulation by officials. In order to 
achieve this, the thesis has provided the first mapping of education structures in the 
post 2003 Iraq disputed territories. The data collection for the research includes 
previously un-collated regional assessments of educational capacity gaps for each 
ethnic community, and the provision of a classification system to identify the different 
kind of schools which have developed in the region; a typology which explains for the 
first time the complex linguistic provisions unique to schools in the disputed 
territories. Underpinning this, the thesis has demonstrated the need to examine not 
only ‘how’, but also ‘why’ education is allowed to be used for purposed outside its 
usual remit.  
 
Education in Iraq has been given the central role of protecting the identity by all of all 
of Iraq’s ethnic groups. But the disregard of non-Arab education in terms of funding 
and ministerial support has generated a climate of fear. The consequences for the 
wider inter-ethnic relations are detrimental and the system is open to manipulation 
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and political corruption. Education reconstruction in countries affected by ethnically 
defined conflicts requires early systems of evaluation for the purpose of education 
and not merely standard indicators.    Education alone cannot create violent conflict 
and the single dynamic of the threat to societal security through education is equally 
unlikely to cause the out-break of ethnic war. However, what we have discovered is 
that the education system in Kirkuk is not facilitating peaceful co-existence among all 
communities. It is laying the foundations for future disputes and dividing an already 
fractured community.  
 
Regardless of the administrative outcome of the region, all parties should be striving 
to build confidence and assure the security, both societal and human, of all 
inhabitants of the region in order to sustain peaceful co-existence. Elite-led 
discussions, which fail to consider the importance of a community’s education 
structure in maintaining its existence, can potentially draw the wider community into 
the conflict. This serves to make a peaceful resolution even harder to attain. 
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Appendix 1 : Letter  of  invi tat ion  
 
 
C o n f l i c t  i n  C i t i e s  a n d  t h e  C o n t e s t e d  S t a t e  
Everyday life and the possibilities for transformation in Belfast, Jerusalem and other divided cities 
w w w . c o n f l i c t i n c i t i e s . o r g  
 
An Examination of the Education System in the city of Kirkuk   
 
Dear potential participant, 
 
This is an invitation to participate in research being conducted by Kelsey Shanks under 
the supervision of Professor Mick Dumper from the Department of Politics at the 
University of Exeter. The research is part of a wider project entitled Conflict in Cities - 
www.conflictincities.org, which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and coordinated by Clare College, Cambridge University and assisted by 
Queens University Belfast and The University of Exeter.  
 
The study explores the relationship between education and conflict. The primary goal 
of the research is to examine the role of education in the city of Kirkuk. The project is 
seeking teachers and education professionals in the city to examine their experience 
of the school system post 2003.  The research hopes to give a voice to educators 
and aid the understanding of the problems they face.  The information gathered will 
contribute toward a pilot study for a subsequent PhD thesis and research, the 
findings of which may be published and will be available to UNICEF education 
practitioners working in Iraq.  
 
Participation in the study involves answering a small number of questions via email, 
then a subsequent round of follow up questions. The provision of some background 
demographic information will also be necessary. The questions will ask about on 
your personal experiences of education in the city and ask more general questions 
regarding the schools in your area. The questionnaire package should take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. Participation in the research is entirely 
voluntary. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to 
keep and asked to use the contact details provided to register your interest. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  
 
At this time I am interested in collecting the names and contact information of 
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potential participants and sending out questions next month. I am hoping to interview 
as many people as possible so if you know of anyone else who may wish to 
participate in this study please forward this information to them. 
 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential. Confidentiality, privacy and 
anonymity will be ensured in the collection, storage and publication of research 
material. Further details of the Conflict in Cities ethics framework are available on 
request. 
 
Thank you for your time and interest in participating in this study. 
 
Contact - Kelsey Shanks - University of Exeter 
Tel 0044 7846943384 email: kjs212@exeter.ac.uk  
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 cibarA - noitativni fo retteL :2 xidneppA
 
 
   والدول المتنازع عليها الصراع في المدن
  من المدن المقسمة اموالقدس وغيره بلفاستالتحول في الحياة اليومية وا  مكانيات 
  gro.seiticnitcilfnoc.www
 
  كدراسة للنظام التعليمي في مدينة كركو 
 
  ، رتقبينالمشاركين الم إلى
 
من قسم السياسة في جامعة  دمبرتحت إشراف البروفسور ميك  شانكس كيلسي هذه دعوة للمشاركة في بحث تجريه
والذي يتم    gro.seiticnitcilfnoc.www  : شروع أوسع عنوانه الصراع في المدنجزء من م البحث ويعتبر. أكستر
بمساعدة من  ، جامعة كامبردجبتنسيق من كلية كلير )CRSE( جتماعيةقتصادية والإمجلس البحوث الإ قبل منتمويله 
   .ترامعة كوينز في بلفاست وجامعة إكسج
 
. الهدف الأساسي من البحث هو دراسة دور التعليم في مدينة كركوكعات ويعد دراسة العلاقة بين التعليم والصراالتبحث 
في  مخبراته لتعرف والبحث عنالمدرسين والمهنيين العاملين في مجال التعليم في المدينة لب إلى الإتصال ويسعى المشروع
قائمين على شئون التعليم وان إعطاء صوت للب ان يقوم البحث أملن حيث. 0220النظام المدرسي في مرحلة ما بعد عام 
أطروحة ماجستير و  تكوين رسالة في المعلومات التي تم جمعها سهمتسوف و  .في فهم المشكلات التي يواجهونها يساعدهم 
ة اليونيسيف التابعة للأمم نظمم تها للقائمين بشئون التعليم فيتاحوا    لنتائج حيث من الممكن ان يتم نشر ادكتوراه لاحقة 
  .العراقي ف )FECINU( المتحدة 
 
 جولة لاحقة منب والمشاركةالمشاركة في الدراسة الاجابة على عدد قليل من الأسئلة عبر البريد الإلكتروني ، تتطلب 
تستفسر الاسئلة عن تفاصيل  .يةالأساس توفير بعض المعلومات الديموغرافيةكما سيكون ضروريًا أيضًا . متابعة ال الاسئلة
تتطلب . من الاسئلة العامة بشأن المدرسة التي تعمل بها مزيدال كما سنطرحالمدينة ب التعليمفي مجال  ةالشخصيتجربتكم 
 سوف تحصل. ث طوعي تماماالمشاركة في البح. قيقة لإكمالهاد 20الاستبيان ما يقرب من مجموعة الاسئلة التي تكون 
 دونة بالأسفلتصال المستخدام تفاصيل الإحيث ستقوم بإ هذه المعلومات ورقةعلى  في البحث اركةالمش تإذا ما قرر 
  .أسبابشرح  نسحاب في أي وقت دونفي الإ تتاح لك كامل الحرية قررت المشاركةما إذا أيضًا في حال . للتسجيل
 
وأنا على . ر المقبلسئلة في الشهالأ همإرسالب حيث أقوم بأى مشاركين مرتقبينتصال للإجمع أسماء ومعلومات أهتم حاليًا ب
، رجاء إرسال المشاركة في هذه الدراسةبيرغب  على صلة بأحد ممن قدإذا كنت ف .د ممكن من المعلمينعدأمل مقابلة أكبر 
  .هذه الرسالة إليهم
 
عدم ذكر و   السرية والخصوصية وستطبق مبادىء .تامةسرية في جميع المعلومات التي تم جمعها سيتم الحفاظ على 
ي لبحث طار الأخلاقللإ كثر وشرح متعمقتفاصيل أ ومن الممكن تقديم .جمع وتخزين ونشر مواد البحث عند الأسماء
 382
 
   .عند الطلب "الصراع في المدن"
 
 .  ةبالمشاركة في هذه الدراس ا  هتمامكمو  كموقتشكرا على 
  جامعة إكسيتر  -- شانكس كيلسي –تصال للإ
  00000840040022: ف الهات
  ku.ca.retexe@212sjk  بريد إلكتروني 
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Append ix 3:  Let ter  o f  Inv i ta t ion  -  Tuk ish  
 
 
Çat ışma Kent le r i  ve İh t i la f l ı  Devlet le r  
Belfast, Küdus ve diğer bölünmüş kentlerde günlük yaşam ve dönüşüm imkânları 
w w w . c o n f l i c t i n c i t i e s . o r g  
 
Kerkük Kentindeki Eğitim Sistemi Üzerine bir Araştırma 
 
Değerli potansiyel katılımcı,  
Bu mektup, Exeter Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü’nden Profesör Mick Dumper’ın 
yönetiminde çalışmasını sürdüren Kelsey Shanks’in araştırmasına katılmanız için bir 
davetiyedir. Araştırma, Britanya Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Kurulu’nun 
(Economic and Social Research Council – ESRC) maddi desteğiyle yürütülen Çatışma 
Kentleri/Conflict in Cities – www.conflictincities.org – adında bir projenin bir parçasını 
oluşturuyor. Cambridge Üniversitesi, Clare College tarafından düzenlenen projeye, 
Queens Üniversitesi-Belfast ve Exeter Üniversitesi de katkıda bulunuyor.    
 
Araştırma, eğitim ve çatışma arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın ana 
hedefi, Kerkük kentinde eğitimin rolünü incelemektir. Proje için, 2003 sonrası okul 
sistemindeki deneyimlerini paylaşacak öğretmenler ve eğitimciler aranıyor. 
Araştırma, eğitimcilerin sesine kulak vermeyi ve karşılaştıkları sorunların 
anlaşılmasına yardımcı olmayı amaçlıyor. Toplanan bilgiler, Araştırma Yüksek 
Lisansı tezinde ve daha sonra Doktora tezinde kullanılacaktır. Bu tez çalışmalarının 
bulguları, Irak’ta çalışmakta olan UNICEF eğitim görevlilerinin kullanımına 
sunulacaktır, ayrıca bulgular ileride yayımlanabilir.  
 
Çalışmaya katılanlara e-posta yöntemiyle belirli sorular gönderilecek ve bunları 
yanıtlamaları istenecek; daha sonra devam niteliğinde sorular da olacak. Ayrıca 
katılımcıların kendileri hakkında bazı temel bilgiler vermesi gerekecek. Sorular, 
kentteki kişisel öğretmenlik deneyimlerinizi paylaşmanızı ve çalıştığınız okulla ilgili 
genel bilgiler vermenizi isteyecek. Anketi tamamlamak yaklaşık 30 dakikanızı 
alacaktır. Araştırmaya katılmak tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Eğer katılmaya karar 
verirseniz, size daha ayrıntılı bilgi gönderilecek ve buradaki iletişim bilgilerini 
kullanarak araştırmacılarla iletişime geçmeniz istenecek. Katılmaya karar verirseniz, 
istediğiniz zaman bir neden göstermeksizin bilgilerinizi geri çekebilirsiniz.  
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İlk adımda amacım, potansiyel katılımcıların adlarıyla iletişim bilgilerini toplamak; 
soruları ise önümüzdeki ay göndermeyi düşünüyorum. Mümkün olduğu kadar çok 
sayıda öğretmenle görüşmek istiyorum; dolayısıyla bu araştırmaya katılmak 
isteyebilecek başka meslektaşlarınız varsa lütfen bu bilgiyi kendilerine iletiniz.  
 
Verdiğiniz tüm bilgiler titizlikle saklanacaktır. Araştırma malzemesinin toplanması, 
saklanması ve yayımlanmasında gizlilik ilkesine bağlı kalınacak, katılımcıların 
mahremiyetine saygı gösterilecek ve kimlikleri açıklanmayacaktır. İstek üzerine 
Çatışma Kentleri çalışma ilkelerine ulaşabilirsiniz.  
 
Ayırdığınız zaman ve gösterdiğiniz ilgi için teşekkür ederim.  
 
İletişim – Kelsey Shanks – Exeter Üniversitesi 
Tel 0044 784 694 33 84, e-posta: kjs212@exeter.ac.uk  
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 hsidruK – noitcudortni fo rettel :4 xidneppA
 
  بيَلَفاست و قودس و شارة دابةشبووةكانى تريانى رؤذانةو دةرةضةكانى طؤِرانى بنةِرةتى لة ذ
  g r o . s e i t i c n i t c i l f n o c . w w w
  سيستةمى ثةروةردة لة شارى كةركوك ليَكؤلَينةوةيةك دةربارةى 
 بةشداربووى بةِريَز،
ئةمة بانطهيَشتانةمةى بةشداريكردنة لة ليَكؤلَينةوةيةكةدا كة لةلايةن كيَلَسى شانكس و بة سةرثةرشتيارى ثرؤفيسؤر مايك 
ئةم ليَكؤلَينةوة بةشيَكة لة ثرؤذةيةكى فراوانتر لة ذيَر . دةمثةر لة بةشى سياسةت لة زانكؤى ئيَطزيتةر ئةنجامدةريَت
كة لةيةن ئةنجومةنى ليَكؤليَنةوةى كؤمةلاَيةتى و ، gro.seiticnitcilfnoc.wwwا د)ململانَى لة شارةكان(ناونيشانى 
هةروةها . خةرجييةكةى دابينكراوة و لةلايةن كؤليجى كليَرى زانكؤى كامبريج ريَكدةخريَت  )CRSE(ئابورييةوة 
 .فاست يارمةتيدةرن لة ثرؤذةكةدالَ زانكؤى ئيَطزيتةر و زانكؤى كوينز بيَ 
رؤلَى  نةوةية لةئامانجى سةرةكى ليَكؤلَي .ئةم خويَندنةوةية لة ثةيوةندى نيَوان ثةروةردة و ململانَى دةكؤلَيَتةوة      
بةشدارى  ثرؤذةكة دةيةويَت لةطةَل مامؤستايان و شارةزايانى بوارى ثةروةردةى شارةكة. ثةروةردة لة شارى كةركوك
ثرؤذةكة بة هيواية كة دةنطى فيَركةران . تةوةبكؤلَيَ  0220ة ثاش سالَى تاكو لة ئةزموونيان لة بوارى ثةروةدةدا ل بكاتثيَ 
كؤدةكريَنةوة لة تيَزى  ئةو زانيارانةى. شتن لةو طرفتانةى روبةِروى دةبنةوةيبطةيةنيَت و هاوكاريان بيَت لة تيَطة
دةستى ئةو  بةر ى بلاَوبكريَنةوة و بخريَنةرةنطة دؤزينةوةكانيش .ةردةطيردريَتش دكتؤرا سوديان ليَوماجستيَر و دواتري
  .دةكةن لة عيَراق كار) )FECINUكةسانةى لة بوارى ثةروةردةدا و لةطةَل يونيَسف 
يَكى ةيةك ثرسيارى كةم لة ريَطةى ئيميَلَةوة، دواتريش ضةند ثرسياررلاَمدانةوةى ذماةبةشداريكردن ثيَكديَت لة و      
ثرسيارةكان دةربارةى ئةزموونى تاكى . هةروها خستنةِرووى هةنديَك زانيارى ديمؤطرافيش ثيَويست دةبيَت. ثةيوةنديدار
 و ثرسيارى طشتى ثةيوةنديدار بة ئةو قوتابخانةى كة كارى تيَدا دةكةيت ارى كةركوكخؤتان لة بوارى وانةوتنةوةدا لة ش
. بةشداريكردن لةم ليَكؤليَنةوةدا تةواو خؤبةخشانةية. دةقيقةى ثيَدةضيَت 20ى راثرسييةكة نزيكة تةواوكردنى.دةبيَت
ئيميَل و ذمارة دا بةشدارى بكةيت ئةم ثةِرة زانياريةت ثيَدةدريَت تا لات بيَت و داواتليَدةكريَت كة ئةو  ئةطةر بِريارت
ئةطةر . ووى بةشداريكردنت تؤماربكةيتبؤ زانيارى زياتر بةكاربهيَنيت و ئارةز تةلةفونةى كة لة خوارةوة هاتووة
 .بِريارى بةشداريكردنيش بدةيت دةتوانيت هةركات بتةويَت بكشيَيتةوة بةبَى ئةوةى ثيَويست بكات هؤكارةكةى دياريبكةيت
لة ئيَستادا دةمةويَت كة ناو و زانيارى ثةيوةنديكردنى ئةو كةسانةى دةيانةويَـت بةشداربن كؤبكةمةوة و مانطى      
بةرئةوة ئةطةر كةسيَكى تر ةهيوادارم بتوانم ضاوثيَكةوتن لةطةَل زؤرترين مامؤستا بكةم ل. اتوو ثرسيارةكان بنيَرمداه
 .وةدا ئةم زانياريانةيان بؤ بنيَرةدةناسيت كة رةنطة حةزبكات بةشداربيَت لةم ليَكؤلَينة
كةسى و ناو تاكة ةكان و ذيانى يراستنى نهيَنياث. دةثاريَزريَندةكريَنةوة بة تةواوى بة نهيَنى ئةو زانيارانةى كؤ     
ى زياتر دةربارةى ئيتيكى ثرؤذةى يزانيار. مسؤطةرة لة كؤكردنةوة و هةلَطرتن و بلاَوكردنةوةى ليَكؤلَينةوةكةدا
 .دا ئامادةية ئةطةر كةسيَك بيةويَت بؤى بنيَردريَت)ململانَى لة شارةكان(
 .زووى بةشداريكردنت لةم ليَكؤلَينةوةدازؤر سوثاس بؤ كات و ئارة
 :بؤ ثةيوةنديكردن
كيَلَسى                                                                retexE fo ytisrevinU - sknahS yesleK - tcatnoC
        زانكؤى ئيَطزيتةر/شانكس
 4400                                                        ku.ca.retexe@212sjk :liame 4833496487 4400 leT
  : تةلةفون. ذ  4833496487
 ku.ca.retexe@212sjk: ئيميَل َ 
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Appendix5: Pilot questionnaire  
 
CONFLICT IN CITIES 
WWW.CONFLICTINCITIES.ORG 
 
KIRKUK EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Name of interviewer: 
Original language: 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Male or Female  
 
      Age  
 
      Do you consider yourself to be of specific ethnic origin / race? 
 
Please state  
 
 
      What is your mother tongue/ first language?  
 
 
What is you connection to the field of Education in Kirkuk?  
Job Title and description 
 
 
 
If connected to a specific school please specify. 
 
 _______________________________________  
 
 
EDUCATION QUESTIONS 
 
Instructions  
 
All questions refer to secondary education, 11-18 year olds. Although if you feel reference to 
primary education is necessary please feel free to include it. 
 
 What issues do you feel are of particularly importance to schools and education in 
Kirkuk at present?  
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 Do you regard the ethnic or linguistic segregation of secondary schools in Kirkuk to 
be deepening alienation between communities? Please explain  
 
 
 Do you think segregated education provides equal opportunities for all communities 
in Kirkuk? Please explain 
 
 
 The provision of first language PRIMARY education is a right recognised by the 
international community and an obvious desire of communities everywhere. 
However, do you feel the expansion of segregated single language SECONDARY 
schools (as opposed to multilingual schools) has been influenced by factors other than 
community request? For example, political actors or interest groups? 
 
 Do you think attempts to spread sectarianism and propaganda by actors in the city 
have influenced the popularity of segregated secondary schools with parents? Does 
fear of the future play a role in the choice? 
 
 
 Do you regard mother tongue primary education followed by multilingual secondary 
education as a viable education strategy? 
 
 
 Are you aware of any multilingual secondary schools in Kirkuk?  
 
 
 Are you aware of any initiatives to promote youth integration? Please provide some 
specific examples. 
 
 
 If you are native to Kirkuk I would be interested in your own experience with the 
school system when you were a pupil. 
 
  
 982
 
 
 
 SEITIC NI TCILFNOC
 GRO.SEITICNITCILFNOC.WWW
 
 cibarA toliP :6 xidneppA
 
 إستبيان حول التربية و التعليم في كركوك
 
 
  : التاريخ
 
  : المقابلة معه تجرى الذي الشخص اسم
 
  :المقابلة يجري الذي الشخص اسم
 
  : الأصلية اللغة
 
  : المكان
 
 
 معلومات ديموغرافية/عامة 
 
  : انثى أو ذكر
 
  : العمر
 
  معين؟) قومي( عرقي أصل ذو تكون أن نفسك تعتبر هل
 
 
 
 
  الأولى؟ لغتك/ الأم لغتك هي ما
 
 
  كركوك؟ في والتعليم التربية بحقل صلتك هي ما
 
  :الوظيفي الوصف و الوظيفي الأسم ذكر يرجى
 
 
 
  . تحديدها يرجى محددة بمدرسة صلة لديك إذا
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 أسئلة متعلقة بالتربية والتعليم 
 
  :تعليمات
 
 11 -11 من أي الثانوي، التعليم إلى الأسئلة جميع تشير
 إلى الإشارة الضروري من انه تعتقد اذا ذلك، رغم. سنة
  . إدراجه بإستطاعتك و اليك يعود الأمر الإبتدائي، التعليم
 
 
 بالنسبة خاصة أهمية ذات بأنها تشعر التي القضايا هي ما 
 الراهن؟ الوقت في كركوك في التعليم و التربية و للمدارس
  
 
 للمدارس اللغوي أو العرقي الفصل أو العزل  تعتبر هل 
 بين العزلة يعمق أن شأنه من كركوك في الثانوية
 كركوك؟ في الموجودة) الطوائف أو القوميات( المجتمعات
  :النقطة توضيح يرجى
 
 
 
 لجميع متكافئة فرص يوفر التعليم فصل أن تعتقد هل 
  :النقطة توضيح يرجى كركوك؟ في المجتمعات
 
 
 
 به معترف حق هو الأولى باللغة الابتدائي التعليم توفير 
 كل في للمجتمعات واضحة ورغبة الدولي المجتمع قبل من
 المدارس فصل في التوسع أن تعتقد هل لكن، و. مكان
 ،)اللغات متعددة مدارس من بدلا( واحدة بلغة الثانوية
 سبيل على المجتمعات؟ طلب غير أخرى عوامل إثر تأتى
  مصالح؟ جماعات أو سياسية جهات المثال،
 
 
 جهات قبل من والدعاية الطائفية نشر محاولات أن تعتقد هل 
 المدارس فصل رواج على أثرت قد المدينة في متنفذة
 المستقبل من الخوف هل الأمهات؟ و الآباء عند الثانوية
  الإختيار؟ هذا في دورا يلعب
 
 
 التعليم يليه ثم الأم بلغة الابتدائي التعليم تعتبر هل 
 للتربية للتطبيق قابلة إستراتيجية متعددة بلغات الثانوي
  التعليم؟ و
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 اللغات متعددة ثانوية مدارس أي بوجود علم على أنت هل 
  كركوك؟ في
 
 
 التي و معلمين-آباء جمعيات أي بوجود علم على أنت هل 
 حول مناقشات في بأشمله الكركوكي المجتمع بمشاركة تسمح
  فيها؟ الدراسة كيفية و المدارس
 
 
 
 بين الإندماج لتعزيز أتخذت مبادرات بأي علم على أنت هل 
  . محددة أمثلة بعض إعطاء يرجى الشباب؟
 
 أن مهتم أنا و أرجو الأصليين، كركوك مواطني من كنت إذا 
 كنت عندما المدرسي النظام مع الخاصة بتجربتك توافيني
  . طالبة أو طالب
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Appendix 7: Pilot Turkish 
 
KERKÜK EĞİTİM ANKETİ 
 
Görüşmecinin adı: 
 
Görüşmeyi yapan kişinin adı: 
 
Dil: 
 
Demografik Bilgi 
 
Cinsiyet 
 
 Yaş 
 
Kendinizi belirli bir etnik kökene/ ırka ait olarak görüyor musunuz? 
  
Lütfen belirtiniz 
 
  
 Ana diliniz nedir? 
 
 
 Kerkük’te eğitim alanıyla ilişkiniz nedir? 
 
Ýþ unvaný ve tanýmý 
 
 
Belirli bir okula bağlıysanız lütfen belirtiniz. 
 _______________________________________  
 
 
 
EĞİTİM SORULARI 
 
Talimatlar 
 
Tüm sorular 11-18 yaş arasındaki orta ögretim ögrencileriyle ilgilidir.  Bunun yanı 
sıra, soruların ilköğretime de uygun olduğunu düşünüyorsanız, bundan da söz 
edebilirsiniz. 
  
 Sizce şu an Kerkük’teki okullar ve eğitimle ilgili en önemli sorunlar hangilerdir? 
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 Sizce Kerkük’te orta eğitim okullarının etnik açıdan veya dil açısından ayrılması, 
toplumlar arasında yabancılaşmaya yol açıyor mu?  Lütfen anlatın. 
 
 
 
 Sizce okulların ayrılması Kerkük’te tüm toplumlar için fırsat eşitliği sağlamakta 
mıdır?  Lütfen anlatın. 
 
 
 
 ÝLKÖÐRETÝMÝN ana dilde verilmesi uluslararası kuruluşlarca tanınmış bir haktır ve 
çogu toplum için arzu edilen bir durumdur. Fakat, (çok dilli okullara karşin) tek dilde 
eğitim veren ORTA ögretim okullarının artması sizce toplumun talebiyle değil de, 
diğer faktörler sonucunda mı meydana gelmiştir? Örnegin siyasetçiler veya çikar 
grupları? 
 
 
 
 Sizce kentteki yetkililerin ayrımcılık ve propaganda yaymaya çalismasi, ebeveynlerin 
bu ayrılmış okulları tercih etmesine neden olmakta mıdır?  Sizce geleceğe yönelik 
endişe duyulmasının okul seçiminde rolü var mıdır? 
 
 
 
 
 Sizce ana dilde ilköğretim ve daha sonra çok dilli orta eğitimin sunulması uygun bir 
eğitim stratejisi midir? 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bildiğiniz kadarıyla Kerkük’te çok dilli orta okullar var mıdır? 
 
 
 
 Gençlerin toplumla bütünleşmesini sağlamaya yönelik bildiğiniz herhangi girişim var 
mıdır?  Lütfen örnekler verin. 
 
 
 
 Eğer kendiniz Kerküklüyseniz, sizin okul sistemindeki tecrübeleriniz hakkında biraz 
bilgi verebilir misiniz?  
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 راثرسى لةسةر ثةروةردة لة كةركوك
 :رؤذ
 :ناوى ضاوثيَكةوتن لةطةَل كراو
 :ناوى ضاوثيَكةوتن ئةنجامدةر
 :زمانى بةكارهيَنراو
 :شويَن
 طشتى/ديمؤطرافىزانيارى 
 
 /نيَر يان مى َ
 /تةمةن
 ئايا خؤت بة بةشيَك لة نةتةوةيةك يان رةطةزيَكى دياريكراو دةزانيت؟
 تكاية ليَرة بينووسة
 يةكةمت ضيية؟/زمانى دايك
 ض ثةيوةندييةكت بة بوارى ثةروةردةى كةركوكةوة هةية؟
 ناونيشانى كار و وةسفكردنى
 
 
 تى تكاية  بينووسةئةطةر سةر بة قوتابخانةيةكى تايبة
 
 ثرسياركردن لةسةر ثةروةردة
 ريَنماييةكان
هةرضةندة ئةطةر ثيَويست بة . 01-11هةموو ثرسيارةكان تايبةتن بة قؤناغى ئامادةيى، لة تةمةنى 
 .ئاماذة بة قؤناغى سةرةتايى دةكات تكاية بينووسة
ثيَت واية لة ئيَستادا ض مةسةلةطةليَك طرنطى هةية بؤ قوتابخانةكان و بوارى ثةروةردة لة  
  كةركوك؟ 
ثيَت واية جياكردنةوةى قوتابخانةكانى بة طويَرةى نةتةوة و زمان لة قوتابخانة ئامادةييةكانى  
 .كةركوك طؤشةطيرى نيَوان نةتةوةكان قولَتردةكات؟ تكاية ليَرة هؤكارةكان بنووسة
ثيَت واية خويَندن بة جيا لة نةتةوةكانى تر هةلى يةكسان بؤ هةموو نةتةوةكانى كةركوك  
 .دةِرةخسيَنيَت؟ تكاية ليَرة هؤكارةكان بنووسة
لة لايةن كؤمةلَطةى نيَو دةولَةتييةوة دانى  دا)سةرةتايي(مافى خويَندن بة زمانى دايك لة قؤناغى  
بةلاَم ئايا تؤ ثيَت واية فراوانكردنى جياكارى بؤ . ثيَدانراوة و ئارةزووى هةموو نةتةوةيةكيشة
لةبةر ) كة ثيَضةوانةى قوتابخانةى ضةندزمانيية(خويَندن بة يةك زمان بؤ قؤناغى ئامادةيى 
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وةكان؟ بؤ نموونة هؤكارى لايةنة سياسييةكان يان هؤكاريَكة كة ناطةِريَتةوة بؤ خواستى نةتة
 طروثى بةرذةوةندى؟
ثيَت واية هةولَدان بؤ بَلاوكردنةوةى تايفةطةرى و ثِروثاطةندة لة لايةن لايةنةكانى شارى  
كةركوك بؤتة هؤى ئةوةى كة دايك و باوكان قوتابخانةى ئامادةيى جياكارييان ثَى باشتربيَت؟ 
 ورى هةية لة هةلَبذاردنى جؤريَك لة قوتابخانة؟ئايا ترس لة ئاييندة دة
 
ثيَت واية خويَندن بة زمانى دايك لة قؤناغى سةرةتاييدا كة بةدوايدا قوتابخانةى ضةندزمانى لة  
 قؤناغى ئامادةييدا بيَت ستراتيجيَكة دةكريَت جيَبةجَى بكريَت؟
 
 ى بيت؟ئايا هيض قوتابخانةيةكى ئامادةيى ضةندزمانى هةية كة تؤ ئاطادار 
 
ئايا هيض كؤمةلَةيةكى مامؤستايان و دايك و باوكان هةية كة ريَطة بدات بة بةشدارى فراوانى  
 كؤمةلَطة لة طفتوطؤكردن دةربارةى كاروبارى قوتابخانةكان؟
 
ئايا وانةى ميَذوو ثرؤطرامى خويندنى  قوتابخانة جياكارييةكان تايبةت بة نةتةوةيةك  
 دةخويَنريَت؟
 
يَك لة ئاراداية بة مةبةستى ثيَكةوة ذيان لة نيَوان طةنجانى نةتةوة جياجياكاندا؟ ئايا هيض هةولَ  
 .تكاية نموونةى دياريكراو ليَرة باس بكة
 
ئةطةر خؤت بة ئةسَل خةلَكى كةركوكى ثيَم خؤشة ئةزموونى خؤت لة سيستةمى خويَندندا بزانم  
 . كاتيَك خؤت قوتابى بوويت
  
296 
 
Appendix 9: Question Prompts 
 
 
Board question prompts 
 
 
 
Technical  
 Number of schools,  
Locations  
Enrolments,  
Curriculum,  
External support. 
 
 
Capacity of schools  
What issues could be improved?  
How could they be improved? 
 
 
Integration? 
School mixing programmers? 
Collaboration between education officials? 
Collaboration between teachers from different schools? 
Language fluency and use in education? 
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Appendix  9 
 
Appendix 10:  
 
Interviews Conducted - 2010/2011 
       Location  Name Title Community Interview  
Ninewa 
 
Director of Education Arab 24/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
Director of Kurdish studies and OM Arab 24/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
S&E Committee Yazidis pro KRG 24/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
S&E Committee Yazidis pro KRG 24/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
S&E Committee Shabek 26/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
S&E Committee Yezidi Pro Kurd 24/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
S&E Committee Yezidi Anti Kurd 25/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
Headmaster - Arabic speaking Yezidi Anti Kurd 25/11/10 Mosul 
  
 
Community education representative  Turkmen 25/11/10 Mosul 
          
  
 
S&E Committee Christians 12/02/2010 
  
 
S&E Committee KRG Representative 12/02/2010 
  
 
MoE Supervisor Assyrian Education  Assyrian 
Cancelled to be interviewed by 
telephone 
  
 
MoE Supervisor Yezidi Education Yezidi 
Cancelled to be interviewed by 
telephone 
  
 
MoE Supervisor Turkmen Education Turkmen 14/10/10 
  
 
S&E Committee Christian 12/02/2010 
  
 
Director of Education Akre Kurd 30/11/2010 
  
 
Acting Mayor Akre Kurd 30/11/2010 
  
 
Mayor of Shekhan Yezidi 30/11/2010 
  
 
Director of Education Shekhan Yezidi 30/11/10 
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Mayor of Makhmour   
Mission Cancelled to be 
interviewed by telephone 
  
 
Makhmour director of education   
Mission Cancelled to be 
interviewed by telephone 
  
 
      
Kirkuk 
 
P/C Education Assyrian 29/11/10 
  
 
DoE Kurdish Studies Kurdish 30/11/10 
  
 
Director of Turkmen education Turkmen 30/11/10 
  
 
ITF Education Committee Turkmen 30/11/10 
  
 
Prof of Education Arab 28/11/10 
  
 
Teacher Trainer Turkmen 28/11/10 
  
 
ITF Education Committee Turkmen 24/11/10 
   
Kurd 08/01/11 
   
Kurd 
08/01/11 
 
   
Kurd 05./01/11 
  
 
       
Diyala 
 
Teacher Turkmen 12/01/2010 
  
 
Teacher Turkmen 12/01/2010 
  
 
NGO Arab 12/01/2010 
  
 
NGO Arab 12/01/2010 
  
 
NGO Arab 12/01/2010 
          
KRG 
 
Dogramaci Foundation Turkmen 10/12/2010 
  
 
Teacher Turkmen 13/10/2010 
  
 
Minister of Education KRG   10/11/2010 
  
 
Director of Assyrian Education KRG Assyrian 10/12/2010 
  
 
Director of Turkmen Education KRG Turkmen 10/12/2010 
  
 
KRG Assyrian education Specialist Assyrian 10/12/2010 
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Community  Number of 
Interviewee
s 
Christian  
Assyrian 
Chaldean 
 
10 
3 
Kurd 11 
Arab 10 
Yezidi  
Pro Kurd 
Pro Arab 
9 
Shabak 2 
Turkmen 13 
Total  58 
  
 
P Head Teacher Assyrian 13/10/2010 
  
 
S Head Teacher Assyrian 13/10/2010 
  
 
P Head Teacher Turkmen 10/12/2010 
  
 
S Head Teacher Turkmen 10/12/2010 
          
KRG with 
DIB  
 
Assyrian Aid Society Assyrian tel ongoing 
experience 
 
Chaldean Cultural Society Chaldean 29/11/10 
  
Kurdish Human Rights Watch Kurd 29/11/10 
  
Chaldean Cultural Society Chaldean 29/11/10 
 
        
Amman 
 
Amman based Iraqi Academic Arab 20/11/10 
  
Amman based Iraqi Academic   20/11/10 
  
Amman Xian Christian 21/10/10 tel 
  
  Arab 20/10/10 
  
Amman based Iraqi Academic Arab 21/10/10 
  
Amman based Academic  Arab 20/10/10 
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INITIAL PROPOSALS FOR QUICK IMPACT PROJECTs  
Mother-Tongue Education in the DIB’s 2012 
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Project Proposals at a Glance 
 
 
Language Curriculum Development 
 
It is essential that any QIP’s considered work toward the recommended goals outlined in the 
Education Language Rights Survey. Therefore QIP projects should serve as a foundation for 
the implementation of a bilingual programme of education and not serve to enhance the 
availability of mono-linguistic schools. Due consideration needs to be given to the findings of 
the report so that QIPs strive to enhance educational outcome, societal integration and work 
with the political realities on the ground and are not taken used to further the educational 
segregation and neglect of bilingualism.  
 
 
Resource availability 
 
Support the participatory production of literacy material in traditional languages; encourage 
educationalists to engage with parents and communities and ensure graded reading materials are 
available in mother-tongue languages to ensure literacy while building on the acknowledgement of the 
need for Bilingualism. 
 
Three stage process  
 
1. Resource development consultations A series of workshops and consultative meetings with 
community leaders and linguistic specialists ‘in order to create a suitable language curriculum for 
traditional languages. The purpose would be to create a collection of traditional poems, songs or 
stories which can be used for standardised resource creation. 
 
2. Resource creation workshops A second round of workshops for teachers and linguistic 
specialists to formulate syllabus and teacher resources.  Using the afore mentioned community- 
nominated resources to create language syllabi, structured lesson plans and teachers’ guides 
which will reduce the need for teacher planning and allow for a fast track training programme to 
qualify teachers in mother-tongue languages. 
 
3. Teacher Resource Centre Creation of an online teacher resource centre which allows access to 
teacher resources, the sharing of lesson plans and a forum for interaction between language 
community teachers. 
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Teacher Training initiatives 
 
Inadequate teacher training in mother-tongue languages and neglect for the importance of 
bilingualism mean that improved teacher training and refresher courses are necessary. A 
series of different courses can be offered to enhance the provision of languages throughout 
the region and advance the training capabilities  
 
1. Design and implementation of short course teacher training - structured curriculum 
Provide a six week training course in structured mother-tongue elective subjects. The course 
would be open to existing teachers of other subjects and, in exceptional circumstances, 
where need arises, fluent speaking community members. 
 
2. Training of mobile Bilingual language trainers  
The training of mobile teacher trainers with specialism in bilingual teaching pedagogy. This 
will allow a wider coverage of training and a cost effective way to maintain a continual 
progression in the development of pedagogy. 
 
3. Development of online training courses in Bilingualism the development of an online 
curriculum to provide existing teachers with new skills in language pedagogy. This can be 
provided through the online teacher resource centre and would require partnerships with 
schools with good online facilities or community centres with internet access.  
 
Advance the principle of Bilingualism 
 
Pilot Bilingual schools Pilot schools to be established on the true principle of 
bilingualism/multilingualism. Opportunities for the establishment of such schools can be 
found in areas where more than one language community share a school building. The 
suggestion of this report would be to investigate the possibility of using a school in Kirkuk 
for this pilot programme, for example Baghdad road. The increased international attention 
and focus on conflict resolution in the city would aid the implementation of such a 
programme. Such schools would require much greater investment in curriculum 
development, teacher training and community advocacy campaigns. 
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Administration 
 
A regional education task force should be appointed which oversees all districts with unresolved 
administration issues. The task force should help to facilitate the joint administration of educational 
affairs in the 15 districts between the KRG Ministry of Education and Baghdad Ministry of Education.  
Considerations 
 The taskforce requires active participation from both Ministries to be successful 
 Great attention should be paid to the qualifications of directorate staff in term of pedagogical 
experience and qualifications  
 Ideally, the Task Force should also have a small dedicated secretariat that can assist with the 
implementation of its mandate. In case it is requested to do so, UNAMI could provide and 
organize international technical assistance to the Task Force and its secretariat.  
 The Task Force members must exercise mutual dependency to avoid ethnically defined 
sections each serving the needs of their own communities.   
 A representative sample of communities from across the DIB’s must be present  
Remit 
 Co-ordinate and ensure Ministerial translation, printing and distribution of textbooks 
 
 Overall coordination of the different efforts to provide mother-tongue education and equality of 
representation.  
 
 Overall, systematic monitoring of the implementation of the different efforts  and ensure that 
when problems or issues arise the required measures are taken to address it;  
 
 Regulate teacher recruitment and salary  
 
 Establish and clarify relationship with external bodies or agencies. Manage and monitor 
donors. 
 
 Co-ordinate funding allocations and resource provision 
 
The Task-Force should establish functional Sub-Committees focusing on the particular issue areas to 
be covered in the subsequent recommendation of this report. Sub Committees may include  
 Curriculum Representation 
o Elective tradition language curriculum development 
o Community cultural representation within subjects 
o Bilingual education development 
 Exam boards 
 
o Exam committee to oversee the examination and certification of pupils in the region 
through both ministries  
 
 Integration 
 
o Oversee extra-curricular integration initiatives 
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Establishment of Community education Committees 
 
Establish local management structures through community education committees (CECs) to serve the 
existing directorates of education in each governorate. Such CEC would provide accountability to 
community members and parents and track, monitor and oversee the external sources providing 
support to schools in their communities, organize a regular dialogue and outreach with the different 
communities to discuss progress and problems faced within the separate school systems. These 
structures would also identify gaps and education provision issues for which no appropriate solutions 
exists and formulate and adopt proposals to address them (and, where necessary, liaise with the 
ministries of education or Baghdad Central Government e.g. for budget requirements).Another 
objective would be to provide consultation and information gathering for the regional task force. 
 
 CECs would have a consultative role as well as decision making influence. 
 
 Comprised of parents/ community leaders/ teachers/ leader of groups / students NGO leaders 
– ensure representation but maintain a representation but manageable group size 
 
 Experience of Pedagogy and Learning environments becomes essential in order to avoid the 
committee becoming a forum for political debate and co-opted for partisan politics. 
 
 The CEC members must exercise mutual dependency to avoid ethnically defined sections of 
the committee each serving the needs of their own communities.   
The Remit  
 
 Provide accountability to community member and parents 
 
 Track, monitor and oversee the external sources providing support to schools in their 
communities 
 
 Organize a regular dialogue and outreach with the different communities to discuss progress 
and problems faced within the separate school systems. 
 
 Identify gaps and education provision issues for which no appropriate solutions exists and 
formulate and adopt proposals to address them (and, where necessary, liaise with the 
ministries of education or Baghdad Central Government e.g. for budget requirements). 
 
 Provide consultation and information gathering for the regional task force. 
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Detailed Project Proposals 
 
Language curriculum development workshops 
 
Project Title Resource Development Consultation workshop  
Issue Area Elective Language Resource Provision 
Objectives  
To create an opportunity for all language communities to; 
 
Discuss, document and edit the most appropriate traditional stories/ 
songs/poetry that can be used to create linguistic teaching resources. 
 
Ensure unified spelling use 
 
Identify and discuss any difficulties in the use and teaching of the 
language  
  
Participants Community leaders, educationalists and linguists from each of the 
minority language communities. 
Duration   
 
Project 
organisation 
Community specific  workshops for Yezidid/Shabak/Assyrian/Turkmen   
 
  
 
Summary of need 
 
Access to community language education is limited by a complete lack of educational 
planning and resource provision for these subjects. Lack of structured curriculum, reading 
programmes and teaching materials have been highlighted by all communities. 
 
Activities proposed 
 Selection of participants and necessary components for workshops  
Community Leadership Community leaders/linguists  
Expertise Education and Linguistic expertise 
Collaboration/Partnership UNESCO/UNICEF 
 Selection of workshop location and venue 
 Creation of workshop programmes which reflect the specific needs of each language 
community 
 Collection and organisation of material collated in preparation of ‘resource provision 
workshop’ 
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Outcome expected 
 
Develop community consensus over the use of languages/spelling/ vocabulary in the 
curriculum and opportunity to identify any difficulties in teaching the languages and propose 
solutions. 
 
 
Project Title Resource and structured curriculum Creation Workshops 
Issue Area Elective Language Resource Provision 
Objectives  
Elective traditional language/ 
 
 To create a structured curriculum for each language 
 Use materials gathered from previous workshop to create a syllabus, 
lesson plans and teacher resources.  
 Creation of graded Literacy materials  
 
Participants Teachers and linguists from each of the minority language 
communities. 
Duration   
 
Project 
organisation 
Community specific  workshops for Yezidid/Shabak/Assyrian/Turkmen   
 
  
 
Summary of Need  
 
Consultation with community education specialists revealed a complete lack of teaching 
resources and reading materials for minority language education in the region. Some 
language communities also lack linguistically specific teacher training access and therefore 
the adequacy of the teaching has been brought into question.  
 
The creation of a structured curriculum and teaching resources would minimise the need for 
teacher planning and lesson design and allow teachers to sufficiently teach the languages with 
a fast track training provision. 
 
Activities proposed  
 
 Selection of participants and necessary components for workshops  
Community Leadership Teachers 
Expertise Education and Linguistic expertise 
Collaboration/Partnership UNESCO/UNICEF 
 Selection of workshop location and venue 
 Creation of workshop programmes which reflect the specific needs of each language 
community 
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Outcome expected 
 
 Creation of a structured syllabus  
 Creation of an accompanying teachers guide with lesson plans and teaching resources 
 Creation of graded literacy resources 
 
Project Title Teaching Resource centre   
Issue Area Improve all aspects of language teaching 
Objectives  
The creation of an online teacher resource website to provide support 
through an online forum. 
 
Linguistic teaching resources  
Venue for online training courses 
A shared space for teachers to communicate ideas and issues that they 
face 
 
Beneficiaries  All teachers in the region 
Duration  Ongoing 
  
 
 
Summary of need 
 
All communities complain of a lack of available resources. Once resources are identified and 
created in the initial workshops it would be essential to ensure distribution and access of 
these resources as well as a continued updating and refreshing of resources and ideas. These 
centres or online forums would allow teachers to share ideas and practices.  
The centres would allow for the potential expansion into providing general support to 
teachers of all subjects. 
 
Activities proposed  
 Web design  
 Identify access partners in each district – either a school or community centre with internet 
provision to be nominated as an access point in each district. 
 
Outcome expected 
 Interactive Teaching resource website  
 Nominated access locations in each district 
 Provide a forum for language teachers to exchange ideas  
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Mother Tongue Teacher training initiatives 
 
 
            Project 
Title 
Short course teacher training - structured curriculum 
Issue Area Teacher qualification for minority languages   
Objectives  
Train teachers in a structured curriculum to allow a fast tracked 
qualification in the different languages 
 
 
 
Participants Teachers from across the region 
Duration   
 
Project 
organisation 
Possible Partnership with UNESCO/UNICEF  
  
 
Summary of need 
 
Consultation revealed that there is a lack of teacher training available in mother tongue 
languages. For some communities this has resulted in either a lack of access or provision by 
teachers who have had no formal training in language teaching. The previous development of 
a structured language curriculum would allow for teachers to participate in a 6 week training 
short-course which would familiarise them with the teaching materials and language teaching 
methodology. The syllabus development and lesson plans would allow for a flexible 
approach to who is trained in mother tongue instruction. For elective subjects such as Yezidi 
or Shabek, if there is a shortage of teachers who speak the mother tongue language, members 
of the community with fluency can be considered to participate in the training.  
 
Activities proposed 
 Selection of trainer 
 Selection of location and venue 
 Creation of a training curriculum using structured syllabus  
 Selection of participants from each region  
 
Outcomes expected 
 Fast tracked teacher qualifications  
 Reduce teacher workload for mother-tongue lesson preparation 
 Open up mother-tongue teaching to community members 
 Increase availability of language elective access  
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Bilingual Teacher Training initiatives 
 
Summary of need 
 
The future implementation of bilingual programs will aim to create a variety of models for 
bilingual education and teachers in the region will require the correct knowledge and 
understanding of bilingual pedagogy. Training courses can be offered through a number 
of small projects which can reach a wide number of teachers in the region. 
 
 
Project Title Training of mobile Bilingual language trainers 
Issue Area Teacher qualification in Bilingual pedagogy 
Objectives  
Enable qualified individuals to conduct in school training in bilingual 
pedagogy 
 
Improve the understanding and importance of Bilingualism and the 
appropriateness of pedagogical approaches to bilingual language 
education 
 
Increase standard and experience of bilingualism  
 
Far reaching access of the training 
 
Participants Possibly existing Language supervisors/ new positions created  
Duration   
Project 
organisation 
Partnership with UN organisation  
Activities proposed   
 Curriculum development for the training course 
 Curriculum development for onward training 
 Location and venues chosen 
 Participant selection 
 Training of Language supervisors in Bilingual pedagogy  
 
Outcomes 
Expected  
 
 
 Increased monitoring and awareness of bilingual pedagogy 
 A cost effective way to reach a large number of schools 
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Project Title 
 
 
Development of online training courses in Bilingualism 
 
Issue Area Importance of Bilingual education  
Objectives  
 Online cost effective and easily accessible training courses for 
established teachers.  
 
Participants Existing teachers 
Duration   
Activities proposed   
 Design of curriculum and course 
 Website design (linked in with teacher resource centres? 
 Identify partner organisations and access venues 
 
  
 
Pilot Bilingual schools 
 
Project Title Pilot schools  
Issue Area Importance of Bilingual education  
Objectives  
Pilot schools to be established on the true principle of 
bilingualism/multilingualism. Opportunities for the establishment of 
such schools can be found in areas where more than one language 
community share a school building. The suggestion of this report would 
be to investigate the possibility of using a school in Kirkuk for this pilot 
programme, for example Baghdad road. The increased international 
attention and focus on conflict resolution in the city would aid the 
implementation of such a programme. Such schools would require 
much greater investment in curriculum development, teacher training 
and community advocacy campaigns. 
 
Duration  Ongoing  
Activities proposed   
 Design of bilingual curriculum to be taught 
 Identify partner organisations and possible venues 
 Community advocacy campaign 
 Teacher training  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administration 
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Project Title 
 
Establishment of Community education Committees (CEC) 
 
Issue Area Management  
Objectives  
Establish local management structures (CECs) to serve the existing 
directorates of education in each governorate. 
Considerations  
 
 CECs would have a consultative role as well as decision making 
influence. 
 
 Comprised of parents/ community leaders/ teachers/ leader of groups / 
students NGO leaders – ensure representation but maintain a 
representation but manageable group size 
 
 Provide accountability to community member and parents 
 
 Track, monitor and oversee the external sources providing support to 
schools in their communities 
 
 Organize a regular dialogue and outreach with the different 
communities to discuss progress and problems faced within the 
separate school systems. 
 
 Identify gaps and education provision issues for which no appropriate 
solutions exists and formulate and adopt proposals to address them 
(and, where necessary, liaise with the ministries of education or 
Baghdad Central Government e.g. for budget requirements). 
 
 Provide consultation and information gathering for the regional task 
force. 
 
Activities Proposed 
 
Aid the establishment of CEC’s through consultation and remit 
design  
 
Duration  Ongoing 
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Appendix: 12 
 
 
  
Thesis Title: Education and Ethno-politics: The Role of Education in the Disputed 
Territories of Iraq. (Working title) 
 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
The oil-rich northern districts of Iraq were long considered a reflection of the country with a 
diversity of ethnic and religious groups; Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Assyrians, Yezidi, Shabak 
and Chaldeans, living together and portraying Iraq’s demographic makeup. However, the 
Ba’ath party’s brutal policy of Arabisation in the twentieth century created a false 
demographic and instigated the escalation of identity politics. Consequently, the region is 
currently highly contested with the disputed territories, or disputed internal boundaries 
(DIB’s), consisting of 15 districts stretching across four northern governorates and curving 
from the Syrian to Iranian borders.  
 
 
The city of Kirkuk lies at the centre of the dispute due to its symbolic importance to both 
Kurds and Turkmen and strategic significance to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). The official contest over the city’s administration has resulted in a tug-
of- war between Baghdad and Erbil that has frequently stalled the Iraqi political system. 
Subsequently, across the region, minority groups have been pulled into a clash over 
demographic composition as each disputed districts faces ethnically defined claims and an 
administrative solution for Kirkuk remains evasive.  
 
 
 
Conflict in Cities and the 
Contested State 
 
Project Report – June 2012 
 
Kelsey Shanks, PhD 
candidate 
 
Department of Politics 
– University of 
Exeter 
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As the political impasse continues, ministries from both the KRG and Baghdad maintain 
varying degrees of administrative influence across the territories. These overlapping 
jurisdictions have created a complex system of service delivery based on ethnic identity. As 
the two linguistically distinct centres of governance vie for control, inter-ethnic communal 
tensions are rising and questions of identity increasingly overshadow day to day life. The 
existing literature and research on the region focuses heavily on the governance outcomes 
and possible administrative solutions. Little has been written about the impact of heightened 
identity politics on the everyday lives of citizens. Regardless of the final administrative 
outcome, the multi-ethnic population of the region require services and systems of 
coexistence. It is within this context that the thesis examines the development of education 
systems across the region post 2003. In the fragile environment of the DIB’s, the way in 
which the education system manages diversity is crucial. Schools hold great influence over 
the integration and segregation of ethnic communities. Yet there is a complete absence of 
scholarly analysis in terms of not only the emergent education system post 2003, but also its 
role within the wider identity based contest. 
 
 
Objectives 
 
 
It was the purpose of the thesis therefore to conduct the first mapping exercise of education in 
the region and to determine the factors influencing the development of education structures. 
The thesis unpacks the central research question of ‘How have ethno-politics influenced the 
education in the disputed territories post 2003?’ The research sought to examine the purpose 
of education in the region, exploring the significance of cultural reproduction and 
investigating the link between demands for ethnically specific education and the wider 
political contestation over the territory. In this respect two fields of influence were important. 
Firstly, the ethnic basis to territorial claims, which has amplified the discourse over linguistic 
presence, cultural representation and minority rights; and secondly, the insecure environment, 
in which sectarian based attacks are frequent and debates over territorial representation have 
been elevated to the height of ethnic survival issues. Given these fields of influence two 
important sub research questions arose; to what extent has ethnically specific education 
become a society security issue? And what is the relationship between education and the 
wider conflict? 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
The thesis drew on a variety of primary and secondary resources in its investigation. Policy 
documents, media reports, UN and NGO education assessments and the collection of nearly 
50 interviews with education officials and community representatives across the territories. 
Data was collected over the course of four separate research trips to Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan and 
Jordan between 2010 and 2011. 
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The Main Empirical Findings 
 
 
 
From an educational perspective, the importance of Mother-Tongue learning stems from an 
acknowledgement of better learning outcomes due to better comprehension. However, the 
situation in the disputed territories is more complicated and a number of contradictions must 
be taken into account. The intricate nature of Iraq’s cultural diversity and political history has 
led to a multifarious network of both political and linguistic representation within each ethnic 
community. Due to the legacy of territorial dispute and devastating effects of Arabization, not 
all members of Iraq’s ethnic groups have an active linguistic basis for identity identification. 
Ethnic communities have been divided by two linguistic authorities and have adapted in order 
to survive, resulting in a varied mix of languages learned from birth within each ethnicity.  
 
In this sense, for some ethnic groups, the use of the term ‘mother-tongue’ is called into 
question and can be seen to take on a new meaning. ‘Mother-tongue’ comes to represent a 
language that is traditionally spoken by their ethnic group and not necessarily one in which a 
person of that group has fluency. The emergent school structure is therefore complex, with a 
plurality of institutional structures and uses of the term ‘mother- tongue’. The influence of 
identity protection has resulted in four models of school to meet the mixed requirements of 
each community; Mother-Tongue, including Turkmen, Assyrian and Kurdish schools, 
Dominant Language submersion schools, Dominant language schools with traditional 
language/religious instruction provision or Dominant language schools with mother-tongue 
year groups and classes within them – teaching a translated curriculum. 
 
 
 
Identity and Education Reform- 
 
With the particular experience of 
genocide and ethnic insecurity in the 
region, education has become an 
obvious vehicle for the reaffirmation 
of cultural identity. Growing ethnic 
segregation within the education 
system provides the perfect means by 
which to reinforce group identity 
markers and strengthen societal 
security though linguistically, 
historically and religiously specific 
education. In this sense, the language 
of instruction has become particularly 
important and calls for mother tongue 
education can be heard from all 
communities. 
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Education and Societal security –  The pursuit of ethnically specific education can be viewed 
in terms of two benefits; the pedagogical advantages of actual mother tongue education and the 
protection of societal security. The investigation found the latter to be of greater significance in 
the disputed territories. Access to ethnically specific education is framed in terms of ensuring 
access to the means of transmitting cultural heritage and this pursuit takes priority over 
pedagogical good practice or acknowledgement of international best practice standards. In this 
sense it is possible to identify children entering ‘mother tongue’ instruction schools because of 
ethnic affiliation and not because they have fluency in the language. This results in a form of 
submersion education which has negative educational outcomes for the pupil. Ensuring the 
transfer of tradition to the next generation and the protection of societal security has taken 
precedence over good practice. The ambiguity of future governance outcomes has created a 
need for representation at all costs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
                                                       
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threats to Societal Security and 
Securitising Moves - Any challenges to 
securing societal protection through 
education have therefore contributed to 
elevating the education narrative from 
one of cultural preservation to 
one of ethnic survival. Perceived 
deliberate threats include; 
 
- Insufficient ministerial 
representation for minority 
languages. (Subsumed under 
Kurdish studies) 
 
- Official channels blocking 
requests for resource allocation 
and funding. 
 
- Prevention of teacher transfers from 
dominant language schools 
 
- No text book translation.
 
- No minority specific language text 
books from GoI. 
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Kirkuk, Education and Societal 
Security - In Kirkuk an additional 
aim can be recognised. In terms of 
the three competing ethnicities, Kurd, 
Arab and Turkmen, linguistic 
representation through schooling can 
be seen to aid credence to their claims 
over demographic majority and 
historical ownership of the city. A 
more political dynamic emerges, 
without substantial representation in 
the region each groups fears it will 
lose control over the territory. The 
fight for Kirkuk is a numbers game 
which demands representation on the 
ground due to the omnipresent 
anticipation of article 140. A battle 
for linguistic supremacy can be seen 
to be fought in order to demonstrate 
 
this. As such, protecting mother tongue education access can be seen to be enforcing their claims 
to administrative control and therefore safeguarding their future societal security in the city. 
 
Securitisation of Education- The lack of 
funding and threat perception has led 
education actors representing their 
communities to advance from securitising 
narratives toward taking direct emergency 
action. Despite acting within the state 
education system, community groups have 
sought private ethnically affiliated donors 
to support the schools and allowed outside 
influences to enter the state education 
system. This external influence has resulted 
in numerous negative outcomes for the 
traditional pursuit of education, both 
through intentional manipulations by actors 
using education for self-serving purposes 
and unintentional administrative 
complications caused by the mixed 
involvement of conflicting jurisdictions. 
Where language is so closely tied to ideas 
of identity, education can be manipulated 
by identity politics and used to serve the 
interests of political elites and nationalist 
extremists. 
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The securitisation of ethnically specific education has opened the door for this possibility. 
Minority communities in some regions perceive the opening of Kurdish language schools as a 
predatory act by the KRG, suggesting that the KRG education programme strives to 
‘eliminate other cultures and languages’ and achieve the illusion of linguistic dominance 
on the ground. Equally such a linguistic battle for regional representation is seen to affect 
political will in terms of the opening and support of language schools in more 
demographically mixed areas. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conflict and post conflict environments, education is too often measured and assessed by 
means of desk counts and gender enrolment. In divided and contested societies, education 
holds a powerful influence over ethnic interaction and the peaceful resolution to conflict. It is 
the recommendation of this research that monitoring systems to detect conflict actors within 
the education system be further developed. Therefore scholars must work toward bridging the 
gap between academic understanding and real world practice.  
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